SWĀMI PRAJÑĀNĀNANDA

PHILOSOPHY OF PROGRESS AND PERFECTION

The book deals with different problems of Change and unfolds the mystery of the Changelessness. Change is the nature of the world, nay, it constitutes the stuff of the world-appearance. Now the question is whether Change persists eternally with its manifold appearance and shifting and deceiving nature. The author discusses various problems of Change in a logical and scientific way and comes to the conclusion that as Change has a beginning, it must have an end. The prime aim and object of all the living organisms are to reach the ultimate end of their purposive and meaningful marching, and that end is the highest realization of the innermost self or Atman, which animates them and inspires them in their way of strivings.

Price : Rupees Eight

विजयिका
२७ अगस्त '६२, सोमवार

PHILOSOPHY OF PROGRESS AND PERFECTION

SWĀMI PRAJÑĀNĀNANDA

PHILOSOPHY OF PROGRESS AND PERFECTION

RAMAKRISHNA VEDANTA ASHRAMA
DARJEELING : : INDIA

First Published February, 1958

Published by Swāmi Bhabeśānanda, Rāmakrisṇa Vedānta Āśrama, Darjeeling and printed by J. C. Sarkhel at Calcutta Oriental Press Private Ltd., 9, Panchanan Ghose Lane, Calcutta-9.

TO

DR. SARVEPALLI RĀDHĀKRIṢṆAN

THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF INDIA

WITH GREAT VENERATION

यदिदं किञ्च जगत् सर्वं प्राण एजति निःसृतम् ।
महद्भयं वज्रमुद्यतं य एतद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति ॥

PREFACE

The theory of progress has been dealt with by various scholars of both the East and the West, and all the savants have more or less come to the conclusion that the word '*progress*' connotes the idea of movement in continuity, either in space or in time, and it marches upward to some known or unknown destination, with some object in view. The theory of progress is, therefore, not an accident but a necessity bearing a motive behind it. It covers the whole range of civilization in its movement through time ; it is applied in all the manifestations of human activity—social instutions, law, trade, the industrial, and the fine arts, religion, philosophy, science, literature, etc. Hegel conceives the human history as the progressive realization of spirit and of freedom. He interprets reality, *qua* temporal, as the self-manifestation, in dialectical progression, of the Absolute. After him, von Hartmann, Julian Huxley and other savants of the West have fully dealt with this doctrine and reached different conclusions. Hebert Spencer assumes a final cause in the way of continual upward movement of the human being and human society. In his earlier philosophy

he adopted the conception of a divine Providence, though in his later philosophy it was superseded by the conception of the Unknowable, existing behind all phenomena. Regarding progress as the successive steps of the process he cherishes the view: 'Always towards perfection is the mighty movements—towards a complete development and a more unmixed good, subordinating in its universality all petty irregularities and fallings back, as the curvature of the earth subordinates mountains and valleys. Even in evils the student learns to recognise only a struggling beneficence. But above all he is struck with the inherent sufficingness of things'. This statement of Spencer seems like an echo of Darwin, who offers his conclusion on the theory of evolution in his celebrated thesis on the *Origin of Species*: 'And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental envoirnments will tend to progress towards perfection'. J. B. Bury has criticized the synthetic views of both Spencer and Darwin and says that the doctrine of Darwin and specially that of Spencer rest on an entirely different basis from the doctrine of the eighteenth century. Spencer says that the idea of human progress is a theory which involves a synthesis of the past and a prophecy of the future. 'It is based on an interpretation of history

which regards men as slowly advancing—*pedetemtim progredientes*—in a definite and desirable derection, and infers that this progress will continue indefinitely'.

On this idea of progress offered by Bury, Harold Temperley remarks, while editing Bury's *Selected Essays* that Bury speaks indeed of the countless stairs, by the help of which man must ascend in the future, and takes for granted that the movement of man is always upward. But his belief in the future is rather a hope than a conviction, as Bury himself calls the desirable destination of the continual movement as 'the illusion of finality', and that proves that the living beings and the world of phenomena move upword, but never reach the termination of final goal.

Lloyd Morgan puts forward his thesis on the Creative Evolution, which explains that a conception of a reality creates itself gradually in its way of evolution. Morgan says; 'Mind as a correlate does not emerge, but there are emergent levels of such mind. * * It is an emergent quality of the correlated psychical order at an approximately definable stage of evolutionary advance'. Prof. Urban is of opinion that it is a crucial point that mind, as a correlate, does not, then, emerge. But we

must insist that emergent levels of a non-emergent mind cannot be thought without the concept of potentiality. 'The idea of evolution', says he, 'as not a mere name for, nor description of, the sequence of phenomena, as not merely the method of creation, but as the creative thing itself, cannot be made intelligible with involving the questions of intelligible substance and intelligible causation already considered'.

John Dewy considers the aspect of philosophy or speculative thought as an evolving history, which collects its ingredients, both material and mental, to enrich the human society and its order. Charles A. Beard, while commenting on Dewy, says: 'With Dewy, philosophy is not a world of abstractions apart from the world of fact evolving under the impulses of science and economic interest. On the contrary, he is always drawing the worlds of thought and fact into living relations, seeking to make philosophy an instrument of aid in bringing about a more ideal social order. He does not look upon the world as completed; nor does he expect to find perfection in an overnight adoption of some rigid Utopia. In his view the continuous improvement of social relations is possible, especially with the help of natural science, and the business

of philosophy is to supply interpretation and guidance'.

The original meaning of the term '*progress*' connotes the idea of movement, change, becoming, struggle, adaptation, reconstruction, evolution, new types of life, and the like. E. L. Schaub says that the terms *progress*, *progressism* and *progressist* 'have appered in an all but bewildering variety of connotations which need to be carefully distinguished. In all of their meanings they have indeed covered more than the bare fact of meaningless flux; or the fact of change; or that even of a succession of changes that exhibit some form, no matter what, of continuity, such as that of change which registers a quantitative increase, whether in an objective regard * * or in a psychological reference * *. Included in all of the meanings which we have found attached to the term 'progress' has been the idea of continuity in terms of approach to some goal—yet not every goal * * but only a goal regarded as desirable'. Bernard Bosanquet attaches the lebel of *progressism* to a variety of temporalistic theories in his late work: *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*. However, the idea of progress may be compared to an act of unfolding, as the opening of an unrolled scroll or the expansion

of a bud into full-blown flower. 'The end of the development', says Prof. Urban, 'is, then, conceived as revealing what the beginning contained, as the oak reveals the true nature of the acron'.

Dr. Urquhart discusses the theory of progress in his lecture on *The Idea of Progress in Eastern and Western Thought* and also in his articles on (a) *The Inner Meaning of Human History*, and (b) *The Influence of Evolution on Christian Thought*. He distinguishes the idea of *progress* from that of *process*, and he says that 'the former is conceived as a task or vocation of humanity, whereas the latter is merely an order inherent in the being of the world'. The *process* can be interpreted adequately within the from of time i.e. as temporal unit, whereas the *progress* requires two essential factors to be fully understood and they are: (a) the relation to change, and (b) the relation to the permanent. The term '*evolution*' sometimes differs from that of '*progress*' to some extent, as, he says, 'evolution guarantees nothing but process, whereas for real progress we must have production of that which human beings regard as valuable, the realization of purpose or end'. In Smuts' view the evolution as creative conveys the idea of progressive advancement, which means the progress (vide *Holism and Evolution*). But the true

basis of progress, states Dr. Urquhart. 'lies and must lie in the reciprocity of human and divine. The ideal must be in relation to the real, the infinite to the finite'. So it is found that the idea or doctrine of progress involves within itself the limitation of *relation* between two things, qualities or actions, of the same or different orders. Again the progress in action can be said to be the ever more perfect unfolding of that which already exists and it can be taken as the urge to the completion or perfection. It is always, in truth, 'the attempt to realise within time something that is essentially above time, and that belongs to a different world from the world of mere change. * * Man has a double consciousness, the consciousness of being a creative at once of time and of eternity. Man never is blest but always hopes to be, and whatever he attains to he strives to go beyond. It is through this conception that he interprets the idea of progress'.

Dr. Urquhart further suggests that Śaṅkara's non-dualistic doctrine of the two orders of knowledge, empirical and transcendental also interprets the idea of progress. Between the two orders of knowledge, the empirical one is lower because of its porous and transient character, and the transcendental one is higher, being permanent and uncontradicted all the

time. So the non-dualistic Vedānta constantly appeals to the religious and spiritual thinkers to rise above the inadequacies of the lower order to attain their ultimate end.

A short sketch of the history of the evolution of the idea of progress has been depicted in the beginning of this book. But yet let me take the opportunity of quoting the beautiful statement of J. B. Bury, regarding the evolution of the idea of progress from the chapter on 'Progress in the Light of Evolution' in his book *The Idea of Progress*. He says:[1] 'In the sixties of the nineteenth century the idea of Progress entered upon the third period of its history. During the *first* period, up to the French Revolution, it had been treated rather casually; it was taken for granted and received no searching examination either from philosophers or from historians. In the *second* period its immense significance was apprehended, and a search began for a general law which would define and establish it. The study of sociology was founded, and at the same time the impressive results of science, applied to the conveniences of life, advertised the idea. It harmonised with the notion of *development* which had become current both in natural science and in metaphysics. Socialists

and other political reformers appealed to it as a gospel.

'By 1850 it was a familiar idea in Europe, but was not yet universally accepted as obviously true. The notion of social Progress had been growing in the atmosphere of the notion of biological development, but this development still seemed a highly precarious speculation. The fixity of species and the creation of man, defended by powerful interests and prejudices, were attacked but were not shaken. The hypothesis of organic evolution was much in the same position as the Copernican hypothesis in the sixteenth century. Then in 1859 Darwin intervened, like Galilio. The appearance of the *Origin of Species* changed the situation by disproving definitely the dogma of the fixity of species and assigning real causes for *transformism*. What might be set aside before as a brilliant guess was elevated to the rank of a scientific hypothesis, and the following twenty years were enlivened by the struggle around the evolution of life, against prejudices chiefly theological, resulting in the victory of the theory.

'The *Origin of Species* led to the *third* stage of of the fortunes of the idea of Progress. We saw how the heliocentric astronomy, by dethroning man from his privileged position in the universe of

space and throwing him back on his own efforts, had helped that idea to complete with the idea of a busy Providence'.

F. S. Marvin, while discusssing on 'Human Progress', in one of the chapters of Edwyn Bevan's book : *Hellenism and Christinity*, says that history 'has unfolded to our eyes an age-long struggle between the forces of Good and Evil in the world. Often the evil side has won a temporary triumph, but in the end the Good will prevail. Here we have a moral idea, an argument from history, and, in part at least, the germ of the idea of Progress' (vide *The Hibbert Journal*, vol. XX ,1921-22). It is nodoubt an instance of the religious or ethical idea of of the theory of progress, which is connected with history or historical process. Bevan points out that the ancient Greeks never contemplated an indefinite progress. The ancient writers, such, for instance, as Homer or Hesiod, believed rather in a downward movement. Plato also believed in the theory of retrogression of the human soul into the animal bodies. The Stoic thinkers believed in a cyclic process by which the course of human history repeated itself, and after long ages a Golden era began again. Vergil gives us this in his famous Eclogue. These are the instances of the doctrine

of progress which is, in other words, known as the historical process.

Hegel interprets the theory of progress in terms of history or historical process. His book : *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* was published in 1837 more than fifty years after Herder's *Ideas for a Philosophical History of Mankind* (1787). Before Hegel, Kant's thesis on *On Idea of a Universal History for a Cosmoplitan Point of View* (1784) created a rousing sensation in the field of historical rational process. Herder recognizes : 'The working of natural laws in the manifold as history and holds that the flowering of a civilization is as natural as that of a rose'. He lays stress on the rôle of geographical and climatic factors in human evolution and the peculiarities of races. The purpose of the historical process, according to him, is 'the attainment of humanity, a state in which a man fulfils himself by reaching the highest stature he is capable of'. Hegel's view of history stands on the foundation of philosophical system. According to him, the concepts of pure reason and logical concepts form 'a self-generating series—thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, the synthesis becoming in turn a new series, and so on'. Hegel formulates the doctrine of moving force in historical change in

his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*. After him and Herder, Kārl Mārx works on the Hegelian dialectic of historical process, but 'reverses his fundamental position and says that Matter precedes Spirit'. Spengler's *Decline of the West* treats the history as 'a series of completed cycles, not a succession of stages in a continuous development'. Arnold Toynbee's *Study of History* envisages the history on historical process 'as a record of civilizations rather than of centuries and continents'. Dr. Nilkānta Śāstrī is of opinion that Spengler is a quasi-historical determinist, 'who holds that all civilizations are fated to die, and that the future will be as the past'. Toynbee differs from Spengler to some extent, because Toynbee holds that 'modern man, unlike his ancestors, has an accumulated store of memories and knowledge which open to him a fair chance of averting the doom'. Toynbee also differs from Kārl Mārx, as he 'rejects the simplified view of history as a struggle for economic control and lays stress on the significance of spiritual factors'. Dr. Śāstrī says that Toynbee's outlook is more biological than mechanical.

Now, what do we mean by the word 'history'? Dr. N. K. Śastri says that the word 'history' can be used in two senses: (1) the sum total of doings

and experiences of man and his changing society and (2) the narrative accounts of such actions by a modern historian. History may be compared to a flux that flows always through different strata of different ages with a constructive motive behind it. Prof. Urban says that the historical process is conceived as 'a combination of progression and retrogression, the concept of historical cycles, alternating periods of development and decay'. The life-blood of history as a humanistic science 'has been the postulation of progress. This postulate has included two elements—the one the element of direction towards an end, the other the identification of this end with increase of value. * * Our task is, accordingly, twofold. In the first place, to examine the law of Entrophy itself—its validity and its implications; and secondly, to examine the relation of the ultimate laws of value, on which finality and progress rest, with this cosmic law'.

Now, what is the cosmic law ? The law constitutes its stuff in its dual phases and they are the 'law of value' and the 'law of existence'. We shall have to find out a fundamental contradiction, apparent or real, between these two phases of law. But inspite of their contradictory nature, they can be recognized as the elements of history and social

life, which are implicitly or explicity taken as the expression or realization of some meaning that signifies an end or a desirable good. ✓

J. B. Bury, while discussing the historical idea of the progress in his *Darwinism and History* says : 'The *historcial* conception of nature, which has produced the history of the solar system, the story of the earth, the geneologies of telluric organisms, and has revolutionised natural science, belongs to the same order of thought as the conception of human history as continuous, genetic, causal process—a conception which has revolutionised historical research and its scientific * * . The genetic principle, progressive development, general laws, the significance of time, the conception of society as an organic aggregate, the metaphysical theory of history as the self-evolution of spirit—all these ideas show that historical inquiry had been advancing independently on somewhat parallel lines to the sciences of nature.'

As regards the historical conception of progress or the linear conception of historical process, Prof. Sorokin says in his *Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis* that the central content of the historical process of mankind and human society was conceived as an unfolding and ever fuller realization of the 'trend of progress and evolution', of steady 'historical tendencies'

and the 'law of sociocultural development'. 'In biology', says he 'the faith expressed itself in an emergence and general acceptance of the 'law of evolution', almost unanimously interpreted in the sense of a linear trend (in its unilinear, spiral, branching, oscillating variations) of a progressively growing differentiation and integration; of a passage from 'the simple to the complex'; from 'the lower to the higher;' from 'the less perfect to the complex'; from 'the amoeba to man;' from 'reflexes and instincts to intelligence and reason,' from the solitary individual to the family, the tribe, the modern state; and, inspite of narrow-minded and reactionary politicians, we or our descendants will yet see the whole human race brought together into a Society of Nations a Federation of the World. Prof. Sorokin further states that the conceptions of philosspphy, social philosophy and philosophy of history of the eighteenth and nineteeth centuries are also found dominant in Herder, Fichte, Kant, and Hegel and others. For Fichte the whole of human history is sequence of five stages: 'an ever fuller realization of freedom, truth, justice and beauty'. It has been mentioned that Hegel's central trend of the historical process 'consists in a progressive growth of freedom, beginning with freedom for none at the dawn of human history,

passing through the stages of freedom for one, then freedom for some, and ending with the stage of freedom for all'. Prof. Sorokin is of opinion that archaeology and history likewise are dominated by the same linear conceptions of historical change. 'The archaeological and historical *law of technological evolution* with its standardized Palaeolithic, Neolithic, copper, bronze, iron, and machine ages is one of these linear laws serving as a fundamental referential and ordering principle. The division of history into Ancient, Medieval, and Modern is another linear conception'.

Albert Schweitzer maintains almost similar view in his *The Philosophy of Civilization*. He says: 'Civilization originates when men become inspired by a strong and clear determination to attain progress, and concentrate themselves, as a result of this determination, to the service of life and of the world'. Civilization is two-fold in its nature: 'it realizes itself in the supremacy of reason, first, over the forces of nature, and, secondly, over the dispositions of men'. These two aspects of civilization are known as two kinds of progress, which can be called spiritual 'in the sense that they both rest upon a spiritual activity in man, yet we may call the supremacy over natural forces material progress because in

it material objects are mastered and turned to man's use'. In truth, both individual and the mass, says Schweitzer, let their willing be determined by the material and spiritual good of the whole and the individual that compose it; that is to say, their actions are ethical. 'Ethical progress is, then, that which is truly of the essence of civilization, and has only one significance; material progress is that which is much less essential and may have a good or bad effect on the development of civilization'. Further he says: 'All attempts at civilization hitherto have been a matter of processes in which the forces of progress were at work in almost every department of life. Great achievements in art, architecture, administration, economics, industry, commerce, and colonization succeeded each other with a spiritual impetus which produced a higher conception of the universe'.

Auguste Comte's theory of Progress or theory of Order is applicable to all kinds of social and human activities. Or it can be said that his doctrine of progress is devoted to the service of Humanity, which unfolds inward reality and brings inexpressible sweetness. He says: 'The very fact that Progress, however viewed, is nothing but the development of Order, shows that Order cannot be fully manifested

without Progress'. Regarding the stages of progress, he says that there are three successive states of morality in relation to the three principal stages of movement of human life and they are: the personal, the domestic and the social. 'The succession,' says he, 'represents the gradual training of the sympathetic principle; it is drawn out step by step by a series of affections which, as it diminishes in intensity, increases in dignity. This series forms our best resource in attempting as far as possible to reach the moral state; subordination of self-love to social feeling. These are the two extremes in the scale of human affections; but between them there is an intermediate degree, namely, domestic attachment, and it is on this that the solution of the great moral problem depends, The love of his family leads Man out of his original state of Self-love and enables him to attain finally a sufficient measure of Social love'.

Comte believes that 'all the characteristics of Positivism are summed up in its motto, *Order and Progress*, a motto which has a philosophical as well as political bearing, * * . With regard to Progress, the assertion will hardly be disputed, no definition of it but the Positive ever having yet been given. In case of Order, it is less apparent; * * '. To define Progress, he says that it is in its true essence identi-

cal with Order, and may be looked upon as Order made manifest. In Sociology 'the correlation assumes this form: Order is the condition of all Progress; Progress is always the object of Order. Or, to penetrate the question still more deeply, Progress may be regarded simply as the development of Order; for the Order of nature necessarily contains within itself the germ of all possible progress. The rational view of human affairs is to look on all their changes, not as new Creations, but as new Evolutions. And we find this principle fully borne out in history. Every social innovation has its roots in the past; and the rudest phases of savage life show the primitive trace of all subsequent improvement'.

Progress is, according to Comte, divided into four successive aspects: material, physical, intellectual and moral. Each of these might again be divided into several intermediate phases. Whatever may be the number of the stages, it will be the duty of man to devote himself in the worship of Humanity, which brings unto him the bliss of pure self-sacrifice and sweetness of life. Here we find that though Comte believes in the existence and importance of the creative process, though he recognizes the utility of 'the camp of construction and progress', yet he believes in a fundamental Law amidst

all the series of progress, which leads to the finality of continual progression (Vide *General View of Positivism.*)

The idea of progress contains also an ethical element, which again develops a philosophical and consequently a spiritual element in its way of advancement. A man is known as a rational being because of his faculty of reasoning or judgement. He does everything not as a automaton, but as a conscious force centre. He thinks and designs a plan before he does anything in an actual form. He first recognizes his mind or *psyche* and then the external world. He draws his inspiration and urge of action from the mind and invariably adopts the principle of speculative thinking i.e. philosophy, which again leads him to spirituality or to the kingdom of spirit. In other words, the idea of progress contains within it the elements of matter, mind and spirit, and the man advances from the matter to the mind, and from the mind to the spirit. Even in the spiritual plane we notice the gradual grades of progress or evolution, and an aspiring man first starts his journey from dualism (*dvaita*) to qualified non-dualism (*viśiṣṭādvaita*) and from qualified non-dualism he reaches to non-dualism or *advaita*, where he finds the complete fruition of his progress or spiritual *sādhanā*.

The creative activity, according to Pañcharātra and other Saṁhitās, which is illustrated in the chain of emanation, has also been discussed in this book. The Pañcharātra, says Dr. M. N. Sircar, 'gives us a chain of emanations, each eamanation, excepting the initial source, originates from an anterior emanation. The first three emanates, together with Vāsudeva, are called *vyūhas*, i. e. the shaving-asunder of the six *guṇas* into three pairs. Each *vyūha* is Viṣṇu himself with six *guṇas*, of which two only in each case, become manifest. * * Each *vyūha* has two activities, a creative and a moral one, corresponding to the two *guṇas*', The chain of evolution of the divine elements has been illustrated thus: 'Pradyumna transfers both the *kūtastha puruṣa* and *māyā* for further development to Aniruddha. And from Aniruddha dircetly comes out *śakti*, from *śakti*, *niyati*, from *niyati*, *kāla*, from *kāla*, the *sattva*, from the *sattva*, the *rajas*, from the *rajas*, the *tamas*'. But ultimately the elements of *śakti*, *niyati*, *kāla*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, etc. resolve themselves into one fundamental principle, and the breaking of the cosmic quiescence and the unstable equilibrium of Prakriti are, in truth, temporary and not permanent.

'The word *creative*', says Dr. Sircar, 'requires an explanation. Creativeness ordinarily suggests an

effort and production or a productive effort. But it does not necessarily convey the idea of a thing originating out a blank negation'. In the expression of infinite life 'the creativeness is evident in the increasing stress and effort of revealing itself in infinite ways'. In the *Upaniṣad* we find the picture of creation, which gives us 'an impression that the becoming is the expression of the divine. The cosmos is a movement of the spirite in itself. It is the cyclic movement of the divine consciousness in in space and time'. Dr. Sircar further says :] 'It is an expression of Bliss. It is not creation, but an expression, or more properly, an emanation, which is periodical and has lapses in time, in cosmic *pralaya*. The world comes out in the form of process of self-alienation of Brahman'. The *Upaniṣad* states that the creative order is conceived as issuing out of Brahman is association with the nescience or *māyā* and the dynamic spontaneous effort has therefore a place in our conception of the Absolute. The latter Vedāntic thought, while describing the order of cosmic evolution or *sristi*, accepts the order as maintained or expounded by Kapila in his Sāṅkhya system. Like Kapila, Vedānta says that from the subtle matter (*sukṣma or mahā bhuta*) originates the gross matter (*sthula bhuta*) through the medium of the process of

pañchikaraṇa, which is the process of combination. The process of *pañchikaraṇa* signifies that '*ākaśa* manifests sounds; *vāyu*, sound and energy; *tejas*, sound, enregy, heat and light; *apah*, sound, energy heat and light and the capacity of affecting taste; earth, sound, energy, heat and light, and the capacity of affecting taste and smell'. There are difference of opinions regarding the way of process. Sureśvarāchārya ascribes these qualities to subtle elements or *sukṣma-bhutas*. Bhāratī Tīrtha ascribes these qualities to the *mahā-bhutas* in his *Pañchadaśī*, The *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* accepts only the three-fold process of combination or *trivrit-karaṇa*. The process of *trivrit-karāṇa* expounds the triplication of the subtle elements of *tejas*, *apah* and *pritthi* (light, water and earth). Vāchaspati Miśra in his *Bhāmatī* and Amalānanda Sarasvatī in his *Kalpa-taru* (commentary) support the process of triplication instead of the five-fold combination (*pañchikaraṇa*).

The *Upaniṣad* also accepts the doctrine of the planes of existence like *satya*, *jñāna* and *tapah*. The mytho-historical *Purāṇa* literature describes the seven and even fourteen planes of existence or *lokas*. It admits also the five-fold sheaths of the *jīvātman* (individual soul) and they are: *annamaya*, *prāṇamaya*, *manomaya*, *vijñānamaya* and *ānandamaya*. The subtle body or *sukṣma-śarīra* (*linga-deha*) is conceived

as possessed of only three-fold sheaths of *prāṇa*, *manah* and *vijñāna*. The sheaths are known as *koṣas* or subtle coverings in Vedānta. As the subtle sense-elements cover the effulgence of the pure consciousness, they are known as 'covering' or *koṣa*. The Non-dualistic Vedānta designates these coverings as the adjuncts or *upadhīs*, which qualify the pure Ātman.

The Mādhyamika school of Buddhism maintains also the process of progress and it says that 'what is, is momentary so that there is nothing that persists after the very first moment of its being and causation thus resolves itself into certain laws regulating the appearance and disappearance of momentary reals'. The Śāṅkhya school upholds that the collocation of the reals (*guṇas*) of Prakriti undergoes changes, both perceptible and imperceptible, and constitutes the ever-changing world of appearance. 'It is', says Dr. S.K. Maitra, 'the arrangements of the reals or *guṇas* causing the appearance of ever-varying forms that are always changing but not the real themselves. That is to say, Śāṅkhya subscribes to what modern scientists would call the principle of the conservation of mass and energy in the world, the total quantity of mass (*tamas*) and energy (*rajas*) always remaining the same though matter or energy

of one form may be changing into matter or energy of another form'. The Nyāya school recognizes the theory of *pariṇāma* as not the momentary change. The Nyāya says that 'the non-momentary substance like five elemantal atoms of earth, water, air, fire, ether, space, time, self, etc., qualities of universals, and the relation of inherence and the non-eternal compounds of the eternal atoms, are subject to change'.

Tantra philosophy admits the theory of change or progress, but it holds that the change happens always upon the changeless ground-consciousness. Tantra believes in the dual phases of consciousness: the one is static with a seed of becoming or sprouting and the other is dynamic with its actualised manifold manifestations. The static consciousness is the Śiva, and the dynamic one is Kālī, who is the cause of creation, preservation and destruction. Tantra philosophy, therefore, considers both the change and the changelessness, as an undivided unique unity that resembles a pea (*chanaka*), containing within it the negative and the positive poles bound up into one. So, though Tantra admits the change or progress, yet it recognizes the static ground of the change.

The non-dualistic Vedāntism of Śaṅkara accepts also the process of progress, as it admits the *vivarta-*

sristi, according to the transcendental method and the *pariṇāma sristi*, according to the empirical method. Or in other words it can be said that the non-dualistic Vedānta (*Advaita-Vedānta*) recognizes the change or progression only from the empirical or *vyavahārika* standpoint, and not from the transcendental or *pāramārthika* viewpoint. In reality, the non-dualistic Vedānta looks upon the change, progress or evolution (*sristi*) as false or delusive (*mithyā*), in the sense that it is eternally negated in the unchanging all-consciousness Absolute. No agency for progression or world-manifestation can be ascribed to Brahman, since Brahman is of the very nature of knowledge and the only reality. 'The *Śruti* text confirms this view: *He desired, may I become many*' (*Taittiriya Up.*, II. vi). Desire and volition can be attributed only to a conscious being. Īśvara (Brahman in its active phase) creates the world in order that the individual souls may reap the fruits of their past *Karma* and also find opportunity for spiritual advancement. The material causality of the Brahman in respect of the universe is intelligible since the Brahman is the substrate of the delusive manifold or the substrate of *māyā* which has evolved in the form of the universe. So, after examining the several objections raised against the doctrine of

progression or creation Āchārya Śaṅkara points out that the main object of the *Advaita-Vedānta* is not the establishment or elaboration of the theory of progression or creation but the teaching of the identity of the supreme Self and the individual self (Vide the commentaries on the *Vedānta-Sūtra*, I. iv. 14; *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*, III. 15; *Chhāndogya Up.*, VI. viii. 4).

This book is an attempt to solve some of the problems of the change and the changelessness, Progress presupposes the idea of perfection, as the notion of dynamicity is preceded by that of staticity. In restlessness there is no permanent peace and solace. The Divine rest or perfection can only promise to bestow upon us the unearthly bliss of Freedom or Perfection. In the discussions on the theories of progress and perfection, I have tried to elucidate first the changing forms and patterns as well as the nature of progress from different viewpoints and then have dealt upon the philosophy of the ultimate end of man's marching or upward progress. An aimless eternal marching or progress towards an unknown destination is meaningless. It is a universal law what has a beginning, must have an end, and on this basis I have constructed the architecture of the philosophy

of progress and perfection. Controversis are inevitable, and opinions of the judges are bound to vary. The taste and temperament together with the viewpoint of one man inevitably differ from those of others. But yet a man adopts a rational path to come to a plausable solution.

Now, let me express my gratitude to Swāmi Bhabeśānanda, without whose unfailing love and inspiration, it would not have been possible to publish this book. I am especially grateful and indebted to Śrī Upendra Kumar Dutt and Prof, Haridās Mukherjee, M.A., who helped me by reading of the proofs and in many ways. My thanks go to Śrimatī Mirā Mitra for the correction of the proofs and preparing the Index. My extreme gratitude goes to the well-known artist Śrī Devabrata Mukhopādhyāya for drawing the beautiful design for the jacket and giving valuable suggestions for the get up of the book. I offer my thanks also to the authorities of the Calcutta Oriental Press for the neat printing of the book.

S. PRAJÑĀNĀNANDA

Rāmakriṣṇa Vedānta Math
19B, Rājā Rājkriṣṇna Street
Calcutta-6.
February, 1958.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER X

APPENDIX

PHILOSOPHY OF

PROGRESS AND PERFECTION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The idea of progress, says Prof. Collingwood, was worked out for the first time by Targot (*Discours Surl' histoire universelle*, 1750) and Voltaire (*Le Sie ele de Louis* XIV, 1751) about the middle of the eighteenth century. It was then recognized as the fundamental category of historical thought. It was again developed in the *Encyclopedie* in 1751-56. During the next half-century this idea of progress was transposed into the terms of natural science. In another half-century it was again expounded by Erasmus (*Zoonomia*, 1794-98) and Lāmārck (*Philosophie Zoologique*, 1809) applying it to the field of biology. It was then famous in the term of *evolution*.[1]

---

1 Vide Prof. Collingwood: *The Idea of Nature* (1945), p. 19. Cf. also J. B. Bury: *The Idea of Progress* (1924), Ch. VII.

It is commonly believed that Charles Dārwin was the first to discover the doctrine of evolution in the West and he proved that 'the species of living organisms are not a fixed repertory of permanent types, but begin to exist and cease to exist in time'. But this is untrue to the fact. Because Erasmus Dārwin had put forward his thesis long before Chārles Dārwin: 'The world was evolved, not created, and it was rather grown than came into being'. Not only this, but there was also current in the then society the belief or tendency: 'What had hitherto been regarded as unchanging, was itself, in reality, subject to change'.

Without entering into details it can be said that after Erasmus, Chārles Dārwin and Chārles Lyell developed the theory of evolution with a more scientific argument from the standpoint of biology. But still there was a difference between the two in the method of their application. Because when the former dealt with the inorganic nature of evolution, the latter proceeded with the organic one. According to Chārles Dārwin, says Dr. Stein, every organism exhibits a moving equilibrium which is recognized as a combination of balanced set of functions. This balanced set of functions can be called *a life*, whereas the overthrow of this balanced

set is known as *a death*.[2] But still it is a fact that all the changes constituting progress or evolution 'tend ever towards a state of absolute equilibrium or rest'.

After the theory put forward by Dārwin, the Lāmārckian evolutionary process expounds that each living being wants an 'extention of consciousness and of power'. Each one strives hard to evolve until its old organs, habits and consciousness are modified, and new ones are created. In this way everyone runs unceasingly 'for fresh conquest of Life' through the evolutionary process though it is slow. The Lāmārckian evolution, says Bernard Shaw, was formerly called *Functional Adaptation* and is now known as *Creative Evolution*. The physicists and the biologists maintain that down from the embryonic stage, from a protoplasm upto the highest stage of the superman, every individual has to weave an infinite series of upward progress and fresh conquests. Some of the evolutionists believe that the evolutionary process is purely a hereditary one and the human life is continuous and immortal. Weismann, the neo-Dārwinist also subscribes to this theory of progress. But his tendency is to rest in the finality

2 Vide Dr. Ludwig Stein : *Philosophical Currents of the Presentday*, Vol. II, p. 277.

of progress and he regards this finality as an 'original substance'. He says that all forms of life have developed as protoplasms from an original primal substance, and this substance is the 'primitive slime' (*Urschleim*) from which were shaped out all the materials of the universe.[3] It can be said that the theory of progress or evolution that comes down from Democritus, Empedocles and Herāclitus has always been modified and reconstructed in the hands of the successive evolutionists like Dārwins, Treviranus, Lāmārck, Mendel, Gālton, Roth, Weismānn, Samuel Butler, Huxley, Herbert Spencer, and others. Dārwin's accidental variations, survival of the fittest, struggle for existence, etc., and Mendel's and Weismānn's theories of evolution were all worked out from the standpoint of biological or the germ-cell theory. From this time onward the evolutionary process really advanced through the field of biology and science. Biology considers all the organism as a flux or process of *becoming* which is essentially a historic being. Prof. Hobhouse says : 'The biologists have been generally content to follow Mr. Spencer in conceiving evolution as a process from the simple to the complex, or they have

3 Cf. Bernārd Shaw: *Back to Methuselah*, p. XXXI.

regarded it simply as a progressive adaption of the organism to the environment'.

Science draws the same conclusion. The function of science is to reduce the complex phenomena to simpler terms. It looks upon the world as *becoming* or ever-changing, but at the same time it values the account of *becoming* or change as 'causal as well as modal'. It is in favour of progress, because it turns its eyes always towards the future prospect and discovers things novel and new that become visible upon the dead and rotten things of the past. But the biological concept of evolution being confined to the phenomena of life alone, 'the need of a more generalized formula was felt and found its response in the wider Cosmic Evolution of Spencer who showed that biological evolution was only one chapter in the whole story'.[4]

---

4 Vide Prof. H. M. Bhattāchāryay: *Studies in Philosophy* (1933), pp. 62-63.

CHAPTER II

BECOMING OR PROGRESS

I

From the eighteenth century both radical revolutionism and philosophical evolutionism arose in a more systematic and scientific method, through Hegel's theory of progress. Hegel (1770-1831) makes an approach in the field of philosophy and science with his doctrines of *becoming* and *unity-in-difference*. His *Phenomenology* is a genuine proof of it. Hegel says that *becoming* or movement always presupposes a degree in which 'the motion of quantum is explicitly put.' He believes that an 'infinite quantitative progression' is contained in the concept of change or evolution. But an infinite quantitative progression, says Prof. Wallace, 'is only the meaningless repetition of one and the same contradiction, which attaches to the quantum, both gradually and, when explicitly invested with its special character, as degree'. The infinite progression was also admitted long ago by the Greek philosophers Permenides, Herāclitus, Aristotle and others. As regards the infinite progression Aristotle says by quoting the words of

Zeno: 'It is the same to say a thing once, and to say it for ever'. But the Eleatic thinkers believe that absolute change or eternal marching is impossible. They say: 'It is impossible for a thing to come from nothing, to become nothing and to change absolutely. And yet we have the right to speak of origin and decay, growth and change, in a relative sense'. Prof. A. W. Benn says in his *The Great Philosophers* (1914) that the Eleates 'denied the reality of change and separation although every school agreed in teaching that all perticular bodies are formed either by differentiation or by decomposition and recomposition out of the same primordial elements. From this it followed, as a natural consequence, that, although the whole mass of matter was eternal, each particular aggregate of matter must perish in order to release the elements required for the formation of new aggregates'. But it should be mentioned that though ths Eleatic philosophy admits the new aggregates, yet the new ones are not different from the old ones. The doctrine of the Eleatic philosophy is similar to those of the Sāṅkhya and Vēdanta philisophies of India. The Sāṅkhya system of Kapila upholds the theory of *satkāryavāda* which maintains that every effect is contained in its cause. It says that some-

thing cannot come out of nothing, and though change (*vikriti*) is admitted from the phenomenal standpoint, yet it is the fact that the cause itself becomes the effect and the unmanifested one appears as manifested and so the effect or *kārya* is no other than the cause or *kāraṇa*. Iśvarakriṣṇa says in the *Kārikā* of the Sāṅkhya : *Asadakāraṇādupādāna-grahanāt sarva-sambhavābhāvāt. Śaktasya śakya-karanāt kāraṇa-bhāvāchcha satkāryam*' (kārikā, 9). That is, the effect is non-different from the cause, and the cause being existent, the effect also bears the status of an existence. Vāchaspati-miśra in his commentary, *Tattvakaumudī* says : *Itaścha satkārya-mityāha kāraṇa-bhāvāchcha, kāryasya kāraṇātmakatvāt, na hi kāraṇādbhinnam kāryam, kāraṇañcha saditi katham tadabhinnaṁ kārya-masad-bhavet ? Kāryasya kāraṇā-bheda-sādhakāni cha pramāṇāni na pata-stantubhyo bhidyate tad-dharmatvāt, * * . tasmat satkāryamiti puṣkalām*'. The non-dualistic Vedānta maintains the doctrine of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. The *Gitā* also supports this theory and says : '*Nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate satah*' (2.16) and '*Avyaktādini bhutāni vyakta-madhyāni bhārata*' (2.28). That is, what is existent, never becomes non-existent and everything unmanifested appears as manifested for the phenomenal purpose. The becoming does not imply

the idea of absolute change, but it is the cause that manifests as the effect, and destruction or dissolusion means the effect comes back to its original form.

The Greek philosophers Empedocles and Anaxagoras also maintain this view of the Eleatics and oppose the thesis put forward by Heraclitus and Parmenides. The question of quantitative infinite progression is really a reflective understanding and it comes only in time of infinity. Spinoza calls this infinity 'a mere imaginary infinity' (*infinitum imaginations*), though some call it by the name of God or Deity. But, truly speaking, the true infinite is more than a mere world beyond the finite and in order to be conscious of it, says Prof. Wallace, we must renounce that *progress ad infinitum* and should step into the foreground of changless transcendental reality.[1]

Hegel maintains that progress or progression is the movement towards perfect freedom. This perfect freedom is the *Becoming* or *progress ad infinitum*. The infinite Becoming is regarded by Hegel as a reality, and, therefore, the reality, according to him, is the Change that moves eternally with its gradual stepping towards the ocean of Becoming.

---

1 Vide *The Logic of Hegel*, Vol. II, pp. 194-196. Cf. also Rand : *Modern Classical Philosophers*, pp. 590-592

Prof. Bosanquet says that this 'conception of reality as *progress ad infinitum* arises by a simple departure from the Hegelian idea of dialectic.'[2] 'For Hegel,' says Prof. Lāski, 'any adequate philosophy of history must be based upon the idea of evolution'.[3] The world of human experience is created by reason, and Hegel believes that this reason is a principle of growth or development. And, so it can be said that growth or development is the pulsation of intellectual world and history. Prof. Lāski says that history, according to Hegel, is therefore 'the slow development of the idea of freedom' and institutions are the efforts of men to embody that idea in concrete externality.

Hegel says that progress or *Becoming* is also *Being*, and the world of *Becoming* is a compound of the three categories, thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Each element is therefore in the dialectical process and it is in continuous transition from old to new forms. So, according to Prof. Lāski, 'each element is always accompanied by its antithesis. Love involves hate, good evil, freedom bondage. Each idea contains

---

2 Vide Prof. Bosanquet: *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, (1924), p. 56.

3 Cf. H. I. Lāski: *Communism* (The Home University Library Series, 1924), p. 56.

these positive and negative elements, though the negative by correction of inadequacy, has a positive character also.'[4] Therefore progress is an eternal becoming in the world of reality, nay, becoming itself bears the status of reality.

But, truly speaking, becoming cannot bear the status of the reality as it has no static form and fixed goal of its own. Progress or becoming cannot also be extended to infinity, as the idea of infinity is contained in the domain of time and, therefore, it cannot transcend the limit of temporal units.[5] Dr. Urquhārt says : 'We cannot contemplate with equanimity struggle prolonged to infinity. There must be time at which we can mentally cease from the process and find confidence in the thought that something has been eternally accomplished. And in the long run we must have the assurance that reality is receptive of our efforts, that drawing down into the reign of actualisation something that belongs to the permanent structure of the

---

4 Ibid., p. 37.

5. But modern science does not admit that space and time are infinite. Prof. Eddington has elaborately discussed this matter in his book *The Nature of the Physical World* and says that prior to the theory of Relativity the orthodox view was that space and time are infinite. But the theory of Relativity has undoubtedly proved that both of them are finite but unbounded and eternal.

universe.'[6] Prof. Taylor discusses this matter in connection with the determination of the goal of moral life. He says that life is but a pilgrimage from the temporal to the eternal. There is a goal beyond us—beyond our terrestrial life, which we have not reached. Because if we had reached it, 'there would be nothing left to inspire effort and prompt to progress, and characteristically moral life would come to an end'.[7] So there must be an end or a goal in every effort. Aimless wandering is meaningless; eternal becoming cannot be possible. We all shall return to the 'undivided unity of God' and this is the final goal of every marching.

Before Hegel we find that Immanual Kant used to believe in the theory of progress as a notion of change in time. Kant says that change has no reality in its essence, but it has an existence in time. In truth, time is a category of nescience and impermanence. A thing perceived may change while yet it retains its unity. The notions of change and of continuty of change are regarded as the indeterminate series of momentary existence in time, that

6 Vide *Dr. Urquhārt Commemoration Volume* (1937), p. 4.

7 Vide Prof. Taylor: *The Faith of a Moralist* (1931), Vol. I pp. 386-387.

endures them. So we cannot escape the implications of the expression that 'changes occur in time', for thereby, on the one hand, we represent time as somehow outside of and embracing the changing whole, and on the other hand, we are attempting the impossible task of representing all reality as an object within our experience—an effort which inevitably leads to the contrast, adopted in many a metaphysical theory, between a timeless reality and the subjective temporal apprehension thereof by the individual mind. In fact, the change or progress is represented as content of knowledge or consciousness or thought in time and it has no value and existence outside time i.e. it is not existent in the Timelessness or timeless reality. So we see that Kant does not admit the existence of the theory of becoming or change beyond time and consequently he beleives in the finality of the progress.

After Kant and Hegel, the theory of progress was put forward by Kārl Mārx (1818). The dialectical historical materialism of Mārx and even that of Engles are based upon the theory of *becoming* or progress. Feuerbach, Strauss, Māch, Engles, Lassalle and Mārx have all borrowed Hegel's dialectical process in their method of logic and philosophy. Or it can be said that their philosophy is based on Hegelian

premises with the economic interpretation of history.

Now, what is the true characteristic of the Hegelian premises, upon which Mārx philosophy of historical materialism is based on ? Let us survey in brief the historical development of Hegel's dialectical process from Prof. M. Beer's short but illuminating book ; *The Life and Teaching of Kārl Mārx* (1929). Prof. Beer says that until towards the end of the eighteenth century, learned and unlearned, philosophers and philistines, had some such general notions as the following. The world has either been created, or it has existed from eternity. It is either governed by a personal, supernatural God or universal Spirit, or it is kept going by nature, like some delicate machine. It exists in accordance with eternal laws, and is perfect, ordained to fulfil some design, and constant. The things and beings which are found in it are divided into kinds, species and classes. All are fixed, constant and eternal. Things and beings are contiguous in space, and succeed one another in time, as they have done ever since time was. It is the same with the incidents and events of the world and of mankind. Such common proverbs as 'There is nothing new under the sun' and 'History repeats itself' are but the popular expression of this view.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century A.D. a new logic was sought on and it was G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) who made a comprehensive and thoroughly painstaking endeavour to formulate a new logic in accordance with the universal process of evolution. His logic could not deal merely with the laws of thought, but must at the same time take account of the laws of cosmic evolution. He created a science of thinking, which formulated a new logic. The essence of his logic is the dialectic. By *dialectic* the old Greeks understood the art of discourse and rejoinder, the refutation of an opponent by the destruction of his assertions and proofs, the bringing into relief of the contradictions and antithesis. Hegel seized hold of this expression, and named his logical method after it. This is the dialectical method, or the manner of conceiving the things and beings of the universe as in the process of becoming, through the struggle of contradictory elements and their resolution. With its help, he brings to judgement the three original laws of thought which have already been alluded to. The principle of identity is an abstract, incomplete truth, for it separates a thing from the variety of other things, and its relations to them.

The thing or the being, against which the contradiction operates, was called by Hegel the Positive,

and the contradiction, the antagonistic element, or the antithesis, he called the Negation. This negation. is not mere annihilation, not a resolution into nothing, but a clearing away and a building up at the same time ; a disappearance and a coming into existence ; a movement to a higher stage. Hegel says: 'It has been hitherto one of the rooted prejudices of logic and a commonly accepted belief that the contradiction is not in essential or so inherent a characteristic (in thought and existence) as the identity. Yet in comparison with it the identity is, in truth, but the characteristic of what is simply and directly perceived, of lifeless existence. The contradiction, however, is the source of all movement and life; only in so far as it contains a contradiction can anything have movement, power, and effect'. In his *Science of Logic* Hegel says further: 'Only active reason reduced the mere multiplicity and diversity of phenomena to antithesis. And only when pushed to this point do the manifold phenomena become active and mutually stimulating, producing the state of negation, which is the very heart-beat of progress and life'.

So we find that the mode of procedure in human thinking and history is called by Hegel the dialectical method or dialectical process. Kārl Mārx

handles this method with unsurpassed mastery and with the help of this method he has formulated the law of evolution of Socialism and constructed the philosophy of dialectical historical materialism. Economic development is the aim and aspiration of his doctrine or philosophy. Engles also adopts this theory of dialectical materialism and builds his philosophy upon it. So both Mārx and Engles look always for the betterment of the people and state. But still they differ from Hegel and have developed their own philosophy purely upon the socio-economical basis with much modifications. 'As Feuerbach and Strauss,' says Prof. Lāski, 'applied the Hegelian dialectic to the destruction of Christianity, and so Mārx applied it to the destruction of Capitalism'.[8]

We know that Mārx became a Socialist in the year 1843. Being an upholder of the doctrine of dialectics, he knew that Socialism could only be understood by a knowledge of the movement operating in middle class society and its developing forces. His investigations in 1843-4 led to the result that political economy forms the basis of bourgeois society. He says that whole nature is not in a state of

8 Vide H. J. Laski: *Communism* (1936), p. 58.

static rest and immobility, but it is in the state of constant change and movement; it is 'in a constant state of coming into being and going out of being in a constant flux'. So it is true that Mārx's materialism is the doctrine of dynamicity and change, and it holds that all things and phenomena of nature 'have their positive and negative side, past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the trasformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes'.[9] That is, the dialectical method of Mārx, says J. Stalin, 'holds that the process of development from the lower to the higher takes place not as a harmonious unfolding of phenomena, but as a disclosure of the contradictions inherent in things and phenomena'.

Again Mārx believes that all sensation or perception is an interaction between subject and object; the bare object apart from the activity of the percipient, is a mere raw material which is trans-

9 (a) Vide Kārl Mārx: *Selected Works* (Moscow, 1946). Vol. I, p. 73, (b) Cf. also M. Beer: *The Life and Teaching of Kārl Mārk* (1929).

formed in the process of becoming known. The continual process of mental adoptation of the subject and the object is called by Mārx 'dialectical' as this process goes eternally and is never fully completed. But this kind of dialectical historical materialism denounces God or any other World-spirit. Because this theory holds that the world with its societies and men is an eternal movement, onward and upward, and has no final goal or stoppage. It believes in the doctrine of Herāclitus who holds that 'the world, the all in one, was not created by any god or any man, but was, is and ever will be a living flame, systematically flaring up and systematically dying down'. So the dialectical materialism does not involve the process of the movement in a repeated circle or spiral, but it weaves the history of unceasing development of production and growth of the renewal.

After Mārx (1818) we find a host of thinkers dealing with the theory of progress in different ages in different forms. Some of them are Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), William James (1842-1910), F. H. Bradley (1846-1924), Lloyd Morgan (1852), Bernard Shaw (1856), R. B. Haldane (1857), S. Alexander (1856-1939), John Dewey (1859), H. Bergson (1859), A. N. Whitehead (1861), J. Arthur Thomson (1861), Prof. Strong (1862),

L. T. Hobhouse (1864), B. Croce (1866), G. Gentile (1875), Prof. Sellers (1880), W. Spengler (1880) Pitrim Sorokin and others.

II

HERBERT SPENCER (1820-1903) believes in the law of evolution simply because the law describes the process 'as one of increasing coherence of *integration* of matter and of what motion is retained in a system'. But, yet he maintains that 'no single process of evolution continues for ever. Sooner or later a stage of *equilibrium* is reached in which the progress stops'. So Spencer's *evolution* is always followed by dissolution which is the reverse of the former, and there is no absolute state at either end of the process. Spencer says that 'any instance of evolution in one of *finite phenomena only*, and always has a *beginning* and an *end* in *space* and *time*'. In fact, the synthetic formula of Spencer's doctrine of evolution can finally be deduced to 'equilibration'. Herbert Spencer says that every motion, being motion under resistance must sooner or later come to an end.

Spencer's philosophy can therefore be said to be the philosophy of '*happening*' which is opposite to Spinoza's philosophy of '*being*'. Spinoza's philosophy

breathes the air of Eleaticism which, in truth, believes in the 'permanent stationary condition' whereas Spencer's philosophy inhales the atmosphere of Heraclitus whose doctrine is that of change and uninterrupted becoming. Again, Spencer is a staunch follower of Dārwin, though he differs from him in many respect. Dr. Stein says: 'The Dārwinian theory confirmed Spencer in the belief that the universal thought of evolution formulated by him in close connection with Lyell's theory of evolution of the earth-crust received a powerful support from the side of biology'.[1]

WILLIAM JAMES (1842) is a pragmatist and his doctrine is a logical conclusion of *reduction ad absurdum* of radical empiricism. Guido de Ruggiero says that *thought* is, for William James, a *stream* in which there are both movements of rest and movements of flux: the first consist of sense-material, the second of thought-relations, and the two are connected in such a way that the movements of flux are derived from the movements of rest. Here we find that James tries to synthesize the movement and the rest which seems like the synthesis of two extremities,

---

1 Vide Dr. Ludwig Stein: *Pholisophical Currents of the Presentday*, vol. ii, p. 277.

one and many—theism and materialism. So it seems that he beleives in the theory of progress which is not only an eternal movement, but also an eternal rest. His attempt of systhesizing of the two extremities or two opposite ends proves that he admits both the states of *being* and *becoming*, which rest on an undivided unity as the stream, the basic ground, and consequently, he believes in the finality of the progress.

F. H. BRADLEY (1846-1924) also believes in the theory of progress. But his theory is meant for the temporal phenomena and not for the nontemporal Absolute. Like Green, he absolutely denies all kinds of progress or development in the changeless reality. He says: 'Further, the ultimate Reality is not a development and it is absurd even to ask if it progresses in time'.[2] Prof. Muirhead mentions that Bradley 'does not here raise the question of the reality of time which is bound up with that of progress, but he makes clear the kind of reality that must be assigned to progress within the world of time'.[3]

---

2 Vide Bradley: *Essays on Truth and Reality* (1914), p. 344

3 Cf. Prof. Muirhead: *The Platonic Tradition in the Anglo-Saxon Philosophy*, p. 227.

Now, though Bradley denies progress in the Absolute, yet he admits the degrees of it from the sides of idea and existence. Bradley's Absolute is the reality, and it is purely the metaphysical and not philosophical one. Metaphysics interprets nature which is lifeless. Nature 'is a network of interconnected events'. Events 'are by no means windowless, lonely and cut off'. Events are really the combinations of various stages of progress that come to happen in time. They are wholly concerned with science that weaves the history of changes. They do not belong to the domain of philosophy. And though they are applied to philosophy, yet the philosophical idea of progress should not be temporal. 'Higher and lower terms', says Bradley, 'which imply always a standard and end, would in philosophy be applied solely to designate rank. * * * Progress for philosophy would never have any temporal sense, * *'.[4]

Therefore progress, according to Bradley, is that which is a constant expansion and systematization, and that is a subject-matter of history. History belongs to phenomenon, whereas noumenon transcends history. He says: 'There is of course progress in the world, and there is also retrogression,

---

4 Bradley: *Appearence and Realiy*, p. 441.

but we cannot think that the Whole either moves on or backward. The Absolute has no history of its own, though it contains histories without number. These, with their tale of progress or decline, are constructions starting from and based on some one given piece of finitude'.[5] Bradley believes that unreality or imperfection has a move and progress, but 'nothing perfect—nothing genuinely real, can move'. So in a mystical way he says: 'The Absolute has no seasons, but all at once bears its leaves, fruits and blossoms. Like our globe it always, and it never, has summer and winter'.[6]

LLYOD MORGAN'S (1852) theory of evolution is called the *emergent evolution.* He uses the word '*emergent*' in his books, *Instinct and Experience* (1912), and *Emergent Evolution* (1923.) The term *evolution*, he says, is not wholly free from ambiguity because in the older sense it meant the unfolding of what is already in being, but enfolded, and in that sense *emergence* would mean 'the coming into view of that which has hitherto been submerged—virtually there, but hidden, latent, and not as yet

5 Ibid., p. 442.

6 'This image is, I believe, borrowed from Strauss.'

potent'. But now-a-days, he mentions, 'the word *evolution* has supplemented the old word '*epigenesis*' and means the coming into existence of something in some sense new * * *'.[7] That is, the word *emergent* signifies that the higher is not a mere modification or complication of the lower but something genuinely and qualitatively new. But Prof. Laguna (1876) considers the emergent evolution as an *unhistorical dogmatism*. He says that it is a 'surprising evolution', because every attempt to make anything more out of it ends in tautology.[8]

However, Llyod Morgan admits that the 'world is in the making, and at every stage of advance we find increasing complexity of stuff and richness in substance'.[9] He mentions about a primal *Nisus* which he calls God 'through whose Activity emergents emerge and the whole course of emergent evolution is directed'. He believes that God is not an 'emergent deity' but he is an 'Activity' from which the whole evolution as movement emerges. 'That activity which I acknowledge,' Morgan says,

---

7 Vide *Contemporary British Philosophy*, vol. I, p. 297.

8 Vide *Comtemporary American Philosophy* (1930) vol. I, p. 418.

9 Cf. Rādhākriṣṇan: *An Idealist View of life*, p. 324.

'is Logos of which the evolutionary process, logically interpreted, is the manifestation'.[10] Therefore the whole course of evolution, according to Morgan, is nothing but the expression of God's purpose and, therefore, it has a beginning in time and space. This conclusion leads us to think that Morgan's progress has also an end to the Activity of the immanent dynamic God, and it is not an eternal progress towards an unknown destination.

BERNARD SHAW (1856) discusses the theory of progress which came down historically and systematically from Bury, Targot, Dārwin, Lāmārck and other biologists and evolutionists. In the *Postscript* of his *Back to Methuselah*, Shaw clearly says that the span of the whole varies in duration 'from the immortality of the eternality splitting amoeba to the brief span of the drosophila fly'. According to Weismann, immortality is natural whereas death means to get rid of its garments of flesh. Shaw really bears in him an unceasing passionate longing for eternal growth i.e. long life. He says: 'Physically I am feeling: * * yet my mind still feels capable of growth; for my curiosity is keener than ever. My soul goes marching

10 Vide *Contemporary British Philosophy*, vol. I, p. 306.

on,* *'.[11] Shaw believes in a life-force, which may be compared to *élan-vital* of Bergson, will-to-live of Schopenhauer and divine Energy or *Śakti* of Indian philosophy. He says that 'clearly then, *Back to Methuselah* was not a commercial job, it came straight from the life-force operating as an *élan-vital* through myself and Barry Jackson'.[12]

Bernard Shaw's doctrine of evolution can be said to be a 'creative evolution'. As the creative evolutionists believe in a 'wishful thinking' of a highest force, he also believes in a supernatural deity or force. He calls it 'an incorporeal Purpose'. This bodiless purpose mysteriously designs the corporeal organs and agents 'to accomplish that purpose, which, as far as we can see, is the attainment of infinite wisdom and infinite power'. A creative force is striving 'by trial and error towards a goal of all-knowingness and almighty power over nature'. Shaw believes that every man completes his journey after passing through gradual evolutions from the stage of an amoeba.

S. Alexander (1859-1939) holds that the world is in a process of continuous emergent evolution

11 Vide *Back to Methuselah*, p. 295.
12 Ibid., p. 290. Cf. also p. 293.

which can be said 'a perpetual transition' or 'an eternal flux'. He, like Llyod Morgan and General Smuts, believes in the principle of emergence and says that mind is, according to our interpretation of the facts, an *emergent* from life, and life is an emergent from a lower physico-chemical level of existance, i.e. matter.[13] He borrowes the word '*emergent*' from Lylod Morgan as he himself admits: 'I use the word '*emergent*' after the example of Mr. Llyod Morgan'.[14] He says that the world-order evolves always in new order from the primal matrix of Space-Time and not from Space and Time. 'New orders of finites come into existence in Time; the world actually or historically develops from its first or elementary condition of Space-Time, which possesses no quality except what we agreed to call the spatio-temporal quality of motion'.[15] Prof. Collingwood says that Alexander begins with space-time, not space and time separately in the Newtonian manner.[16] By *space* he means metaphorically 'the body' and *time* 'as

---

13 Vide *Space, Time and Deity* (1934), vol. II, p. 14.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid, p. 45.

16 Vide R. G. Collingwood *The Idea of Nature*, p. 159.

the principle of organization, the mind'. By '*imergence*' he means a new creation, because by constellation or collection of the motion new or altogather new something emerges.[17] Prof. Rogers criticizes the view when Alexander says that the new things evolve at once and are expressible without residue in terms of processes proper to the level from which they emerge. Prof. Rogers says that this is a perplexing view and it is 'seemingly an attempt to ride both horses at once'.

Alexander says that nothing in the universe is at absolute rest, everything is in movement within Space-Time. This movement is increasing and the unceasing movement or change is the progressive upward movement or the forward impulse that flows like the ever-passing stream-current of Heraclitus. Prof. Collingwood says that the mind has the privilege of being conscious of this drive and conceiving in its thought the goal towards which its evolution is leading it. The change or movement is not unnoticed by the mind and it does not flow aimlessly as Hume says: 'All drive has a goal and it is known by the mind that witnesses'. This statement of Prof. Collingwood seems some-

17 The emergent quality is the summing together into a new one.

what like that of the non-dualistic Vedānta of India, which says that there must be a foundational witnessing consciousness amidst the changing flux or continuous succession of changes of the world-appearance.

Alexander holds that the cosmic process is always progressing upward from the inorganic to the organic, from the animal to the human, from the human to the superhuman. So this evolution is a kind of 'yearning' of everything for its 'final advent' which may be called *perfection*. It may be called the resurrection of the old life into the new one, an upliftment of the limited to the limitless, a march from the fragmentary to the whole. And it is a fact that some day or other everything in this world will reach the ultimate perfection in Deity. Such is the assurance of the *Upaniṣads* of India and it has also been confirmed in this modern age by Rāmakriṣṇa Paramahaṅsa and Swāmi Vivekānanda. So evolution or progress according to Alexander, continues but ends in a perfect type.

JOHN DEWEY (1859) believes in a kind of different evolution. He says that moral ideal is 'a growth from one age to another and keeps an underlying constant reconstruction'. He denies the existence of any absolute Mind, and in this respect he differs from

T. H. Green (1830-1882), who maintains that the 'whole course of human moral evolution is already and externally known to an absolute Mind'. He says that no value should be absolute and eternal; existence or any kind of absolute sanction and guarantee is impossible. All values 'are and ought to be underlying perpetual modification and reconstruction in the course of reflective thinking with reference to changing social conditions and increasing scientific knowledge'.[18]

John Dewey is different from pluralist William James in his view, because he is a believer in Hegelianism and tries to unify diverse elements into mutually interested inorganic wholes, whereas James believes in a world of many fragmentary and disconnected elements.

HENRY BERGSON (1859) works out the idea of evolution, progress or process of change as 'an essentially biological idea', but in the final analysis he reduces it to 'terms of life,' which is also a pure activity and a 'sheer infinite positive *élan*'. He maintains that there can never be 'anything really new; all future events are implied in any past event' or in Bergson's own phrase—*tout est donné*.

---

18 Vide Wright: *A History of Modern Philosophy*, p. 546.

Here Bergson differs in his view from those of both Morgan and Alexander, because Bergson does not admit any new form or quality after the emergence, whereas Morgan and Alexander believe in a quite new type and quality that emerge from the constellation or collocation of motion. In this respect Bergson differs from Heraclitus, Mārx and Engles, and he clearly holds: 'Its past, in its entirety, is prolonged into its present, and abides there, actual acting'. W. K. Clifford emphasizes the same idea when he admits: 'It is the peculiarity of living things not merely that they change under the influence of surrounding circumstances, but that any change that takes place in them is not lost, but retained and as it were, built into the organism to serve as the foundation for future actions'.[19] But it should be noticed that though Bergson does not admit any new quality in evolution, yet he does not believe in a definite goal where evolution or change terminates. So, like sceptic Hume of the West and the nihilist Mādhyamikas or Yogācāras of the East, Bergson says that the 'process of the world is a vast extemporization; the vital force has no aim, no goal, no guiding lights outside it or guiding principles

19 Cf. *Contemporary British Philosophy* (1925), Vol. II, p. 310.

within; it is sheer force, whose only inherent property is to flow, to push indefinitely onwards in any and every directions'.[20] But it is curious to mention that he again admits in his *Creative Evolution* that the flow or push 'would be a simple one, and we should have been able to determine its direction, if life has been described a single course, like that of solid ball shot from a cannon. But it proceeds rather like a shell which suddenly bursts into fragments, being themselves shells, burst in their turn into fragments destined to burst again, and so on for a time incommensurably long'.[21] So, from this statement we come to know that Bergson's time-process is not a mere change, but is a change with a swelling or growing force. It is an ever-growing force, because every moment the self, says Prof. Loomba, 'is creating itself and thus expanding itself endlessly'.[22] Therefore, a ceaseless swelling change or flux really constitutes the stuff of the Bergson's Reality.

Prof. Russell says that Bergson's creative evolution is not an adaptation to environment. It is neither mechanism nor teleology, but a free will and

---

20 Vide R. G. Collingwood: *The Idea of Nature* (1945), p. 138.

21 Vide Bergson: *Creative Evolution.*, p. 103.

22 Vide Loomba: *Bradley and Bergson*, p. 137.

spontaneous impulse to creation. Bergson also maintains that evolution is truly *creative* like the work of an artist. It is true to the fact that spontaneous activity, 'implies a subjectivity, and must not be confused with the motion of subjects'. In this sense Bergson's theory of unity of life 'must destroy the spontaneity which he affirms to be life's essence'.[23]

Bergon's unity of life must be regarded as the unity of its original impulse or *êlan*. And it should be remembered that this unity is not a substance or an essence, but it is an activity. This *élan* is one, and he says in his *Creative Evolution*: 'The one *élan vital* runs through all the divergent lives of evolution though the one current splits up ever more and more and its various branches seperate ever more widely from each other as it advances'. So Bergson tries to find out a unity which is a dynamic creative activity with an endless stream of becoming, with a movement up or movement down. Therefore it is an activity which involves both identity and change. But, truly speaking, change and identity, movement and rest, dynamic and static forms, are contradictory

23 Cf. Bergson's *Creative Evolution and the Individual* by Rev. Oliver Quick in *Mind*, vol. XXII, No. 80, April, 1913, pp. 223, 224.

to each other and, therefore, a thing which contains contradictory categories, implies the status of relativity and abstraction and cannot be recognized as an ultimate reality.

But it is also a fact that an essential unity lies behind everything of this world of change and this unity is the unity of life. This unity of life is regarded again as an universal activity which underlies all the individual activities. It cannot be considered as an abstraction of individual thought, but it must be timeless and supra-personal. It is timeless because it transcends all the 'real duration'. Real duration is recognized by Bergson as a medium of absolute change 'in which the absolutely new is continually coming to birth'. But it may be asked how then a real unity can run through it, how can life of which it is the stuff be really one? To this Bergson himself does not offer any satisfactory answer. 'To this it may be replied', says Rev. Quick, that as Prof. Bergson points out, individuality is only a matter of degree and development. 'As we look back up the stream of evolution, individual distinctions seem fade away and yet find life. Consequently unity, through the change of duration, belongs not only to life as individual, but also to life itself, of which individuality is but a

development'. Further Rev. Quick says that Bergson's theory of evolution does not afford us this kind of solution.

In fact, Henry Bergson's doctrine of evolution is a *creative* durational one. The whole universe, according to him, is the clash and conflict of two opposite motions: the life, that moves upward and the matter that goes downward. Between this conflict of matter and motion, Bergson's creative evolution finds its richness and fruition of validity and reality. The motion or life retains in it the capacity for the free activity and struggles always 'to find new outlets, seeking always for greater liberty of movement amid the opposing walls of matter'.

Like Llyod Morgan and Alexender, WHITEHEAD (1861) believes in a kind of evolution, which is an eternal order and a creative reality. He says that the 'universe is a developing series of events, revealing a hierarchy of grades and values'. This kind of evolution or progress connotes the idea of motion. That motion is nothing but 'a fact in nature, kinetic energy and momentum' and it depends entirely upon physical concepts. Whitehead says: 'Accordingly I assume it is an axiom, that motion is a physical fact. It is something that we perceive as

in nature. Motion presupposes rest'.[24] Therefore evolution, according to Whitehead, is a cosmic series that flows but ends in an ultimate irreducible principle which can be recognized as God. He also admits a creative process and that process is the achievement of actuality by the ideal consequent, in virtue of its union with the actual ground. In the phrase of Aristotle, this process is the fusion of being with not-being.[25] The whole process of the world 'comprises to produce a new creation', and the new creation is enriched at last in the union with the eternal completed harmony and that is God.

Whitehead says that 'order of the world is no accident'. He echoes like the Upaniṣadic truth that the world-appearence emerges from God and goes back to God again. The order fights for freedom and emancipation from the bondage of grades, from the lower to the higher. He says that 'the universe exhibits a creativity with finite freedom and a realm of forms with infinite possibilities, but this creativity and these forms together are impotent to achieve

---

24 Vide Whitehead: *The Concept of Nature* (1930), p. 105.

25 Vide Whitehead: *Religion in the Making* (1930), p. 101.

actuality apart from the completed ideal harmony, which is God.'[26]

PROF. THOMPSON (1861) discusses the process of becoming which he deals in his *A Biologist's Philosophy*. From the biological standpoint he formulates the world as a historical form that changes all the time. He believes in an organic evolution. He says that we should not confound the word 'development' with the word 'evolution' or 'organic evolution' as the former is somewhat different from the latter. But Prof. Joseph has deliberately mixed up these two words in his 'Herbert Spencer lecture' (1924) on *The Concept of Evolution*.[27] Haeckel also correlates these two words saying 'ontogeny tends to recapitulate phylogeny'.

With regard to the difference between the two ideals, organic evolution and development, Prof. Thompson says that organic evolution 'is a process of racial becoming or phylogeny' whereas development 'is a process of individual becoming on ontogeny.'[28] Really 'organic evolution is a natural process of

26 Ibid., p. 108.

27 This lecture has now been published in a booklet form by the Oxford University Press.

28 Cf. *Contemporary British Philosophy* (1930) vol. II, p. 313.

continuous racial change in a definite direction' and thus gives rise to distinctively 'new individualities'.

Prof. Thompson differentiates the change into two heads: (a) the radio-active changes, and (b) the achievements of the synthetic chemists. He makes differences again among the organic evolution, individual development, human history, cosmic genesis and chemical transmutation.[29]

Prof. C. A. Strong (1862), the American philosopher believes in the theory of change. He says that change is not reality, but 'it is the passage from one state of reality to another'. Change is the process that consists in re-arrangement of metaphysical units that occur from instant to instant. It constitutes the form of Nature, which is again 'a continuum but not the whole'. Continuity, both temporal and spatial, he says, depends entirely on the causal relations of causality, because all causal action proceeds from spatial and temporal continuity. This is also the opinion of Newton, Clerk Maxwell, Einstein and other eminent scientists. In this world of continuity there exists only the states and the states, in truth, build the structure of the change which is

---

29 Cf. *Contemporary British Philosophy* Vol. II, pp. 312-315.

'in its essence, always either prospective or retrospective'.[30]

PROF. L. T. HOBHOUSE (1864) is also an evolutionist though he believes in the finality of progress. He is of opinion that there is an ultimate harmony which is conditioned by everything that exists or is a condition of development. He says: 'What exists must be capable of harmonization, and the configuration which it assumes at any time must be one determined ultimately by the effort towards harmony'.[31] Disharmony or discord in an evolutionary process is not merely 'an empirical fact', but there is a distinction between a disharmony and a discord. It rather leads us to the conception of a harmony, 'it is determined by its tendency towards a harmonious system'. Prof. Hobhouse says that the principle which runs through the configuration is not static but a dynamic entity. 'It is an impulse towards harmony and effects itself by a development which transforms the conditions limiting or thwarting it, and renders them subservient to its ends'. He again differentiates between the empirical mind and the

---

30 Cf. *Nature and Mind* by Charles Augustus Strong, appeared in *Contemporary American Philosophy* (1930), vol. II, pp. 313-329.

31 Vide *Development and Purpose* (1930), p. 350.

absolute mind and believes that though the empirical mind passes through gradual progress yet it realizes itself at the highest known phase of its development. That is, it realizes 'what are the fundamentals of its structure as it has been all along'. The empirical mind is then equipped with a new consciousness. It does not invent but discovers 'a unity underlying the differences and divergences of life, and a plan containing the possibilities of a future realization'.

The neo-realists CROCE (1866) and GENTILE (1875) were the typical upholders of the theory of progress. Time and change are the basis of their Reality, and therefore, Reality, according to them, is 'becoming' and 'a history or an unending dialectical progression'.

Prof. Bosanquet says that the idea of evolution in time is taken by them as the very spirit of their philosophy. So the progress, according to Croce and Gentile, 'being rooted in the ultimate conception of reality as becoming, is conceived as necessarily unending', and is therefore the progress *ad infinitum*. But, in truth, Croce has protested against this view. He says that 'the progress *ad infinitum*, never reaching its goal, is not a progress, and the idea of approximation is an illusion'. And if reality is purely *becoming*, it ought not to end, and if it can

end, there can be no reason why it should have began. So it is clear that Croce does not admit the theory of progress *ad infinitum*. Because, as the progress begins or starts from a point, so it must end somewhere. So Croce believes in a finality where there is no movement and no evolution of any kind.

PROF. R. W. SELLARS (1880) also upholds the theory of progress or change in his *Evolutionary Naturalism*. To substantiate his views it can be said that the 'whole process is through and through physical, the socalled psychical events being only too highly complicated psychical events. Or, to put it more definitely the psychical is an evolution from a purely physical and mechanical world that has nothing of the nature of mind, and the psychical, when it reaches the human level with the high complexity of human brain processes, plays its parts as conscious thinking and conation in the total complex of psycho-physical events'.

Similarly PROF. J. B. PRATT (1875) believes that in the attainment of the par excellence ecstatic vision there are generally three stages which are *purgative*, *illuminative* or *meditative* and *unitive*. The third stage 'is both a kind of experience and a kind of life'. In the opinion of St. Teresa there are four degrees or stages of 'mystic union with God', and they are

(1) the incomplete union; (2) the complete or semi-ecstatic union; (3) the ecstatic union and (4) the transforming union or spiritual marriage.[32] Poulin also describes three kinds of stages and they are quietude, complete union and ecstasy. Pratt mentions that for the highest mystical experience or ecstasy these four degrees are necessary. St. Banaventura has described 'seven degrees of contemplation', which are similar to our Brāhmāṇical Tāntric seven levels of consciousness. Gerson describes three, St. Francois de Sales six, Alvarez de Paz fifteen, Scaramelli eleven and Ribet seven degrees or grades.[33] Prof. Pratt's contention is that the degrees are the different grades of evolution in the path of spiritual progress. The individual souls who aspire to attain highest ecstatic vision, will have to pass through these grades and at last reach the highest goal.

Now, in more recent times progress theory has been elaborately discussed by the German social philosopher, Oswald Spengler and the Russian-American sociologist, Pitirim Sorokin. The name of Dr. Benoy Kumar Sarkar should be mentioned in this connection, because he has also subscribed his

---

32 Cf. J.B. Pratt: *The Religious Consciousness* (1948), p. 398.

33 Ibid., p. 399.

independant view regarding the theory of progress and its destiny.

OSWALD SPENGLER in his celebrated work *The Decline of the West* (1917-23) sets out the bold proposition that mankind is on decline today. He makes out a distinction between kultur and civilization. The former is, in his view, more substantial and more creative, and hence, superior to the latter. While kultur represents the spiritual phase of life, civilization the material phase. Any transition from the former to the latter means degeneration, falling away from the ideal. The ideal is, in Spengler's views, the village or the rural community while city or urban society is its degeneration. Our present phase of life breathes a spirit of civilization and hence, in Spengler's view, it is far away from the kulture, the ideal phase.

Regarding the problem of civilization as a fundamental question of all higher history, Spengler says in the *Introduction* to his book: *The Decline of the West*: 'For every culture has *its own* civilization. * * The civilization is the inevitable *destiny* of the culture, * * *. Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of which a species of developed humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, the thing-become succeeding the thing-becoming, death

following life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built, petrifying world-city following mother-earth and the spiritual childhood of Doric and Gothic. They are an end, irrevocable, yet by inward necessity reached again and again'[34] That is, according to Spengler, the old is replaced by the new to build the architect of the culture and civilization and this process of building or construction is repeated by inward necessity of the society or the people of the State, and though the cycle of process is reached again and again,[35] yet it has an

---

34 Vide *The Decline of the West* (New York, 1932), p. 31

35. But Sir Arthur Eddington (1882) does not admit the theory of repeated progress or becoming in which individuals have to move again and again, and instead of it he accepts the condition of chaotic changelessness of static extension, the definite form or nature of which is not even known to him. He says that we generally interpret the world outside us in terms of evolution and progress, instead of a static extension by the feeling of *becoming* as a true mental insight into the physical condition which determines it. But, whether the progressive or repeated becoming is possible that should be judged. He states: "I am no Phoenix worshipper. This is a topic on which science is silent, and all that one can say is prejudice. But since prejudice in favour of a never-ending cycle of rebirth of matter and worlds is often vocal, I may perhaps give voice to the opposite prejudice. I would feel more content that the universe should accomplish some

end i.e. fulfilment and finale of a culture ('They are an end').

Spengler states in relation to *State and History* that culture is the being of nations in State-form. 'The Cosmic flowings appear as that which we call actuality, real life, being-streams in bodily form. Their common badge is Direction. But they can be grasped differently according as it is the *movement* or *the thing moved* that is looked at'. According to him 'a movement *has* form' and that which is moved is 'in form' or, to use another sporting expression, when it is 'going all out' it is in perfect condition'. The individual class or family, he says, is the smallest whereas the nation is the largest unit in the stream of history. 'The state in the simplest sense of the term may be as old as free-moving life itself'. Further, he says that history is no other than the being-streams of humanity when we regard them as *movement*, and family, estate, people, nation, when we regard them as the *object moved*.

---

great scheme of evolution and, having achieved whatever may be achieved, lapse back into chaotic changelessness than that its purpose should be benalized by continual reptition. I am an Evolutionist, not a Multiplicationist. It seems rather stupid to keep doing the same thing over and over again".—Vide *The Nature of the Physical World* (Everyman's Library Series, 1930), p. 92.

'Politics is the way in which this *fluent* Being maintains itself, *grows*, triumphs over other life-streams. * * That which we now-a-days like to call life-energy (vitality,) the 'it' in us that at all costs strives forward and upward, the blind cosmic drive to validity and power * * *. For it grows or *it dies out*, there is no third possibility'.[36]

In Spengler's opinion man has become utterly materialistic and he believes that the spiritual values are almost completely lost to view. This is civilization—a perversion and degeneration of Spengler's ideal kulture. But one should be cautious to note that Spengler is optimistic enough to visualise a state where our very life-process will be reversed, the evils allied with civilization will be transcended and mankind elevated to the realm of kulture. In other words, man is moving today through present chaos and suffering, vice and stupidity to an illuminous level where he will be deeply rooted in spiritual triumph. Thus Spengler is robustly optimistic in postulating a spiritual futurism of mankind.

PITRIM SOROKIN has set forth his views on progress in his celebrated four volume works: *Social and Cultural Dynamics* and *Sociology of Revolution*.

---

36. Vide *The Decline of the West* (1932), pp. 439-440.

Inspite of his formal and methodological differences with Spengler, he is in the last utterance Spenglerian in substance. Like Spengler, Sorokin also believes that at present mankind has become utterly materialistic or 'sensate', as he calls it. He believes that this sensate phase of life will in the future be counteracted and rendered ineffective by the re-assertion of the spirit in man. That phase will be 'ideational' or spiritual and it will mark the 'subjugation and control of nature by man' and will lead to the 'control of man by himself'.[37] Thus in fine, it may be stated that Sorokin, like Spengler, holds before man's vision a spiritual futurism—a futurism that believes in the lasting triumph of virtue over vice. Prof Benoy Sarkar also points out in his *Villages and Towns as Social Patterns* that 'spiritualitarian futurism is the common ideological platform of both (i. e. of Spengler and Sorokin). Each is convinced that something glorious and magnificient is tending to happen today or tomorrow which is calculated to spiritualize or re-spiritualize humanity. Even something of the Divine Absolute—a Bodhisattva, is being in'. As regards the creation of *history* Pitrim A. Sorokin

---

37 Vide B. K. Sarkar: *Political Philosopher's since* 1905, Vol. II, part. III, pp. 42-43.

holds that a history is a result of the uninterrupted creation though it is not so endlessly new and inexhaustible. The history of mankind does certainly repeat itself, but still it appears as new. He says: 'History is like an author who without interruption is writing ever new dramas, tragedies and comedies with new characters and heroes, with new scenery and environment, but * * * with old subjects which many times in the previous works of this indefatigable author have been repeated before. Like the writer who has written himself out, History, in spite of all its creative forces has to be repeated'.[38]

Dr. Sorokin says that revolution connotes the idea of change in all aspects of society. He states that revolution signifies a change in the behaviour of the people on the one hand and their psychology, ideology, beleifs and valuations on the other. It signifies a change in the biologic composition of population and of the reproductive and selective processes in its midst. It represents also the deformation of the social structure of society and means the change of fundamental social processes. The valuation of revolution is subjective and its scientific investigation is objective.

---

38 Cf. Sorokin: *The Sociology of Revolution* (1925), p. 5.

So we find that Dr. Sorokin was an out-and-out sociologist or rather revolutionist with the belief in a methodical new creation of society and not in its destruction.

The Spengler-Sorokin theory of progress has been severly called in question by Dr. B. K. Sarkar who rejects the futurism of Spengler-Sorokin as figment of wishful thinking, having no foundations in the world of reality. Any system or theory which fights shy of evils at every stage of human existence is untrue to human nature. He observes: 'The persistence or survival of evil is not a feature in the futurism as promulgated by this (Splenger-Sorokin) conception of progress. That the re-spiritualization of mankind may somehow be counteracted, baffled or rendered somewhat weak by the reassertion of the brute in man, the sensate, the intellect and so forth is hinted at neither by Sorokin nor by Spengler. There is no suggestion in either to the effect that even under 'magnificient ideationalism' and 'return to spiritual home' all may not be 'well on earth'. Progress theories, like those of Spengler and Sorokin, leave mankind no Satan to fight against, no *himsā*, *a-dharma* to combat, no misery to challenge. They render morality and spirituality bloodless and insipid by injecting strong doses of victories won and results

achieved. It is in the nature of complacent futurism to overlook the consideration that neither morality nor spirituality can flourish without some doses of evil to be counteracted and overpowered by man's creative intelligence and will. No evil, no morality. No evil, no progress. This fundamental consideration about the human *psyche* is ignored by Sorokin as much as by Spengler'.[39]

Dr. Sarkar is a pronounced pragmatist and pluralist. He is consistently opposed to the monistic sway of virtue or vice and by that reason of any other single phenomenon. In his view, man moves and acts not by a monistic urge, but by a series of dualistic complexes. 'At every stage the world', he says, 'is governed by the complex of the two alleged polarities or antithesis, i.e. *dharma*, *a-dharma*, sensate-ideational or intellect-soul. etc. as the categories may happen to be'.[40]

Dr. Sarkar holds that the seeds of duality or complex are deep in man's constitution. Human mind is, in his view, the theatre of opposites, vice-virtue complex or *dharma-adharma* amalgum and it is the permanent stuff of human nature. Here is to be

39 Dr. Sarker: *Villages and Towns as Social Patterns* (1941), p. 498.

40 Ibid., p. 502.

sought the roots of all conflict which alone sets man in motion. This conflict is universal and permanent. 'War between good and evil', observes Sarkar, 'is the eternal lot of man, and in this war no ultimate evil finally overpowers the good and no ultimate good finally overpowers the evil. The disequilibrium marches on with man and his creativities. Evil changes its forms and so also does good. One position of disequilibrium changes for another position. But it is disequilibrium all the time. It is the different positions, stages or forms of disequilibrium in motion that constitute progress'.[41] This progress then presupposes a condition of unrest which is generated by the conflict of opposites within us. These opposites change form and position, but in their deepest essence they persist in our blood. We cannot wholly transcend the limits of duality and complex, unrest and conflict, which are eternal and hence progress is eternal. Again it is to be stated that Sarkar does not even believe in the reality or validity of synthesis which is an essential element in the Hegelian-Mārxist dialectic. Hegelian-Mārxist dialect believes that progress wrought through a tension between thesis and antithesis which are in course of struggle united in a synthesis marks

---

41 Ibid., p. 521.

a stage of rest and harmony. Dr. Sarkar considers this synthesis as 'more apparent than real' and it is 'nothing more than a phase of the eternal conflicts between thesis and antithesis'. Thus Sarkar is explicitly a believer in perpetual unrest, conflict, struggle, position-changes and hence sharply opposed to the finalists. Dr. Sarkar himself says that a final annihilation of evil or *a-dharma* cannot be realistically speaking demonstrated in the nature of social evolution or human destiny.[42]

ALDOUS HUXLEY (1890) also raises the question of evolutionary progress and asks: can evolution be regarded as a genuine progress ? 'The lower forms of life', he says, 'persist more or less unchanged; but among the higher forms there has been a definite trend towards greater control and greater independence of the physical environment'. So, evolutionary progress can be divided into two kinds: 'general all-round progress and one-sided progress in a particular direction'. The last one leads to specialization and the first one being an one-sided progress 'makes it impossible for itself to achieve generalize progress'.

42 Cf. *Political Philosophies since 1905*, Vol. II, pt. III, pp. 66-68, and also *Villages and Towns as Social Patterns*, pp. 521-524.

The result from specialization is not successful, because the creatures who prove in specializing themselves 'to perform one sort of task and to live in one sort of environment' are 'fore-doomed to ultimate failure'. They reach 'a relatively stable position and become incapable of further development'. Only man alone can keep himself free from specialization and is therefore able 'to go on progressing in the direction of greater awareness, greater intelligence, greater control over environment'. So progress can be acheived by the highest types of animal life.[43]

Huxley states further that the highest type of evolution 'can continue to be a genuine progress only when certain conditions are fulfilled'. And these conditions are: (i) an organism must proceed forward along with the whole biological front and not with one part of itself or in one particular direction only. So one-sided specialized advance is not compatible with genuine progress; (ii) an organism can adopt even the one-sided specialized advance by an intra-specific competition. 'Progress', says Huxley, 'is dependant on the preponderance of intra-specific co-operation over intra-specific competition'; and (iii) an advance by *intelligence*. That is, by intelligence

43 Cf. *Ends and Means* (1946), pp. 262-264.

it is meant that advance in the biological progress is not effective unless an organism is conscious of one another's need for co-operation, i e. unless it communicates with one another for 'the fulfilment of certain physiological and mechanical conditions'.[44]

RABINDRANATH TAGORE (1861-1941) admits the theory of progress, but believes in its finality. He holds that the process of becoming is inevitable in every phase of human life. 'The development of intelligence and physical power', says he, 'is equally necessary in animals and men for their purposes of living, but what is unique in man is the development of his consciousness which gradually deepens and widens the realization of his immortal being, the perfect, the eternal. * * * He knows and uses this world where it is endless and thus attains greatness, but he realizes his own truth where it is perfect and thus finds his fulfilment.'[45]

The poet says that for widenment of the narrow range of individual consciousness the scientific knowledge is also necessary, and for this purpose the process of gradual development or progress in our civilization is admitted. But progress does not connote

---

44 Ibid., pp. 264-265.

45 Vide *The Religion of Man* (1949), pp. 19-17.

the idea of eternal marching without an end. Progress means 'there is an ideal perfection which the individual seeks to reach by extending his limits in knowledge, power, love, enjoyment, thus approaching the universal'. He says that the evolution of process of the world has also made its progress towards the revelation of its *truth*. And even the 'physiological process in the progress of Life's evolution seems to have reached its finality in man'. While discussing about the realization of the infinite in his book *Sādhanā* he compares the process of becoming as the rushing stream of sounds that creates music of life. He says: 'In the music of the rushing stream sounds the joyful assurance: 'I shall become the sea'. * * * But it can and does become sea. * * * It moves through the thousand objects on its onward course, and its motion finds its finality when it reaches the sea, * * * In the same manner our soul can only become Brahman as the river can become the sea. * * * Once our soul realizes her ultimate object of repose in Brahman all her movements acquire a purpose. It is this ocean of infinite rest which gives significance to endless activities.'[46]

46 Vide *Sādhanā* (1947), pp. 156-157.

SWAMI ABHEDANANDA (1866-1939) also subscribes his views regarding the theory of evolution or progress. He says that in explaining the theory three principal factors should be observed and they are: (a) *the tendency to vary* which exists in all living forms whether vegetable or animal; (b) *the tendency of environment* to influence that variation, either favourably or unfavourably, and it is called the *natural selection*; and (c) *the tendency of selective process* or *the struggle for existence*. Generally we find that man's 'self' consists of two natures, animal and moral or spiritual, Swāmi Abhedānanda is of opinion that it is not true that moral or spiritual nature of human beings is traced as the outgrowth or gradual development of the animal nature by means of the struggle for material existence, because we find that moral or spiritual qualities are not to be found in lower animals, although the struggle for existence is there. He says: 'Vedānta accepts evolution and admits the laws of variation and natural selection, but goes a step beyond modern science by explaining the cause of that 'tendency to vary'. It says 'there is nothing in the end which was not also in the beginning'. It is a law which governs the process of evolution as well as the law of causation. If we admit this grand truth of nature, then it will not be difficult to explain by the theory of evolution

the gradual manifestation of the higher nature of man. The tendency of scientific monism is towards that end.'[47]

According to Swāmi Abhedānanda the end of evolution is the attainment of perfection and it is a grand truth of Vedānta. The tendency of the law of evolution is to reach perfection. He says: 'Evolution attains to the highest fulfilment of its purpose when the spirit manifest perfectly. The tendency of nature is to have perfect manifestation of all her powers. * * As we find in the process of evolution, when animal nature manifests perfectly, the moral and spiritual nature remain latent. Again often moral and spiritual nature remain latent. Again when moral and spiritual nature manifest fully, the animal is in abeyance.''

In Swāmi Abhedānanda's view, the theory of reincarnation is a supplement to the theory of evolution, because evolution explains the process of life, while reincarnation explains the purpose of life. As he says: 'The theory of reincarnation is a logical necessity for the completion of the theory of evolution. If we admit a continuous evolution of a unit

---

47 Vide Abhedānanda: *Reincarnation*, (1951), pp. 55-56.

of the germ of life through many gross manifestations then we unconsciously accept the teachings of the doctrine of reincaranation. In passing through different forms and manifestations the unit of life does not lose its identity or individuality'. Now, what do we mean exactly by the doctrine of reincarnation ? 'The doctrine of reincarnation says that each individual soul is potentially perfect and is gradually unfolding its powers and making them actual through the process of evolution.' The theory of transmigration is an another phase of theory of progress or evolution which explains the continuity of and presupposes the existence of the soul as an entity which can live even the gross material body is dead or dissolved into its elements. Swāmi Abhedānanda exhibits his own original views taking a bold stand on the rock of logical and acientific arguments when he explains the theory of transmigration in his celebrated book *Reincarnation*. He accepts the modern science and its truth-seeking method, but rejects the rigid and gross theories of the modern scientists, agnostics and materialists, who admit the theory of heredity and endeavour to explain everything by it. He further refutes the views of the Christian Jews, Mohammedans and Parsees as regards their beliefs in the theory of transmigration. The

Swāmi says that the theory of transmigration or metempsychosis is believed by many philosophers as the passing of a soul from one body into another after death. The belief is found even in Pythagoras, Plato and their followers. Plato described in mythological language in *Phaedrus* how the human souls go out of dead bodies and take new ones for getting newer experiences. The Platonic idea of transmigration admits the successive lives after death. According to this theory, the souls are allowed to choose their lots in accordance with their experience or bent of character, but not to receive the natural consequences of their good and bad deeds. Plato believed that souls generally choose bodies in lower animals. But the Hindu view of transmigration is quite different. Buddhist rebirth theory is also different from the Hindu one, because the Buddhists do not believe in the permanence of the soul entity, whereas the Hindu believes that soul is permanent and body is impermanent. Swāmi Abhedānanda shows the difference between Hindu or Vedāntic theory of reincarnation and Platoic theory of transmigration. He says that according to Hindu or Vedāntic theory the soul or germ of life passes through the lower stages and comes at last to higher human plane, and after coming to the higher plane, it does not retrograde in lower

animal bodies. But the Platonic theory is quite opposite to it, because it teaches that souls can retrograde to different animal bodies. It is true, the Swāmi states, that although "there are passages in the scriptural writings of the Hindus which *apparantly* refer to the retrogression of the human soul into animal nature, still *such passages do not necessarily mean that the souls will be obliged to take animal bodies. They may live like animals even when they have human bodies*, as we may find among us many people like cats and dogs and snakes in human form and they are often more vicious than natural cats, dogs and snakes. They are reaping their own *karma* and manifesting their *animal nature*, though physically they look like human beings.' Swāmi Vivekānanda upheld the view of the traditional Hindu scriptures, but Swāmi Abhedānanda took a very rational, and scientific view. Here lies a difference between Swāmi Vivekānanda and Swāmi Abhedānanda in their respective views. Mr. Tylor, Prof. Seth Pringle-Pattison, Dr. Rādhākriṣṇan and others uphold the same view which Swāmi Abhedānanda maintains. Like the Swāmi, Dr. Rādhākriṣṇan says in his *Idealist View of Life* (1237, p, 292): 'It is possible for man to degenerate into a savage being but he is still a man. * * * It is possible that rebirth in animal form is

a figure of speech for rebirth with animal qualities'. Swāmi Abhedānanda gives strong and reasonable argument in support of his view and he says that we 'have already passed in the evolutionary process through the lower grade of animal organisms. Now that we have outgrown them, why should we go back to them?' However, in the opinion of Swāmi Abhedānanda reincarnation of the soul is nothing but the fulfilment of ultimate purpose of earthly life; it is a means to an end; it is a marching towards the human prime goal which is the attainment of Godconscousness.

III

In India we find the idea of progress evolved long before the Greek and the other Western philosophers dreamt of it. The nucleus of the idea of progress is contained in the cosmology of the Rigveda. In the *Upaniṣads* it is more vivid and systematic. It was further developed by Kapila on a very scientific and rational basis. Kapila was an original free thinker, and his system breathes the pure atmosphere of independence and freedom of thought. Prof. Rādhā-kriṣṇan says: 'In Kapila's doctrine, for the first time in the history of the world, the complete independence

and freedom of the human mind, its full confidence in its own powers were exhibited.[1]

Swāmi Abhedānanda is of opinion that all the evolutional systems of the world are indebted to Kapila. He says: 'All neighbouring peoples, who came in contact with India, were influenced more or less by Kapila's system of philosophy. The idea of religion found amongst the Greek philosophers and neo-Platonists has often been traced back to the influence of the Sāṇkhya school. They came in contact with India and India also had communications with them. It is also a fact that in ancient times the Hindu philosophers came to know the school of Socrates.'[2]

Firmly and with no faltering accent Sir M. M. Williams says in his *Hinduism and Brāhminịsm* thus 'The Hindus were Spinozites more than two thousand years before the existence of Spinoza, and Dārwinians many centuries before Dārwin, and evolutionists many centuries before the doctrine of evolution had been accepted by the scientists of our time and before

---

1 Vide Rādhākrisṇan: *Indian Philosophy* (1940), vol. II, p. 249.

2 Vide Swāmi Abhedānanda: *Attitude of Vedānta towards Religion* (1947). p. 105.

any word like evolution existed in any language of the world.' Huxley also unhesitatingly admits this fact and he says that doctrine of evolution was familiar to the Indian sages and philosophers ages before Paul of Tarsus was born.

In the *Upaniṣads* we find the evolutionary process in the level of consciousness or mind. The *Māndukya Upaniṣad* admists four levels of consciousness, *jāgrat, svapna, suṣupti* and *turiya.* These divisions quite correspond to General Smuts' four wholes of experience, matter, cell, mind, and personality.[3] Western psychologists and psycho-analysts like Freud, Adler, Jung, Allan and others divide consciousness into three levels and they are the unconsciousness or subconsciousness, the preconsciousness and the consciousness. Freud says that the preconsciousness is the unconsciousness only from the descriptive point of view.[4] Both the preconsciousness and the unconsciousness are latent. Freud calls these three levels again as Ego, Id and Superego or Ego-ideal. The repressed serves us a prototype of the unconscious. * * That which is latent, and only

---

3 Cf. *Yoga and Psycho-analysis* by Sj. Kumer Pāl, M.A. appeared in the *Parabuddha Bhārata*, May, 1947, p. 204.

4 Vide *The Ego and the Id* (1947), p. 12.

unconscious in the descriptive and not in the dynamic sense, we call *preconscious*; the term *unconscious* we reserve for the dynamically unconscious repressed, so that we now have three terms, conscious (Cs), preconscious (Pcs), and unconscious (Ucs), which are no longer purely descriptive in sense.

In the Vaiṣṇava literature and especially in the *Pañcharātra* and Rāmānuja systems we find the mention of four kinds of *vyūhas*, *saṅkarṣaṇa*, *vāsudeva*, *pradyumna* and *aniruddha*. Each of these *vyūhas* is a cosmic spiritual evolute or creative emergence in successive order, parallel to the order of cosmic material evolutes of *ahaṁkāra*. Each of the *vyūhas* is an independant creative centre, which contains two kinds of activities, a creative and a moral ones. Among these two activities, one is connected with the origin of beings and the other with their ethical progress. Again each of these activities of a *vyūha* is said to be mediated by some *guṇa*. As for example, *saṅkarṣaṇa* presides over *ahaṁkāra*, *vāsudeva* over *chitta*, *pradyumna* over *buddhi* and *aniruddha* over *manas*. The creative activities of the *vyūhas*, says Otto Schrader, came into play one after another marking out in the following successive stages in the creation of the non-pure universe.[5]

5 Cf. Otto Schrader: *Introduction of the Pañcharātra and the Ahirbudhanya-Saṁhitâ*, p. 36.

Dr. S. K. De says: In some Satvata-Tantra, we are told, there is enumeration of nine *vyūhas* (also referred to in *Śrīkrisṇa-sandharabha*, p. 154), viz. Nārāyaṇa, Nrisiṁha. Hayagrîva, Mahāvarāha and Brahmā, in addition to the four mentioned above;[6] but the four appear to be the original and generally accepted *vyūhas*.[7] Again we find the mention of twelve *vyūhas* which are consecutive ones of the four principal *vyūhas*, *saṅkarṣaṇa* and others. Dr. Bhāndārkar is of opinion that five kinds of *vyūhas* again constitute the status of Ānandabhairava or Mahābhairava. These five *vyūhas* are composed of 'nine collections of things which is made up of such time and its various forms (*kālavyūha*), existing things like the blue, substance (*kūlavyūha*), names (*nāmavyūha*), perception (*jñānavyūha*), the five faculties, viz. consciousness, heart, will, intelligence and mind (*chittavyūha*).'[8]

Now, what do these *vyūhas* signify? The *vyūhas* are no other than different manifestations of human consciousness. The word '*vyūha*' connotes therefore

---

6 *Saṅkarṣaṇa*, *Vāsudeva*, *Pradyumna* and *Aniruddha*.

7 Vide *Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal* (1942), pp. 187-188.

8 Vide *Vaiṣṇavism, Saivism and Minor Religious System*, (1928), pp. 206, 207.

the idea of progress—the progress of manifestations of the mind or consciousness. Because both from the biological and philosophical standpoints it is true that as an animal passes from one life to another, his inner ingredients (like mind, conciousness, etc.) develop through gradual process, and he will have to complete his cycles of births and deaths till the end of his journey. The birth of every living being signifies a step in the way of his life's progress. Though the word *vyūha* in the *Pañcharātra* and different Vaiṣṇava literature conveys a specific meaning, yet it, in the truest sense, signifies a grade or level in the way of progress like the words *chakra*, *padma* and *bhūmi* or the plexus of the Tantra literature. In Tantra and later Yoga literature like *Hatayogapradīpikā*, we find the mention of seven *chakras* inside the canal of the spinal column and they have been described beautifully ascribing varigated colours, deities, etc. The psychic energy *Kulakundalinī* sleeps under the bed of the subconscious plane or *mūlādhāra* and it is awakened with the friction of will-power (*ichhā-śakti* or heat-energy) and vital-air (*prāṇavāyu*). It remains as if coiled i. e. inactive or static. It is the stored up impressions of hundreds of births of living beings and known as the divine Śakti. It rises gradually upwards penetrating the levels of

plexus one after another and at last it reaches to the plexus of thousand petals (*sahasrāra*). It is the highest level of consciousness, which shines with its undying glory and lustre for eternity. It is called the Parama-Siva or supreme consciousness with all-existence, all-knowledge and all-bliss. The individual psychic energy (*kāmakalā*) or *Kundalinī* communes in this highest level with the Parama-Śiva, the highest consciousness and completes its toilsome journey. The progress of man ends when he attains the supreme consciousness or Divine realization and this is the real purpose of differnt *vyūhas* or *chakras* of the Vaiṣṇava, Tantra and later Yoga literatures.

In Buddhist psychology we also find the mention of seven mental processes for removing the impurities of passions and different mental obstructions. The seven kinds of purifying methods (*viśudhi-magga*) are no other than the seven stages of progress or marching towards the attainment of the absolute purity which leads to *Nibbāṇa* or Nirvāṇa. It is said that Buddha, the Blessed One taught his disciples these seven paths of progress (towards the final goal) and they are: *śīlaviśuddhi* or purity of morality, *chittaviśuddhi* or purity of mind, *ditthiviśuddhi* or purity of right views, *kaṅkhavitaraṇiviśuddhi* or purity consisting in overcoming all doubts, *magga-*

maggenānādassana-viśuddhi or purity of insight concerning the discernment of the right resp. the wrong path, *pati-padanānādassana-viśuddhi* or purity of insight into the four paths of holiness. There are again subdivisions of each of these seven stages of progress. It is said that in the fourth and fifth stages there are variations of consciousness or knowledge which evolve through the process of gradual progress or becoming.[9]

The Buddhist psychology divides Bodhisattva's career or spiritual *sādhanā* into ten grades. They are known as *bhūmis* or *vihāras*. The *bhūmis* or *vihāras* are no other than the different steps towards Perfection. In the *Dhammasaṅgani* these *bhūmis* are known as the *magga* (sanskrit *mārga*). In the *Bodhisattabhūmi* we find the mention of seven *bhūmis* and thriteen *vihāras*.[10] But the Hīnayāṇis believe in four stages only like the followers of the Advaita Vedānta. The Pāli Cannon describes the three *vihāras* instead of thirteen, and they are: *divva-vihāra*, *ārya-vihāra* and *brahma-vihāra* (*divya*, *ārya* and *brahma*,

9 Cf. Ven Vappa Mohā Therā: '*Satta-viśuddhi or the Seven Stages of Purity* (appeared in the *Mahā-Bodhi* Journal, vol. 55, Nos. 5-6 May-June, 1947), pp. 43-56.

10 Vide the name of the *bhūmis* and *vihāras* in Dr. Har Dayal's book: *The Bodhisattva Doctrine or Buddhist Sanskrit Literature*, pp. 278-282.

which mean divine noble and sublime). The three divisions of the Pāli Cannon correspond to the three divisions of consciousness i.e. subconsciousness, consciousness and super-consciousness of the Western psychology to an extent. Dr. Suzuki mentions the names of ten *bhūmis* of the Buddhists, which are: *pramidetā*, *vimalā*, *vabhakāri*, *archismatī*, *sudurjayā*, *abhimukhī*, *dūraṅgamā*, *achalā*, *sadhumatī* and *dharmamegha*.[11] In the *Daśabhūmikāsūtra* these *bhūmis* have also been mentioned. The *bhūmis* or stages of progress as mentioned in the *Mahāvāstu* again differ in their names and they are: *durāroha*, *buddhamāna*, *paṣpamanditā*, *ruchirā*, *chittavistāra*, *rūpavatī*, *duryayā*, *janmanideṣa*, *yauvarāja* and *abhiṣeka*. It has been said in the Buddhist literature that Bodhisattvas rise and advance from one stage (*bhūmi*) to another till they attain the Enlightenment or Nirvāṇa.

Again the Buddhists who believe that knowledge or consciousness (*vijñāna*) is momentary (*kṣaṇika*), every unit of consciousness originates and dies one after another in the streams of consciousness (*vijñānadhārā*) and not a single unit exists as permanent, are not correct. Because nothing remains baseless in this

11 Vide D. T. Suzuki: *Outlines of Mahāyāṇa Buddhism*, pp. 313-326.

world, everything must rest on same ground. The streams of water pass, having their permanent ground as the bed of the river. So one unit of consciousness may be followed by another unit, but all the units pass having their basic ground as the permanent supreme consciousness, the Ātman or Brahman. Dharmarāja Adhvarin, the author *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* says: "*Kiṁ cha siddhānte dhārāvāhika-buddhisthale na jñāna-bhedah*,"[12] i.e. there is no difference of successive cognitions or break of knowledge on the occassions of a continuous stream of cognition, because even for a continuous stream of cognition, there is a content or an object of earlier or preceeding cognition: "*dhārā-vāhika-huddherapi pūrva-pūrva-jñānā-viṣayatattāt kṣṇa-viśiṣta-viṣayakatvena na tatrāvyāpti.*"[13] The contention is that the stream or continuousness is no other than the progress or the process of *becoming* and it never exists as a baseless flux. It may move forward, in a straight line, in a wavy motion or in a circular way, but in every movement it possesses some basic consciousness as its ground which connects or links up the succeeding units of consciousness.

---

12 'किं च सिद्धान्ते धारावाहिकवुद्धिस्थले न ज्ञानभेदः, * * ।'

13 '* * धारावाहिकवुद्धेरपि पूर्वपूर्वज्ञानविषयतत्तत्क्षणविशेषविषिष्ट-विषयकत्वेन न तत्राव्याप्तिः' ।

The doctrine of the momentary cognition of *kṣaṇi-kavijñānavāda* of the Buddhist deduces everything of the world to a stream of isolated consciousness, which proves that everything in this world is momentary, therefore unreal and void (*sūnya* or non-existant). The Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṅsakas object to the entire theory of flux which is pivoted on the truth or the proposition: 'what is existant is momentary'. But the Buddhists argue against the objections of the Naiyāyikas aud Mīmāṅsakas and say that the life of consciousness beginningless, never-ending continuum, in which each precedent conscious moment is followed by a subsequent consciousness moment, which derives its existance from the former and goes on producing its duplicate without end, Thus so far consciousness *qua* consciousness is concerned, it is an eternal, timeless process without a definite beginning or an abrupt end.[14] To this non-dualistic Vedānta says that the socalled timeless consciousness continuum is neither than a fictitious idea nor an unreal fiction, as every happening has its existence in time and space and the idea of *becoming* also presupposes the idea of *being*. Again a man who knows the momentari-

14 Cf. Dr. Mookherjee: *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux* (1935), p. 205.

ness and unreality of a thing or a cognition, becomes the existent ground of the knowledge of the momentariness or unreality, and so an eternal continuum or progress without a knower as its ground, without a purpose and a goal is meaningless and absurd. A solid answer has been given in this way by Śaṅkar to refute the doctrine of void or *śūnyatā* of the *śūnyavādi* Buddhists. Śaṅkar argues that it may be a statement of fact that the world of appearence is a non-entity and void (*śūnya*), but there should exist a cognizer (*jñātā*) of the cognition (*jñān*) of void and that proves that void or timeless continuum must be based on a ground other than it.

Saṅkara in *Pañcikaraṇa* and Sureśvara in the *Pañcikaraṇavārtika* have divided consciousness into four levels. Bhāskararāya in his *Vārivasyarahasya* puts it in ten grades, and *Nārada-parivrājaka Upāniṣad* deals with sixteen grades of internal evolution. Madhusudan Sarasvati describes nine stages of progress in his *Siddhāntavindu* and eleven stages in his *Bhaktirasāmrita*. It has already been mentioned that Yoga and Tāntric systems of *sādhanā* admit only seven stages. They have also admitted some subtle divisions between the *chakras*, *ājñā* and *sahasrāra*. The *Mahā-Upaniṣad* and the *Yogavāśistha Rāmāyaṇa* divide the level of consciousness in the same way.

Vedānta deals with five kinds of sheaths or levels of experience and they are known as, *annamayakoṣa manamayakoṣa*, *prāṇamayakoaṣ*, *vijñānamayakoṣa* and *ānandamayakoṣa*. These are really the levels of consciousness and the aspiring soul passing through these levels attains the immortal bliss.

CHAPTER III

PROGRESS AS THE CONCEPT OF CHANGE

PROGRESS connotes the concept of motion. The theory of progress again explains the process of change, evolution or involution, through gradual movements, upwards or downwards. The course of change moves from one point to another either in a straight line, in a circular or spiral way. It appears in successions or series as a flux of connected or disconnected fragments, as a flowing current of a river or as a changing flame of a candle or as a flying patch of the cloud. It emerges as a substance or as a quality totally new in form, or repeats and represents the past in the garb of the present.

The wheel of progress rotates from the beginningless past and will continue to do so through the endless eternity until it terminates. There is no crying halt to the march of progress. There is no rest in the ever recurring rotation until it fulfils its mission, until it comes back to its causal state. Even this vast universe, in which we live, move and have our being, has been shaped out through the gradual process of evolution. As regards the gradual shaping out of this universe Swāmi Abhedānanda says: 'The

basic material of the world goes through various phases of transformations, such as liquid. gaseous and solid before a planet or a cosmic body becomes inhabitable, either for vegetables or animals. A large mass of the vegetable substance, or whatever it may be called, passes through the gaseous state, liquid state, solid state, as it is cooled, it becomes the home of various plants and animals of different kinds. This process may take millions of years and then, in course of time, the solid body begins to dissolve and gradually evolves into its original nebulous material, or ethereal substance. Ascending through the process of evolution, matter gradually passes from one form to another until organic life is possible.'[1]

The process of progress may be called Nature or *Prakriti* though practically it forms the category of Nature as a whole. The function of Nature is to weave eternally the net of events of matter and spirit. But its historical development is the record of the annals of living beings: their races, their cultures, their societies, their births and deaths, ups and downs, and thus it makes a history of the world in its organic wholeness.

---

1 Cf. Abhedānanda: *Attitude of Vedānta towards Religion* (1947), p. 103.

Dynamicism belongs to the very stuff of Nature. It may be called an evolving practical history that knows development in a dialectical process. Well has it been said by Sir Brajendranāth Seal, the greatest Indian savant, that the historical dialectical change does not know the stamp of finality on any particular stage in its way of development, but is left to follow freely its own course.[2] But it is a fact that an evolution is always preceded by an involution, growth is always followed by decay, and the repeated occurrences of the two opposites create a cycle in the bosom of eternity. Some say that this series of cause and consequence is the prime factor in the process of progress. They make an eternal progression or marching with an ever-recurring circle that rotates and does not know how to stop. But this cannot be possible. It may be a fact in the world of imagination and fancy, but in the pragmatic field of experience, this seems to be an impossibility. Because what has a beginning, has also an end. The initial is followed by the final. When a ball rolls, it begins its start from a point and marches forward until it reaches the terminus. Every movement proceeds with a motive behind it; it can never be

2 Cf. Prof. B. N. Seal: *New Essays in Criticism* (1903), p. 14.

blind and aimless. It cannot run or rotate eternally without any ultimate aim or goal. Every progression has, therefore, a beginning and an end, and it moves gardually towards a goal as its finality.

Progress or development can generally be divided into two main heads: (1) it appears without producing any qualitative and quantitative changes, and (2) it appears as an emergent evolution of a different new element with qualitative and quantitative changes. The former is called *sadriśa-pariṇāma* and the latter, *visadriśa-pariṇāma* in Indian philosophy. In *sadriśa-pariṇāma* the change goes with repeated forms without disturbing the primal quality and quantity, whereas in *visadriśa-pariṇāma* the change appears in a quite new form. Kaṇāda, the author of the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy, Gautama, the upholders of the *Nyāya* philosophy and the *Tāntrikas* in the East, and Llyod Morgan, S. Alexander, Mārx, Engels and others in the West, are the exponents of *visadriśa-pariṇāma*. Kapila, the author of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy and the Vedāntists in the East, and Bergson, Croce, Gentile, Clifford and others in the West, maintain the theory of *sadriśa-pariṇāma*. The Greek philosophers Empedocles and Heraclitus believe in the theory of *visadriśa-pariṇāma*, whereas the Ionians, Plato and Aristotle maintain the

theory of *sadriśa-pariṇāma*. Empedocles puts forward the theory that the existing universe came into being through the gradual process of evolution. Heraclitus says that none can take bath twice in the same river, and so the world-appearance is a 'continual and all-pervading change'. Plato like Ionians believes the progress to be constant or continuous. He maintains that world of nature 'as such is process, growth, change'. It is a spontaneous movement. It moves by itself and it is a self-causing and self-existing process. Aristotle calls this progress a movement, as a process or a development, and not an evolution. Because 'for Aristotle the kinds of change and of structure', says Prof. Collingwood, 'exhibited in the world of nature from an eternal repertory and the items in the repertory are related logically, not temporally, among themselves.'[3]

It has been mentioned that the *Nyāy-Vaiśeṣika* schools are the upholders of *visadriśa-pariṇāma*. And in defence of their theory they say that when milk is changed into curd, the latter becomes entirely a new substance with its new characteristic ingredients. But the *Sankhya-Vedānta* schools refute the arguments of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* schools in favour of

3 Cf. Prof. R. G. Collingwood: *The Idea of Nature* (1945), p. 82.

its theory of *sadriśa-pariṇāma*. They say that though different kinds of ornaments are made up of gold, yet the gold-element remains the constant factor in the midst of all changes in its forms. The theory of *visadriśa-pariṇāma* is also known as the production theory or *pariṇāmavāda* that is reduced to the doctrine of dualism, and *sadriśa-pariṇāma* is known as the theory of superimposition or *vivartavāda* reducible to the doctrine of monism or non-dualism.

Well has it been said by Prof. Joad: The progress which 'we know as evolution advances by increasing the size, not of the cell or of the individual, but of the *unit of organisation*. Evolution, in fact, is a process by which ever more numerous and diverse units are integrated into ever richer and more comprehensive wholes'.[4] It has already been said that progress or development cannot be an aimless marching. It moves to reach a definite end or destination. The human life is also meaningful and purposive. A purpose implies an inclination to reach a definite goal and that is realized in the way of progress. Life 'is conceived initially as a mere blind thirst of impulsion, a *will-to-live* as Schopenhauer calls it, expressing itself

4 Vide Prof. C. E. M. Joad: *The Philosophy of Federal Union*, pp. 12-13.

in a never-ending stream of impulses and desires'.[5] In fact, the idea of purposiveness emerges 'as one of the qualities that life acquires in the process its own evolution' and the height of hope and aspiration flash on the mental horizon as it discovers the path to further upward progress. Those rays of hope and aspirations are Schopenhauer's 'first dim light of dawn', that shares 'the name of sunlight with the rays of full midday'. Swāmi Abhedānanda says that in the process of gradual evolution in man's life there must lie 'some definite purpose at each step; it does not evolve blindly as some think, but gain some definite object to fulfil the desire that has existed potentially in that particle of life from beginningless past'.[6]

Everything in this world represent, as it were, a stage in progress or development. The concept of progress presupposes the idea of growth. For example, a man has developed from an amoeba which is a compound of the protoplasms of homogeneous character. A man is simply an organism, that evolves or develops gradually from the lower to

5 Cf. Prof. C. E. M. Joad: *Guide to Modern Thought*, p. 138.

6 Vide Swāmi Abhedānanda: *Attitude of Vedanta towards Religion* (1947), p. 31.

the higher structure, or from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous; he is nothing but an ever-increasing complexity and diversity in the character of the actions that take place in the process of evolution. In fact, evolution 'not only exhibits a constant process of differentiation and a constant increase in the diversity of parts and organs, but there goes along with this what might be called a process of unification whereby the parts are brought into ever closer and more essential relation to one another'.[7] So an evolution does not only mean a mere assemblege of component parts in the structure, but also 'a real and organic whole', and that is formed by the gradual process of progress or development with necessary adjustment and readjustment according to the varying situations in the life-process.

Dr. Rādhākrisṇan says: 'There is real temptation, genuine struggle involved in every transcendence of the natural man. * * This transcendence is a phenomenon common to all progress. From the pursuit of its prey by the amoeba to the spiritual struggles of the striving soul, we have a continuously graded series of purposive efforts'.[8] He argues

7 Vide J. E. Creighton: *An Introductory Logic* (1946), p. 370.

8 Vide Dr. Rādhākrisṇan: *Kalki* (1934), pp. 62-63.

further that a man 'is never satisfied with mere acceptance or adjustment. There is an urge in the breast that makes him go forward and upward. The ultimate aim of life is not simply to maintain but to elevate the plane. The invididual desires to live more and still more and surpass himself in order to reach plentitude of living'.[9]

Truly speaking, hunger is life as it is the chief factor in the struggle for existence. Swami Abhedānanda says that satisfaction is death and dissatisfaction is life. He means to say that when the word *satisfaction* is used in a very high sense it denotes *perfection* or an achievement of the highest good. But, found in the ordinary usage, it signifies a suicidical halt in the way of aspiration in one's life, and that means a temporary fulfilment of all the further desires. Ordinarily such satisfaction of desires kills the spur to further advance. Viewed in this light, satisfaction carries with it the germs of death, and dissatisfaction serves as the driving impulse to progress whose course is finished with the attainment of *mokṣa* or the highest apperception of the Absolute.

All progress, says Dr. Rādhākriṣṇan, is due to rebels. Rebellious attitude is the logical outcome

9 *Ibid*, p. 66.

of one's deep-seated discontent. Discontent in its turn gives momentum to life and its activities. So adventure in the form of creative activity is necessary in every human life as it promises the genuine security of bringing immortal perfection to mortal man. Inactivity in higher life is adorable, because it signifies the self-resignation to the cosmic will. But inactivity in ordinary life means idleness that indulges the mind and body to sink in the dark grave of despair and pitiable loss. Activity brings with it the inspiration and enthusiasm in every sphere of life. Activity brings in return a purposive and meaningful progress that bestows the blessings of permanent freedom. 'Mere acceptance without adventure, mere adjustment without alternation' says, Dr. Rādhākriṣṇan, 'may mean perfection of a kind, peace of a sort, but it is not the perfection of a human being or the peace of a spiritual nature.'[10]

Peace of the blessed spiritual nature breathes the holy atmosphere of serene calmness that leads to God-realization. God-realization is the final goal of all human progress. Man alone enjoys the peaceful bliss of Immortality. Man 'alone has the surest conquest on the conflict between what he is and

10 Cf. Dr. Rādhākriṣṇan: *Kalki.*

what he can be. He is distinguished from other creatures by his seeking after a rule of life, a principle of progress'. Again it should be remembered that the epithet 'man is choicest son of God' does not mean that man of all kinds or man of all grades will achieve the bliss of Immortality, but it signifies that he is only chosen to get perfection, who rises on the crest of progress, who has finished his toilsome journey of the decitful world, and who is willing to correct his error or false knowledge that chains him and deludes him in the world of change.

The world of endless or timeless *becoming* cannot stand as static, It is ever dynamic. It is an ever-changing actuality like a flux or a flowing flame. It creates the present, past and future.[11] It marches onward through its passing phases and thus makes an eternal chain of changes. Change is its life, and change constitutes its stuff. So, with the changes eternal, the world evolves with its races. peoples, cultures, societies, civilizations, philosophies, religions, arts and literatures, that build a history of the world. The German sociologist-philosopher

---

11 Oswald Spengler defines present, past and future thus: 'The possible is called the *Future* and actualized the *Past*. The actualizing itself, the centre-gravity and centre of meaning of life, we call the *Present*',—Cf. *The Decline of the West* (1946), vol. I, p. 54.

Spengler's remarkable hypothesis lends also the similar conclusion. Spengler's thesis submits: 'Races and cultures are units which undergo a rhythmically ordered sequence of birth, growth, decline, and decay * *. In the past, perhaps regional civilizations succeeded one after another or passed through the stages of infancy, youth, maturity and old age, and when they decayed, they left their inheritance to the younger ones which sprang up after them.'[12]

Impulse to progress lies in the very stuff of creation. It is the vital force in the cosmic order. From the amoeba to man there are innumerable changes and developments, and through them the human society with its immense wealth and beauty marches onward towards its ideal perfection. The human society is not a steel-framed cell that can defy growth or expansion. It has an adventurous history of progressive events and incidents. It is mobile and ever-shifting. It marches with its aims and objects. Its present merges into the depth of the past and the future appears in the hollow of the past. The cycle of present, past and future builds the immense structure of eternity. The dynamic dance of *Natarāja* goes on all the time without cessa-

---

12 Cf. *Kalki* (1934), p. 10.

tion. Everything in this world will pass, nothing will remain as static except the immutable trancendent Reality. This present civilization and culture that delude us with their pseudo-permanency, will also be merged into a newly shaping future, and that future ones will reappear in a new aspect. The progress thus moves with its phases upward and downward upon the breast of the undying Time or Mahākāla. To describe this ceaseless change of the world in the words of Dr. Rādhākrisṇan it can be said: 'The world is casting off its old garments. Standards, aims, and institutions which are gradually accepted even a generation ago, are now challenged and changing. Old motives are weakening and new forces are springing up. Anyone who has an insight into the mind of the age, is vividly conscious of its restlessness and uncertainty, its dissatisfaction with the existing economic and social conditions and its yearnings for the new order which is not yet realized'.[13]

The changing or shifting phase is thus the nature and stuff of progress. All progress involves the complexity of potentiality and actuality, and potentiality, says Prof. Collingwood, 'is the seat of a nexus in virtue of which it is forcing its way to-

---

13 *Ibid*, p. 7.

wards actuality'. The actuality is another form of the evolutionary progress. Aldous Huxley also raises the question: whether the evolutionary progress can be regarded as genuine. He himself replies to it that 'lower forms of life posits more or less unchanged; but among the higher forms there has been a definite trend towards greater'. He admits that the evolutionary progress can be divided into two heads: 'general, all-round progress and one-sided progress in a particular direction'. The last one leads 'to specialization, and the first one being one-sided makes it impossible for itself to achieve generalized form'.[14]

But whatever may be the phases and volumes of progress, it is a fact that progress always expresses the idea of *change*. This change is again conscious and continuous and it knows the finality as its end. It moves towards the eternity with an impatient longing and urge to complete and not to continue its marching all through the ages. It reaches its goal where there remains no marching, no change and no concept of dynamicity. Then it completes its journey and attains perfection which is permanent and transcends the limit of space and time.

---

14 Cf. Aldous Huxley: *Ends and Means* (1946), pp. 262-266.

Now, what are the criteria for testing the soundness of the concept of progress? It is a general belief that change or progress of a man consists in the way of his self-realization and the progressive society is that order of collective existence which affords greater and greater scope for the self-realization of its individual members. But some are of opinion that if self-realization means just the discovery of one's likeness in others in increasing degrees, it cannot be held as a true criterion of progress because of its inadequacy and one-sidedness. The *Upaniṣadic* cult of the Absolute or Self-realization as preached by the *Bhagavad-Gītā* upholds that 'what I do, what you do, and what others do, willy nilly we endeavour in different ways, according to our capacities and opportunities, to carry out, fulfil and manifest the best intentions of the Supreme Being and the best creation of the Maker'. But the upshot of this entire teaching of the *Upaniṣad* or the *Bhagavad-Gītā* tends to suggest that each one of us should be left in our own place to work out our own destiny and should not be made to brook any interference from others.

Dr. B. M. Baruā defines three kinds of tests of progress of which the first one consists in an increasing capacity to devise and an increasing preparedness to give effect to those methods of education and

training which enable more and more not only to discover their likeness or points of agreement but also to notice, criticize, appreciate and profit by their unlikeness or points of disagreement in others. The second one consists in the increasing potentiality and possibility of men for the attainment of those forms of existence and development, physical, social, political, economic, moral, intellectual, spiritual and artistic, which compel others more and more when they come in contact not only to find therein striking expressions of themselves but also to note, appreciate and profit by the unlikeness. The third one consists in the increasing capacity of men to formulate and the increasing readiness to earnestly and effectively try the different ways and means of articulating human powers, thoughts, ideas, arts and institutions which persuade others more and more when they come in contact not only to detect notable analogies of their own power, thoughts and the rest but also to discern, appreciate and profit by the distinctive features.[15]

Further there are some conditions or states of progress which can roughly be classified into five heads and they are: *strangeness*, *conflict*, *harmony*,

15 Vide Dr. Baruā: *Philosophy of Progress* (1948, p. 58.

unity and *beatitude*. (1) The condition or state of *strangeness* expresses the idea of unlikeness or seperateness, 'It implies the co-existence of separate individuals, groups or associations with or without changes of mutual encroachments'. (2) The condition of *conflict* is the perpetual state of antagonism, opposition or contradiction. One may consider it as a means of the greatest possible energy for preparation, effort and action. (3) The conditions of *harmony* leads men to the contemplation of conciliation, compromise or concord admidst the state of conflict or disharmony. (4) The condition of *unity* (*sāmagrī*) allows to each community, group, class or party to enjoy a collective duty in unision and order. (5) The condition of *beatitude* leads men to the state of inwardness of strangeness in so far as it concerns individual life. This last one is generally regarded as a purely spiritual or emotional state, which makes the aspiring souls to enjoy the transcendental and eternal Bliss.

Besides these conditions or states, there are again four kinds of modes of progress and they are: *conservation*, *reformation*, *rebellion* and *revolution*. Sometimes *co-operation* or *federation* is regarded as the fifth mode of progress. (1) The mode of *conservatism* is either articulate and inarticulate and 'it is intended to maintain through all times and under all

circumstances the interests either acquired or already enjoyed, either fanciful or real, by an insistence or rigorous adherence to tradition, to customs and usages, the established ways of thinking and working.' (2) The mode of *reformation* is intended to introduce some new interpretations or partial alterations and adjustments to meet the exigencies of time, or of thought, without disturbing the main structure of conservatism which is considered as good and useful. This mode is generally understood as a doctrine of slow changes that improves gradually the foundation of the main structure of conservatism. (3) The mode of *rebellion* is known as a reactionary movement or progress having a logical step from reformation. (4) The mode of *revolution* serves to bring into bold relief the central idea which lies concealed or implicit in the mode of rebellion. The mode of revolution may be either retrospective or prospective in its aim and principle. It is 'retrospective', says Dr. Baruā, because 'it tends to put the hand of the clock backward by trying to bring back an idealised past or original state of things that never existed, and *prospective*, when it tends to put the hand of the clock forward by holding before man an ideal state that is yet to be.'[16]

16 *Ibid.*, p. 63.

It has already been said that progress generally connotes the idea of continuous advancement and implies continued, repeated and sustained efforts to produce the diverse and best possible results, 'but if it implies, on the contrary, that mankind should at all times and in all cases follow the beaten track and travel by one and the same kind of vehicle to a fixed paradise, it dwindles into monotony which means dullness'. But the true significance of the word '*progress*' lies in the gradual upward marching or movement and not in a monotonous stereotyped way. In truth, the idea of improvement from the lesser to the greater is contained in the word '*progress*'. It leads to perfection which conveys the idea of finality or termination of marching of the living soul. In the opinion of Dr. Baruā, perfection as another synonym 'may have its significance as the last stage of the history of a single course of action devised to produce a particular kind of result. But if it impels one to believe that no other courses can be devised to produce other good results and that it is advisable in the economy of human thought and energy to keep to that single course of action under all conditions. the consequence is stagnation, and hence death'. But perfection in its truest and highest sense does not hold

any one-sided narrow out-look or conclusion, rather it produces a result and conveys a meaning which are accepted by all the savants of all the time of all the countries.

The psychology of progress also holds 'that there is the mental world and the world of extra-mental reality, each independent of the other but at the same time entering into a relation of reciprocity to each other so that the mental series go on along with the extramental series, each having an empirically real relation of interaction with the other, and that the mental series in its interaction with the extramental adjusts itself with the extramental according to its needs and interests which also emerge from such interaction'.[17]

The philosophy of progress also aims at making all self-conscious of their own potential greatness and worth as individuals as well as of their possibilities for various attainments and achievements through their individual and collective efforts. The religious school of philosophy or religious idealism[18] leads us also to the same conclusion, though in a

---

17 *Ibid.*, p. 68.

18 Cf. H. M. Bhattāchārya : *The Concept of Progress* (in his book 'Studies in Philosophy' (1933), Vide also W.R. Inge: *The Idea of Progress.*

different suggestive argument. Some are of opinion that the religious school of philosophy 'seeks to hypnotise one into the belief that the whole system of things has been tending towards the fulfilment of the purpose of an intelligent Divine principle which so shapes its contents and adjusts its movements as always to make a right move towards the progressive realization of its own purpose'.[19] But it should be remembered that the religious philosophy does never hypnotize a man in confining him within the limited walls of pessimism, rather it widens his narrow outlook and makes him conscious of his infinite possibilities and divine potentiality and inspires him to cut asunder the delusive chain of progress. The highest aspiration and aim of the human life are to reach the ultimate Divine goal, and the religious philosophy awakens in man an intense love and longing for reaching that goal.

19 Vide Dr. Brauā: *The Philosophy of Progress* (1948), p. 70.

CHAPTER IV

PROGRESS AND PERFECTION

SOME hold that progress implies an eternal marching towards perfection, which eludes man's grasp for all time. They argue that man will never reach the absolute goal, and he is incapable of its attainment. He only derives joy and happiness in his incessant striving for the goal. He sings the unceasing song of the unknown throughout his life and does not know when he will stop—when he will reach his destination, deriving his delight in the singing only. At first sight the doctrine appears to be sound, but a closer thought shows it is unsatisfactory and incomplete with facts. Bradley, the greatest English philosopher says: 'If you are to be perfect, then you, as such, must be resolved and cease; and endless progress sounds merely like an attempt indefinitely to put off perfection'.[1] Prof. Taylor presumes that this criticism of Bradley is directed particularly against Kant's notion of morality or 'on the alleged need of endless life'. Bradley tends habitually, says

---

1 Vide Bradley: *Appearance and Reality* (1930), p. 450. Vide also Hegel's *Phänomenology*, p. 449-460.

Taylor, 'to underestimate the closeness of the connection between morality and religion, and so he maintains that the ethical perfection is the pursuit of an impossibility'. Prof. Allotta accepts this thesis of Bradley as an 'eternal war that signifies the endless fight, not the victory gives its value'.[2] It is a fact that, that which has a beginning must have an end. Birth, for instance, is always followed by death and vice versa: *'jātasaya hi dhruvo mritur-dhruvam janma mritasya cha'*. So the very assumption which has a beginning in time leads inevitably to the conclusion that it has also an end or a cessation in time. Swāmi Abhedānanda says: 'Now, how is it possible that anything that has a beginning at one end, will continue to exist for ever at the other? It is absurd. It is an absolute impossibility. Anything that has a beginning must have an end'.[3]

Any other conclusion is, therefore, inconsistent with the starting premise. Vedānta philosophy is also based upon the doctrine of progress. It argues like modern science that 'each soul is passing through various stages of evolution, and manifesting those

2 Prof. Taylor: *The Faith of a Moralist* (1931), Vol I. p. 387.

3 Vide Abhedānanda: *Life Beyond Death* (1948), p. 101.

powers that are potential within itself'. By passing through different stages each one gradually rises higher and higher until he reaches the ideal wherefrom he once sprang into phenomenal existence. Swāmi Abhedānanda says that Vedānta 'accepts the idea that there is a natural evolution of our spiritual conception, and it teaches that each individual mind passes through all the different stages that lie in animism or polytheism on the one hand, and the highest form of monism on the other. So it is not correct in Vedāntic view that everyone proceeds eternally towards an unknown destination and that his joy is born of such unending pursuit after the highest goal'. The Swāmi rightly observes again that 'every individual will reach the Absolute sooner or later, no one will be lost'.[4] He says further: 'We are evolving, progressing everyday, until we reach that state, that goal, which is the ideal. Before we understand what that Absolute is, we must pass through the different stages of evolution in our spiritual progress'.

Swāmi Vivekānanda opines that every individual is passing through the gradual process of evolution and will reach the ultimate goal some day or other.

4 Vide Abhedānanda: *True Psychology* (1946), p. 194.

He says:] 'Nowadays it is asserted that man is infinitly progressing forward and forward, and there is no goal of perfection to attain to. Ever approaching, never attending, whatever that may mean and however wonderful it may be, it is absurd on the face of it. Is there any motion in a straight line?, A straight line infinitely projected becomes a circle, it returns to the starting point, You must end where you begin, and as you began in God, you must go back to God.''

· Śrī Aurobindo lends his view to the theory of progress in a different way. He says that evolution is always accompanied by descent and integration. He believes that evolution or progress is not merely an ascent from the lower to the higher stage, but is equally a descent to the lower stages and an integration of the higher with the lower stages. Mind evolves into supermind, and it does not mean that the supermind is an enlarged intellect. Because the evolution of mind into supermind is only possible by being completely transformed by the descent of the mind into supermind. So, according to him, no movement upwards or advance in evolution is possible unless 'the higher state succeeds in descending into

5 Cf. Vivekānanda: *The Science of Philosophy and Religion* (1931), p. 6.

the lower states and causing a transformation of them'. The upward movement is always towards the cosmic consciousness where our separate individuality merges and we become 'a delegate of the supermind consciousness'. Again when discussing on *The Ascending Series of Substance and the Sevenfold Chord of Being* in his monumental book: *The Life Divine*, he says that matter 'is the last stage known to us in the progress of pure substance towards a basis of cosmic relation[6] and if there is an ascending series in the scale of substance from matter to spirit, it must be marked by a progressive diminution of these capacities most characteristic of the physical principle and a progressive increase of the opposite characteristics which will lead us to the formula of pure spiritual self-extension'.[7] He also mentions about the Sāṅkhyian classificasion of five elemental states of the substance that go with a constant progression from the more subtle to the less subtle.

Science emphasises the reign of law. It holds that wherefrom a thing proceeds, it goes back to that place. If a stone is thrown into the sky from the

6 Śrī Aurobindo: *The Life Divine*, Vol. I, pp. 304-313, 316-320.

7 Ibid., p. 305.

earth, it will not go upwards for ever, after reaching some height it will again come down to the base. And this is the law of gravitation. So progress cannot even be thought of so far as the natural laws go; there must be an end. Dr. Rādhākriṣṇan argues: 'It cannot be a question of perpetual travelling. We should also arrive. It cannot be interminable singing; there should also be such a thing as completion in a song. There must come a time when all individuals will become sons of God and be received into the glory of immortality. When the world is redeemed the end of the plot is reached. Earth and heaven would be no more; the timeless and the transcendent alone remains'.[8]

Such is also the view of Prof. S. Alexander when he holds that the whole universe which is the product of the Space-Time matrix works gradually towards the realization of the ultimate perfection which is also known as the Deity.

Vedānta accepts the doctrine of eternal progress so far as the changing phenomena are concerned. But there is no progress of the Ātman. The Ātman is a constant entity and it is unchangeable amidst all changes. It has no evolution and involution, birth

---

8 Vide Dr. Rādhākriṣṇan: *An Idealist View of life* (1937), p. 309.

and death, growth and decay. It is an immutable and integral unique substance. Vedānta says that the Ātman is not only divine, but every individual, nay, every living creature is also potentially divine, containing as they do the spark of the immortal Ātman. Vedānta further holds that evolution is necessary only to raise ourselves to a higher level wherefrom we can cast off the false coverings of the Ātman, and those coverings are no other than nescience or non-knowledge (*avidyā or ajñāna*) of the real nature of the Ātman. Sustained striving is necessary to remove those false coverings, and man is capable of that attainment. Sooner or later this striving is started in time and will be ended in a timeless depth. The length of time required for its completion can be shortened by more serious and sustained longing and effort for the exalted end. Even in their absence the individual will spontaneously march to the ultimate goal beyond which there lies nothing. Deliberate undertaking simply speeds up the process which leads to the same goal. Vedānta has evolved the concept of striving or progress under different heads, *viz. material*, *moral*, *religious*, and *spiritual*. At first man lives on the grossly material plane. From there he strives to march forward. Secondly, he steps into the moral plane. Next, he transcends the moral

level and rises to the religious plane, and from there he enters into the spiritual realm. The spiritual realm is the terminus of his travelling, and there he discovers his inmost Self with the dawn of fulness of vision. He then witnesses the effulgent rising of the transcendental Sun. And in this way we are all gradually going out of the world of matter, life, mind, and intelligence, and reaching at last the kingdom of spirit we discover our greatest treasure, the immortal Ātman.

Though Vedānta admits the doctrine of progress as the stages of dualism, qualified nonduailsm and monism, yet it does it so long as the man is not rooted to the ultimate reality. The ultimate reality transcends the processes of ascending and descending complex. It knows no change and hence no progress. It is the last limit of man's march and as soon as he reaches it, he is merged into the supramundane Absolute which is limitless and changeless. Thus Vedānta recognizes progress or evolution only from the standpoint of marching or striving, otherwise it holds that progress is purely phenomenal and frail, and that it has neither absolute validity of its own, nor does it bear any logical value and significance in the domain of spirituality. The Ātman is already an accomplished fact. Therefore, no kind

of dynamic progress or evolutionary practice is necessary for the acomplishment of its recovery. But as the mysterious nescience or *avidyā* has made us forgetful of our abiding greatness and dignity of spirit, a deliberate and intelligent striving or progress is necessary to re-discover the forgotten Self. And, therefore, it is certain that a progressive advance is necessary for unfolding the divine powers already latent in each individual soul to attain *prefection*.

Now, what do we mean by *perfection* ? Perfection does not mean a deliverance from the bondage of worldly fetters. It is neither an outcome of some practice or *sādhanā*, nor an aroused and created something from non-existent and uncreated thing or power in the subconscious depth of living beings. But it is already an established fact—an attained one—that shines always with its self-luminous divine light. It forms the very essence of our *being* and *becoming*. It is the supra-intellect Ātman or *psyche* that sustains, preserves and makes us living. It is called in Indian philosophy *mukti*, which is non-different from the divine *recognition* (*ātma-pratyavijñānam*) or self-realization (*ātma-jñānam*).

Owing to the false knowledge (*mithyā-pratyaya*) or delusion (*māyā* or *avidyā*) we forget

our pristine glory and sublimity. The forgetfulness is delusion or *māyā*. We are spotless, pure and sublime by nature, but for the non-knowledge of those divine qualities we *imagine* ourselves as impure and limited. Imagination is an assumptive imposition, and though it is false and illusive, yet we take it as true and real. The false thinking is the root of all evil and bondage. It has been compared with darkness. The darkness is regarded as a negative principle or negation, which again asserts the existence of light as a positive principle or position. In fact, darkness is not a stuff entirely different from light, but it is the absence of light only. Again non-knowledge is the cause of the deceiving or wrong knowledge. As for example, in darkness we often take a trunk of a dead tree as a man or an evil spirit. The wrong or defective knowledge arises due to the dim light *i.e.* absence of proper light. Similarly, we consider the world-appearance as real due to our defective or wrong knowledge *i.e.* for want of proper or right knowledge. The wrong knowledge is known as false or *mithyā* and it is delusion or *māyā*. The delusion has no real existence of its own. Because if it would have been real, it would appear as real all the time, present, past and future. But it does not appear

so. Again it is not absolutely non-existent or *asat*. Because if it would be entirely non-existent, it would never appear even as a wrong or defective knowledge. It is not even both existent and non-existent (*sadasat*), thesis and antithesis, at the same time. If it were so, it would appear at one time as real (*sat*) and another time as unreal (*asat*). Therefore, as the world *appears*, its apparent existence (*prātītika-sattvā*) is regarded as an unspeakable and indescribable *i.e. anirvachaniyam* ('*anirvachaniyamiti māyā*').

It is our duty to unfold the mystery of *māyā*. *Māyā* plays with us a hide and seek. It deludes us with the false notion that we are different from the birthless and deathless Ātman—we are mortal beings subject to birth and death. We shall have to re-discover our abiding glory by the correction of error of our false knowledge. As nescience is regarded as a kind of knowledge of the non-knowledge, so correction is also a kind of knowledge. It can be said to be the regaining of the primal or basic knowledge. It is, in truth, the divine realization or self-recognition of our true being and existence. The necklace of self-knowledge is already round our necks, but for the non-knowledge of its recognition we cry for the socalled lost necklace. So we shall have to correct

our false notion that the necklace of self-knowledge is lost. We possess the knowledge of the Ātman all the time. It is necessary only to recognize it. We should recognize simultaneously the nature of the false knowledge and the right knowledge. And this Divine recogntion is called *perfection* or God-consciousness.

In fact, progress and perfection are interlinked together for man's highest achievement. One can be regarded as the means and the other as the end or goal. And in this respect though they are distinct from one another belonging to two different grades or orders, yet there is a note of harmony and amity between them. Dr. Rādhākrisṇan says: "Progress refers to a future world-aeon and perfection to the ultimate depths of one's being. Progress deals with a solution in the stream of time at some undated moment in the future history of mankind. It thinks of an ultimate perfection within the time order, within the limits of the historical process. Perfection is a victory over time, a triumphant passage from the historical to the superhistorical'.[9] Bradley also makes a sharp distinction between progress and perfection. He says that progress belongs to the domain of change, whereas

9 Vide *Progress and Spiritual Values* by Dr. Rādhākrisṇan, (*Philosophy*, Vol. XII, No. 47, 1937, p. 264).

perfection is individuality that belongs to the changeless Whole or Absolute. He states: 'Perfection and individuality belong only to that Whole in which all degrees alike are at once present and absorbed. This one reality of existence can, as such, nowhere exist among phenomena. And it enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress'.[10]

Hegel admits this distinction in his *Phenomenology*. He says that 'individuality is made manifest in the Changelessness, and that the Changelessness is made manifest in individuality'. The individuality is the changeless true self, which transcends all kinds of progress or evolution.

Since the days of Plato, says Rev. Quick, philosophy has been familiar with the proof that absolute change is impossible, because 'change in order to have any meaning must always be relative to the identity of the thing changing'. Well has it been said by Dr. Rādhākriṣṇan: 'From the theory of the human perfectibility inherited from the eighteenth century, from the Hegelian interpretation of history as the progressive manifestation of absolute spirit, from the more recent doctrine of evolution, above all from the

---

10 Vide *Appearancc and Reality* (1930), p. 442. Cf. also Rand: *Modern Classical Philosophers*, p. 779.

immense scientific and technological progress, we were led to believe in a constant, continuous, and almost automatic progress.'[11]

So progress is not inevitable. It requires to be achieved by man who grows by aspiration and effort. It unveils the mystery of the soul. It makes us discover the soul's pristine glory and inherent richness. Progress is, therefore, admitted as long as perfection is not attained or *regained* with the throwing off of the barrier of the false knowledge (*mithyā-jñāna*) or non-knowledge (*ajñāna*). Perfection assures a man of the status of a superman. It bestows on him the blessings of Freedom, which solves for ever the mysteries of life and the world, and the life thus gained is free and eternal. By this it does not mean that perfection brings unto us an everlasting life on earth, because everlasting life on earth means life infinitely extended through time and space. But perfection to which alone eternal life belongs, transcends time, as well as all extensions in space. Progress that belongs to a differene plane and order, does only help to bring unto us the revelation of perfection, which is a self-revealing (*svayam-prakāśa*) and self-complete (*svayam-sampūrṇa*) fact in us.

---

11 Cf. *Progress and Spiritual Values* by Dr. Rādhākrisṇan in the *Philosophy*, Vol. XII, No. 47, July, 1937, p. 260.

CHAPTER V

KNOWLEDGE AND THE ABSOLUTE

We know an object either in a subjective or an objective way. The function or the process of knowing is separate from both the subject who knows and the object to be known, and this separateness implies a relation between the knower and the known — the subject and the object. The subject is 'I' or '*I-consciousness*, which thinks and contemplates, and object is the content of thinking or contemplating. This thinking or contemplating, according to Prof. Alexander, is the compresence between a mind and an object. The compresence may hold in three different ways: (a) between two external or physical objects, (b) between two mental acts, and (c) between a mind and some non-mental object. Prof. Alexander calls it a *cognition* or an *experience* as an instance of the simplest and most universal of all relations.[1] The experiencing is the mind's awareness of the objects, and the awareness is aware of itself. He says: 'My awareness and being aware of it are identical'.[2] Therefore the mind enjoys every experience and

---

1 Vide *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol, II (1934), p. 82.

2 Ibid, Vol. I, p. 12.

contemplates its objects, and these two existences, the enjoyed and the contemplated are united by the relation of compresence which is nothing peculiar to cognition.

In fact, the process of knowing or contemplating involves 'a contract' or 'a connection' between the subject and the object. 'In every act of knowledge', says Prof. Lossky, 'two aspects must be represented, the one coloured by the feeling of subjectivity, the other bearing the character of objectivity'. And this 'contract' or 'connection' involves the forms of judgment, deduction and induction, comparison and the categories of time, space and causation. We know or intuite an object in time which is no other than a type of duration or succession of accidents and by knowing or intuiting an object we limit the object by its form, size and relative positions, from which we get the idea of 'space'. Time is a type of duration or succession of accidents. Dr. Rādhākrisṇan says that time is connection and not mere succession, because past never dies, but lives in the present and the present flows into the future.[3] The time, according to Spengler, is a *word* to indicate something inconceivable, a sound-symbol and to use scienti-

---

3 Vide Dr. Rādhākrisṇan: *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 239.

fically, is utterly to misconceive its nature, and space is a conception.[4] According to Kant, space and time are the pure forms of intuition and through the categories of space and time a construction of understanding is based. Prof. Alexander says that Space-Time is the primal stuff from which the world of change sprung up. The non-dualistic Vedānta subscribes somewhat the same view regarding the space and time, because it says that space and time are the inherent ingredients of nescience (*māyā*), that causes *projection* of the world (*sriṣti*). In fact, what we represent in this world of appearence is our own ideas as objects of perception, or knowledge or intuition outside of us in space and time. Again, there must be a cause behind a subject-object relation, as nothing happens in this world without a cause behind it. The law of cause and sequence is reigning supreme over the world of appearence. Every event or incident, physical or psychical, is subject to this inevitable and inscrutable law and the time-order is a dominant factor of this law: *kārya-kāraṇa-vādi-vādinām kṣaṇaghatitatvāt*'.

The universal doctrine of cause and sequence (*kārya-kāraṇavāda*) has been fully dealt by Kapila in his *Sāṅkhya* system. Regarding the relation of cause and sequence, Dr. Seal wisely estimates that this

4 Vide Spengler: *The Decline of the West*, p. 122.

relation exists in this phenomenal world only 'to add that the category of causality is mediated through the *schema* of order of Time. The empirical intuition first superimposes relations of antecedence and sequence on changing phenomena * * , and the understanding out of these relations creates order in Time. The empirical intuition then intuites the phenomenal series of transformations of Energy in the Time-order, and in so doing, imports the relation of cause and effect into the course of Nature'.[5]

Now, we do an act because we want to do it. All requirements of our life are fulfilled because we desire to have it. The law of demand and supply works behind the world of relations in the form of cause and sequence. 'We don't know', says Aldous Huxley, 'because we don't want to know. It is our will that decides how and upon what subjects we shall use our intelligence'.[6] In fact, underneath all our works and activities we have always deep motives and these motives, guided by our necessities give rise to the impulses to the senses in the form of vibrations. They are really the excitements which the mind receives from the contact of the senses with the objects,

---

5 Cf. Prof. Seal: *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* (1915), p-22.

6 Cf. Huxley: *Ends and Means* (1946), p. 270.

internal or external. These impulses lie buried under the threshold of the subconsciousness or unconsciousness and when they arise on the conscious plane they bring with them the impressions stored up in the subconscious mind. Swāmi Abhedānanda says that the subconscious or the unconscious mind is the 'larger plane' where lie submerged the sleeping impressions of our thousands of past incarnations. Swāmi Vivekānanda designates the subconscious mind as the 'vast field'—'the dark ground'. Dr. Jung says: 'We may call consciousness the daylight realm of the human psyche, and contrast it with the nocturnal realm of unconscious psychic activity which we apprehend as dreamlike fantasy. * * and it is highly probable that the unconscious psyche contains a wealth of contents and living forms equal to or even greater than does consciousness, * * * '.[7] Prof. Pratt says that the conception of the subconscious or the unconscious originated with Leibniz who, like Kaṇāda, the expounder of the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy proved that the monad (*aṇu*) is the source of the world-cosmology. It was made popular as a philosophic doctrine by von Hartmann in his *The Philosophy of the Unconscious*. But, in recent times, it was

---

7 Vide Prof. Jung: *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (1947), p. 13.

imported from philosophy into psychology partly by F. W. H. Myers and his followers and partly by various neurologists and medical men who applied it to the field of pathological mental phenomena.[8] Myers admits that 'underneath the conscious personality there extends a much larger subliminal self, below the threshold of our immediate awareness'. He calls it 'a larger Self',—'the supraliminal self', which is 'a more comprehensive consciousness, a profounder faculty or region'[9] All eminent scholars like Dr. Worcester, Prof. Dreamer, Miss Sinclair and Marshall admit this subconscious region as the larger plane or as the 'undifferentiated mass of unemphatic psychic parts.'[10] Prof. Joseph Jastrow calls it the 'mass impressionism,[11] and Prof. Ward 'the background or *continuum*' as the matrix of all the consciousness.

---

8 Cf. Prof Pratt: *The Religious Consciousness* (1945) pp. 45-46.

9 Vide *Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death* (1903), vol. I, p. 12.

10 Cf. (*a*) Miss Sinclair: *A Defence of Idealism* (1917), p. 259. (*b*) Marshall: *Consciousness* (1909), p. 20; (*c*) Dreamer: *Body and Soul* (1908), p. 39. (*d*) Worcester: *Religion and Medicine* (1908), p. 42. (*e*) Prof. Pratt: *The Religious Consciousness* (1945) pp. 48-51.

11 Cf. Jastrow: *The Subconsciousness* (1506).

The subconscious or unconscious level of the mind is the dreamless unmanifested (*suṣupti—avyakta*) psychic ground where the seeds i.e. germs of our lives, past, present and future remain unmanifested in a static form. This unmanifested ground is the undifferentiated basic consciousness (*kāraṇa-ajñāna*). In non-dualistic Vedānta it has been figuratievely called as *Avyakta*, *Prajñā* or *Prakriti.* It has been designated by the Brāhmaṇical Tantra as *Kāmakalā* or *Kundalinī.* In the Trika system of Kāśmere Śaivaism it is known as the *Parā-Vāk* and the grammarians call it the *Śabda-Brahman.* The Brāhmaṇical Tantra philosophy says that *Kundalinī* is the foundational psychic content or spiritual energy that lies burried in the hidden depth of every man and animal. In man it can be aroused. It is so called because of its 'coiling' i.e. the coiling up of a serpent. It is supposed to be stored up at the end of the spinal chord and is known as the *spirit energy.* It is the life-force or vital energy (*prāṇa-śakti*). The *Sāradātilaka-Tantra* compares it with 'a flash of lightning' (*vidyut-latākārā.*) In the *Satchakranirūpaṇa* it has been described as a luminous (*basanti*) thread encased at the base of the spinal chord by subtle *nāḍis* or nerves. The nerve-centres are called as *suṣumnā, chitrinī, brahmā* etc. With the stir of this *Kundalinī*, it is said, a true spiri-

tual life begins in a man. It is the real urge for freedom.[12] The Trika system of Kāśmere Śaivaism says that *Kundalinī* or *Avyakta* is really the causal nescience or Will ('*paramā-ichhāśakti*') as the *Vīja* consisting of higher intelligence or *Bindu*, which is Śiva. It assumes also the form of *Kāmakalā* or *Parā-Vindu*, which can be equated to the combined principles of *Bindu*, *Vīja* and *Nāda*. It is the storehouse of dynamic energy or Will. It has already been said that the impulses lie deep in the basic level or consciousness (*mūlādhāra* or subconscious mind) and therefrom create eddies and bubbles on the surface of the conscious mind. These eddies and bubbles are the desires and when these desires grow intense and furious like the mad rolling waves of the ocean, they are called as passions. Psycho-analysts say that the subconsciousness is 'a restless sea of instinct and impluse—a sea agitated by gusts of *libido*, swept by the waves of desire threaded by the currents of urge and drive; and upon these waves and currents consciousness, with all that it contains bobs helplessly like a cork.'[13] The great Psycho-analyst Freud

12 Cf. *The Yoga of Kundalinī* by Dr. M. N. Sircar in The *Prabuddha Bhārata*, Feb-March, 1943, pp. 100-106, 149-156.

13 Cf. Prof. Joad: *Guide to Modern Thought*, p. 210.

is of opinion that the passions or desires are the suppressed impressions that lie burried under the threshold of our mind. 'These are evil desires, the seeds of sexuality and infantile pleasures'. But this view has been modified by Freud himself later on and he supplies a third factor which he designates as 'the creative or dynamic aspect' of the mind. His followers Profs. Adler and Jung have also refuted the previous view of Freud, and they recognize the subconscious mind as a conscious dynamic energy-centre. Dr. Hinkle says that Dr. G. Stanley Hall compares the submerged impressions with an 'ice-berg' which floats on the subliminal mind, and when they are struck by an impulse, they are aroused on the conscious plane and cause men to suffer from all kinds of mental and bodily ailments. Dr. Dreamer is of opinion that man's mind is something 'far larger' than he is conscious of and his consciousness is but a speck of light illuminating one part of his whole self.[14]

The science of psycho-analysis is a process by which the hidden depths of the individual consciousness can be revealed, and 'the underlying motives and unconscious tendencies which determine action and character can be brought to light'. The theory of

---

14 Cf. Dreamer: *Body and Soul* (1909), p. 39.

psycho-analysis is first worked out by Freud. He discovers that *libido* or love is the urge, passion or desire which is the spring of all conative action and is mainly sexual in character. Freud says that what we call the *libido*, is the *Eros* of Plato, and it is 'an expression taken from the theory of emotions. We call by that name the energy (regarded as a quantitative magnitude, though not at present actually measurable) of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word love'. Dr. Jung absolutely disagrees with this conclusion of Freud and says that the impressions or instincts of men and all living beings are derived from 'the undifferentiated primal life-force' and they are not necessarily to be known as the sexual contents.

Dr. Jung says: 'Freud's original conception does not interpret *everything sexual* although this has been asserted by critics but recognises the existence of certain forces, the nature of which are not well known**'.[15] Dr. Jung throws equal emphasis on *libido* or love but widens its scope. Because, with him, says Dr. Selbie, 'it is not primarily or exclusively sexual, though sex is one of the chief forms of its manifestations. It is rather what Bergson calls an

15 Vide Dr. Jung: *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 77

élan vital, 'the very stuff and reality of our being'; an urge or energy, which regulates all our aims and actions.'[16] McDougall also criticizes the Freudian view by characterizing it as 'pan-sexuality' and he says:] 'A principal error of Freud's treatment of dreams (as of the neuroses) is too free and wide generalisation; he too readily erects into general propositions, true of all dreams and of all men, conclusions of a speculative nature arrived at by the study of a limited number of cases, generally neurotic patients'.[17] Dr. Brown calls this *libido* as not a psychical energy, but as a physiological energy, because he takes interest in all chemical theories of sex. Dr. Jung refutes all these absurd views and offers his opinion specially against the Freudian school by saying:] 'It is well known that the Freudian school presents the unconscious in a thoroughly depreciatory light, just as also it looks on primitive man as little better that a wild beast.* * Freud has invented the idea of sublimation to save us from the imaginary claws of the unconscious. * *The unconscious is not

---

16 Vide Dr. Selbie: *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 288

17 Cf also Dr. Jung: *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 80. Cf. also McDougall: *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, (1948) p. 187.

demonic monster, but a thing of nature that is perfectly neutral as far as moral sense, aesthetic taste and intellectual judgement go'.[18] Further he says: 'A fundamental mistake, and one which is commonly made, is this: it is supposed that the contents of the unconscious are unequivocal and are marked with plus or minus signs that are immutable. As I see the question, this view is too naive. The psyche is a self-regulating system that maintains itself in equilibrium as the body does'.[19] At last Dr. Jung substantiates his conclusion by saying: 'Freud began by taking sexuality as the only psychic driving power,* *. For my part, I have subsumed the various psychic drives or forces under the concept of energy in order to avoid the arbitrariness of a psychology that deals with drives or impulses alone.* * Common-sense will always return to the fact that sexuality is one of the psycho-physical function* *.[20] He points out elsewhere: 'Therefore I suggest that the psychoanalytic theory should be liberated from the purely sexual standpoint. In place of it I should like to

---

18 Vide Dr. Jung: *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (1945), p. 19.

19 Ibid., p. 20.

20 Ibid., p. 138.

introduce an *energic viewpoint* into the psychology of neurosis. All psychological phenomena can be considered as manifestations of energy, in the same way as all physical phenomena are already understood as energic manifestations since Robert Mayer discovered the law of the conservations of energy. This energy is subjectively and psychologically conceived as *desire*. I call it *libido* using the word in the original meaning of this term, which is by no means only sexual. * * From a broader standpoint *libido* can be understood as vital energy in general, or a Bergson's *élan vital*.'[21] So, in our opinion, the conclusion of the Freudian school and that of Brown are not correct, and they may be said half-hearted and partial, because according to Indian psychology i.e. Yoga psychology impressions are not all evil, but they are the primal energy of human nature. Especially Freud and his school fail to well-justify the spirit of Indian thought and its spiritual *sâdhâna*. The nature of the Indian philosophical thought is absolutely

---

21 Vide Dr. Jung: *Callected Papers on Analytical Psychology* (1917), pp. 231, 412.

Dr. Rādhākrisṇan contends that the term '*libido*' which the psycho-analysts employ to denote the deeper centre of one's being is unfortunate.—Vide *An Idealist View of Life* (1937), p. 217.

inwardising and spiritual. It is spiritual in the sense it recognizes the *psyche* as the divine spirit or pure self-effulgent consciousness. The inner apperception of this divine spirit constitutes the core of Indian spirituality (*âdhmyâtikatâ*). So Indian spiritual and even philosophical thoughts are purely subjective. But the Freudian analysis is purely objective and, therefore, external. Freudian method seeks always the fountain of absolute happiness in the objective field. And though it recognizes a primal psychic stuff as a basic ground of all the passions, desires, emotions and even all the human aspirations, good or bad, yet that stuff or matrix is not a world-transcending spiritual one. Even the highest bliss and contentment achieved by the Freudian process are absolutely gross and sensebound. Well has it been said by Dr. Maitra: 'What in the Freudian view is to come through an objective science and its empirical methods is according to religious belief, a matter of transempirical realisation in a supra-scientific objectivity'.[22]

The impressions (*saṁskāras*) really constitue the stuff of the internal luminous sense or *Antaḥ-karaṇa*. It has been recognized by the Indian Yoga psychology as the basic energy and is known as

22 Vide Freud: *The Ego and the Id*, p. 69.

Kuṇḍalinī, *Śakti*, *Prakriti*, *Avyakta*, *Prajñā*, *Mahāmāyā*, etc, which build our personalities and character. When they are controlled and properly guided by our good thoughts and reason, they bring unto us the celestial bliss and happiness.

Some scholars compare this basic or cosmic energy, *Kundalinī* (*Prakriti*) with *Id* of Freud. But, truely speaking, they are not similar, because Freud is not concerned with the problem of metempsychosis and he is of opinion that *Id* is the storehouse of the former ego-structures or 'of the earlier ego-constructions of the race transmuted from parents to offspring',[23] whereas cosmic energy or *Prakriti* is the embodiment of the impressions (*saṁskâras*) of the past incarnations of beings. Dr. Rāju also well-estimates by saying: 'In Indian thought we do have concepts similar to the *Id* and the unconscious. The *ālayavijñāna* of the Buddhists, which is the storehouse of *tanhās* or *vâsanâs*, though called *vijñāna*, is the unconscious. In the Hindu systems the concept of *avidyâ*, which, though understood differently by each, is regarded as unconscious energy. In its undisturbed state it is known as deep sleep. The deep sleep is not an absolute vacuum, but a great

23 Vide *Freudian Topography* by Dr. P. T. Rāju in *The Prabuddha Bhārata*, June, 1947, p. 225.

force, lying dormant in its potential state. It is also known as the causal body or *kâraṇaśarīra*'.[24] Dr. Sircar disagrees with them who compare the causal energy, *Kundalinī* with the '*Id*' of Freud. Dr. Sircar says that the causal energy, *Kundalinī* may be called the unconsciousness, but, in truth, it is absolutely different from the unconscious of Freud and modern psychologists. He further states: 'The '*Id*' of Freud contains the passions. The '*Id*' is connected with the desires and with the vital life. The unconscious, which becomes active with *Kundalinī* is free from the impetuosity of the vital life. It gives the feeling of a mental and vital plasticity, suppleness, and ease'. So the cosmic energy may be compared to an extent with the super-ego, though it transcends 'the Freudian sense of the super-ego'. The *Kundalinī* as the super-ego does not emerge 'out by repression of conscience and moral sense', but it is the dynamic source of conscience or consciousness that supplies all energy to all living beings.[25] Otherwise these impulses or desires always expand and contract, and they catch whatever they get within their ever-dissatisfied clutches. The supply of everything is

---

24 Ibid., pp. 224-225.

25 Vide *The Yoga of Kundalinī* by Dr. M. N. Sircar in *The Prabuddha Bhārata*, March, 1943, pp. 151-152.

followed by the demand we make, and the mutual relation between demand and supply depends entirely upon the universal law of cause and sequence.

Our knowledge becomes always of the manifold, and Kant says that it is empirical and floating by its nature. Really whatever we get or acquire through the senses are brittle and relative and so contingent. 'All that our sense experience tells us of,' says Sri Aurobindo, 'is form and movement. Forms exist, but with an existence that is not pure, rather always mixed, combined, aggregated, relative'.[26] The apparent expressions of sense-experiences are: *introspection, reflection, memory, recollection, recognition, identification, intuition, sensation, imagination*, and other operations of the mind. We *introspect* a thing within and within it happens and passes. It is an observation directed upon our personal cognition or experience. Introspection is that which, says Perry, 'yields an identification and inventory of mental contents'. Aaccording to Prof. Holt, introspection 'is not a simple act of immediate perception, but is a very complicated process involving both memory and judgement.'[27] We *reflect* upon a fact which the

26 Vide *The Life Divine* (1943), p. 80.

27 Cf. Prof. Ray: *Consciousness in Neo-Realism*, p. 67.

mind takes in its own operation in the form of an understanding. We first see a thing and then recollect its dormant mental image[28], which lies burried in the cave of the mind as impressions or *samsakâras*. *Memory* is a shadow-idea or reconstruction of the thing seen before (*pūrvadriṣtâvabhâsa*). Memory, says Bradley, 'is an ideal construction of the past by which the present reality is qualified, or we know the past as an enlargement by ideal content of reality beyond present'. According to Hume, memory is a faculty by which we repeat our impressions or ideas as reappearance. We *recognize* a thing of the past experience when it is apprehended again. So there happens a dual function of perceiving and apprehending in the act of recognizing. Or it can be said that observation and recollection are the conditions of recognition. The Buddhist teacher Vasubandhu distinguishes memory from perception by saying that our *memory* represents another mode of self-creation

28 Prof. Holt regards 'images' as 'essentially neutral' and objective in character.' So images, according to him, are 'in the conscious cross-section exactly in the same sense in which sensations and perceptions belong to the psychic manifold'.—Vide Prof. Ray: *Consciousness in Neo-Realism*, p. 62.

of thought, which is dependent on the perceptual mode of self-creation, whereas the *perception* is a special mode of the self-creation of knowledge.[29] In memory we feel or perceive the objects which we collect from knowledge directly before us.

We *identify* a known and perceived fact when we associate it with another thing of similar nature. We *intuit* an experience to get its immediate awareness, or as Swāmi Abhedānanda says that 'the direct and immediate perception of the subjective mind is called *intuition*'.[30] But Bergson's intuition signifies a penetration into the spontaneous and moving whole. It is a kind of 'intellectual sympathy'—a direct approach to integral experience of vitality which enables us to enter into the core of it. This intellectual appreciation is the only inexpressible medium through which we enter into the citadel of the unique absolute Reality, and for want of it we hopelessly move round the Reality and cannot touch or penetrate its region.[31]

Intuition may generally be divided into two kinds, higher or transcendental, and lower and empirical.

---

29 Cf. Dr. Dāsgupta: *Indian Idealism*, p. 110.

30 Vide Abhedānanda: *True Psychology*, pp. 11, 194.

31 Cf. Bergson: *Introduction to Metaphysics*.

The higher one is the presentation of reason which we call the intellectual apprehension, and the lower one is nothing but a direct sense-experience or sensibility. It becomes always the perception *â priori*, as Kant says, because pure intuition, according to Kant, exists *á priori* in the mind as a mere form of sensibility and without any real object of the senses or any sensation. Höffding while expounding the intuition of Bergson, classifies it under four heads: (a) *concrete intuition*, (b) *practical intuition*, (c) *analytical intuition*, and (d) *synthetic intuition*. Again Bergson recognizes intuition as both metaphysical and psychological. (a) *Concrete intuition* is an immediate appreciation that becomes the process in sensation, memory and imagination. It has 'something individual and special, and is insignificant contrast to the attentive activity. * * * as well as to abstraction, generalisation, and conclusion'. (b) *Practical intuition* is a 'sponteneous synthesis of experience and observation' or judgment. It 'plays an essential rôle', says Prof. Höffding, 'when man forms his own belief and conception of life.' (c) *Analytical intuition* is an immediate knowledge of a relation. It is an act of thought or comprehension 'of the difference or identity existing between two images of sensation, memory or imagination, appearing simultaneously or

successively'. (d) *Synthetic intuition* is an immediate perception 'of a connection or a totality which may be acquired by going through a series or a group of embers or parts, if one has a certain comprehension of their mutual relation'.[32] Bergson also admits the different grades of intuition. Ordinarily the human intuition is quite inadequate to give us a full vision of the Absolute. So metaphysical intuition which is gained through painful and laborious effort, is the highest kind of intuition. Like Bergson, Śrī Aurobindo also admits the types or grades of intuition, though he differs from him in differentiating those grades by giving them different names.[33] Intuition not only reveals itself as flash from above, but also form within – from the psychic principle, which is the *chit* or *chaitanya* that forms the core of all the living beings. It is another feature of Śrī Aurobindo's conception of intuition or integral experience distinguished from that of Bergson.[34]

Höffding says that 'Spinoza has placed this intuition at the summit of human knowledge, because it

32 Vide Höffding: *Modern Philosophers*, pp. 225, 228.

33 Dr. Maitra: *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Śrī Aurobindo*, (1945), p. 39.

34 Cf. Dr. Maitra: *Sri Aurobindo and Bergson*, in *Śri Aurobindo Mandir Annual*.

transcends all the laws that govern the appearance and is deep penetration into the immediate awareness of God, the Absolute. But Höffding was unaware that before Spinoza, Indian spiritual *sādhanā* heightened the phase of intuition with its supramundane spirit and nature. Bergson's *metaphysical intuition* appears also a 'deepening and amplifying perception', and it is the intuition of the reality which does not transcend the change but embraces the continual fluxes that constitute the essence of reality, and so from the transcendental viewpoint, Bergson's intuition is regarded as phenomenal.

Kant's intuition is also phenomenal, as it is sensuous. Even pure intuition of Kant 'is said to contain an *á priori manifold*, a manifold which is not a manifold of sensa, but is given because of the nature of our sensiblility. This manifold is composed only of relations (spatial and temporal)'.[35] So Kant's *intuition* and even his *pure intuition* do not transcend but contain 'a multiplicity which in itself has no unity' and, therefore, they are contingent. Prof. Alexander calls intuition as 'a function underlying sense-perception'. Bradley's higher

35 Prof. Paton : *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, (1936), vol. I, p. 105.

intuition or experience cannot also transcend the inner agreement and harmonious relation of transmuted and bankrupted manifold that drags it to the inner contradiction and duality. But the Vedāntic intuition is quite different. It transcends them all and leads to an immediate ultimate experience (*aprokṣānubhūti*) of the supra-rational divine consciousness of the non-contradicted and homogenious Reality, which is all-knowledge and all-bliss.

By 'sensation' we mean a 'perception' in which sense organs are involved. Therefore sensations, says Prof. Joad, 'are the same entities as sense data differently arranged'. Regarding the difference between 'sensations' and 'sense data', Prof. Joad says: 'When we arrange together all the appearances presented at a certain place where there is a brain, we call them sensations; when we arrange together all the appearances presented by a socalled object at all places, we call them *sense data*. Sensations and *sense data* are formed of the same fundamental stuff taken in different contexts'.[36] Dr. C. G. Jung draws a sharp distinction between 'sensation' and 'intuitition'. He says

36 Vide *Contemporary British Philosophy*, (1225), vol. II, p. 179.

that 'intuition' is also a perception, though in perception there does not happen any direct conscious sensory experience, but in a sensation as a perception sense-organs are directly involved. He says again: 'I have therefore defined *sensation* as perception through conscious sensory processes, and *intuition* as perception by way of unconscious contents and connections'. Dr. Jung recognizes 'sensation' and 'intuition' both as perceptive and non-rational functions, as 'they make us aware of what is happening, but do not interpret or evaluate it. They do not act selecting according to principles, but are simply receptive of what happens'.

The fourfold mental functions are *thinking*, *feeling sensations* and *intuition* and they vary from each other according to general attitude and thus eight variants are produced. The distinctive works of those four different functions are: (a) *sensations* establish what is actually given, (b) *thinking* enables us to recognize its meaning, (c) *feeling* tells us its value, and finally (d) *intuition* points to the possibilities of the when and whither that lie within the immediate facts.[37]

We imagine a thing by the faculty of repre-

37 Cf. Jung: *Modern Man in Search of Soul*, (1945), pp. 104-107.

sentation, It is associated with memory, and mind in imagination keeps before it an image of visible forms. The objects are presented to the senses and re-presented in imagination.[38] So McDougall calls it a 'pictorial thinking' and he says that in imagination 'we depict to ourselves the object as we have perceived it, as we have seen, heard, touched or otherwise sensed it'. He distnguishes three levels of imaginaiion: (i) *reproductive* or *representative imagination*: (ii) *constructive imagination*: and (iii) *creative imagination*. All the levels of imaginations, he says, are purposive in the wider sense of the word, i.e. they are conative. Bradley says that *imagination* is not something employed by thought, but is itself thinking proper. Because in *imagination* 'the connection between subject and predicate is that of casual occupancy, but in *memory* we have possession which to such an extent is de facto that the question of title is

38 Prof. Höffding differentiates memory from imagination, and says: 'There is in sensation, memory and imagination and immediate perception.*** In *memory* arise anterior facts, as sponteneous images of totality, and in *imagination* there is a new creation of such images, the rise of which may be as unconscious as the way in which an image of sensation or memory comes into being'.—*Modern Philosophers*, (1915), p. 255.

not raised, or, if raised, is assumed to be somehow satisfactorily settled.'[39]

These different phases of knowledge are discursive and contingent, as they are always of the phenomenal fleeting objects. These are like the eternal fluxes, though they have their ground in a changeless divine knowledge. The phenomenal knowledge is empirical and it possesses multiple fragments and divisions. It can be classified into two heads, direct and and indirect. The direct knowledge comes straight without any obstruction. We get it through the inner or outer senses coming in contact with the socalled real things already given to us. It is also called the immediate knowledge. We know an object indirectly or immediately when the senses get in touch with it intermediating through a thing or a process other than the object itself.

There are again knowledges, false and real. False knowledge is an illusive knowledge. We do understand a thing as illusive and unreal when it has no existence of its own. We mistake a rope for a serpent through wrong knowledge. The illusive knowledge is deceptive and, therefore, it is not the thing-in-itself.

---

39 Vide Bradley: *Essays on Truth* and *Reality*, (1914), p. 369.

We often see a mirage in the desert. It is illusive, because it is the false image, i. e. the unreal representation of the real water previously seen somewhere. It has no real existence and worth of its own and yet it is seen. It is seen as real, because it borrows its reality from its ground (*adhiṣṭhāna* or *vimva*), real or unreal. There remains an impression (*saṁskâra*) of the thing, real or unreal, seen before, and owing to distance, dimlight or darkness that impression gets crystalized into a new seeming reality. It is the unreal reflection (*prativimva*), or it can be said to be a borrowed reality. It gets appreciation only from the ignorant who do not know its real nature, i.e. who cannot discriminate the real from the unreal. The ignorant look upon the mirage as real, but the wise are never deluded by its deceptive character. The wise have already corrected their errors and so they remain unaffected.

A right and valid knowledge (*pramā*) is an uncontradicted (*avādhitam*) and previously unacquired (*anadhigatam*) one, as it has no second and no opposite. But there are differences of opinions regarding the definition and determination of the valid knowledge. As for example, the Buddhists say that knowledge which does not fail to accord is valid: 'अविसंवादि विज्ञानं प्रमाणत्वम् । अविसंवादित्वं च अर्थक्रियाकारित्वम्' । The Naiyāyikas hold that the means of valid knowledge is the instru-

ment of it and experience of an object as it is, is valid knowledge: 'प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणं। यथार्थानुभवः प्रमा। अनुभवश्च स्मृतिव्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञानम्'। The Logicians do not recognize the recollection (*smriti*) as a direct experience or cognition, The Prabhākaras say that cognition is also a means of valid and right knowledge consisting in manifestedness: 'प्राकट्यरूपप्रमाकरणत्वेन ज्ञानस्यापि प्रमाणत्वमाहुः'। The Vedāntists, like the Naiyāyikas, exclude the recollection from the category of the valid knowledge and they say that it is an unsublated or uncontradicted entity: 'तत्र स्मृतिव्यावृत्तं प्रमात्वं अनधिगतावाधितार्थविषयकज्ञानत्वम्'। 'The Indian philosophers', says S. S. Śūryanārāyaṇa Śāstrī, are divided in their views as to whether recollection (*smriti*) is a case of valid knowledge. It results, not from a distinct cause of cognition, but from the residual impression of a prior cognition; hence there seems to be little need to recognize it as independent knowledge'. The contention of the author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (of the *Vivaraṇa* school) is that the recollection is excluded from the valid or right knowledge. The non-dualistic Vedānta admits the pure consciousness as the direct knowledge which is only a valid cognition: 'प्रत्यक्षप्रमा त्वत्र चैतन्यमेव यत् साक्षादपरोक्षात्' इति श्रुतेः', etc.

The false knowledge is always contradicted (*vādhitam*) and sublated by the real or right know-

ledge. A false knowledge seems to run parallel with its rival, the right knowledge. Vedānta says that between the two, one must be real and other unreal, two realities cannot exist at a time, one is bound to depend on the other. The transcendental view-point of Vedānta holds that the false knowledge is a relative one, and as *relation* means an awaiting of something, so the false knowledge is subject to limitation. As for example, when we use the number 'two', it is obvious that the composite number 'two' stands in relation to its constituent part, the number 'one'. The number 'two' can never stand apart from or independent of its related 'one'. If it stands independent of the number 'one', it no longer remains as the number 'two', but transcends both the numbers 'one' and 'two'. Prof. Whitehead calls the number 'one' as the ultimate notion which is synonymous with the term 'entity'. He says in connection with the Ultimate: 'The term 'many' presupposes the term 'one', and the term 'one' presupposes the term 'many.[40] Well has it been said by Dr. Caird while discussing the *Philosophy of Plotinus*: 'Even the names 'Good' and 'One' he (Plotinus) finally has to reject as expressing rather

40 Cf. Whitehead: *Process and Reality* (1929), p. 28.

what it is in relation to us than what it is in itself. And to say that this relation is negative, and that, for instance, we call it 'One' simply in opposition to the multiplicity of the finite, does not enable us to escape the difficulty; for a negative relation is still a relation, and must have some positive basis'.[41] So it is true that the related things are always dual or plural by their nature and they fall short of their essence and validity.

An empirical knowledge is always subject to change. In this world of relations and opposites our knowledge or experience through the dusty glass of material senses are porous and subject to limitation. In other words, it can be said that our knowledge or experience connotes *limitation*.[42] When we gain

4. Vide *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, (1923), Vol. II, pp. 219-20.

42 Madhusudan Sarsvatī mentions three kinds of limitations. He says: 'There are three kinds of limitations: viz (1) limitation in space, (2) limitation in time, and (3) limitation by objects. Of these 'Limitedness in Space' consists in the character of being the object of absolute negation. 'Limitedness in Time' is that character whereby a thing is capable of destruction: and 'Limitedness by Objects' consists in being the object of mental negation'. (Vide Eng Trans. by MM. Gangânâth Jhân: *The Advaita-*

experience of a thing by the sense-affection, the thing is always the object, i.e. content of our knowledge or experience, and we the knowers or experiencers become the subject. The intermediate process between the object and the subject is the third principle which connects the two and makes the whole thing conditioned. Again we acquire knowledge or experience of a thing as an object which is different from us, the subject, and so the object or content of our knowledge or experience is included in the domain of duality and cannot transcend the limit of plurality.

It will be noticed again that the subject which thinks, intuits, or perceives, is the centre from which everything can be judged and ascertained. The subject is the *ego* or *I-cognition.*[43] The subject

---

siddhi of Madhusudan Sarasvatī, p. 65). The original text runs thus:

'तच्च देशतः कालतो वस्तुतश्चेति त्रिविधम् । तत्र देशतः परिच्छिन्नत्वं अत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वम् । कालतः परिच्छिन्नत्वं ध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वम् । वस्तुतः परिच्छिन्नत्वं अन्योन्याभावप्रतियोगितम् । * * अतोऽन्यदार्तमिति श्रुत्या अनात्ममात्रस्यैव विनाशित्वप्रतिपादनात् ।'—*Advitasiddhi* (Nirṇaya-Sāgara ed.), p. 315

43 Some philosophers call it the 'pure ego'. Dr. Sorely says: 'The self with which we are acquinted is never the 'pure ego.' The pure ego is always a factor in

knows both the object and the knowing process, as Prof. McTaggart holds. The subject knows, as it were, even itself. So it follows that behind the process there remains a real subject that knows the empirical subject or ego. The real subject is the constant transcending fourth principle or Substance upon which the tripartite aspects, the subject, the object, and the process have their true being. All these aspects owe their reality and existence from this fourth principle (*tūrīya*). It has been called the fourth principle (*tūrīya*) in comparison with the third, *Iśvara* to indicate its transcending supra-mundane divine nature. In truth, it is not a principle or state at all. It is the Ātman or transcendent Absolute. It is the only real and self-existent substance in the world of change, and everything else is frail, floating and phenomenal.

Change is the world. The one unique continuity is broken as if into innumerable fragments and the socalled contingent fragments are again tied up into an unending series of a seeming permanency, which looks like an unbroken line. But its reality is apparent, as it has no fixed point of its

---

the mental state known introspectively, but introspection cannot present it in isolation.'—Vide *Dr. Sorely*: *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 204.

own. It changes its position always from one point to another, and this change is called a movement that proceeds and has no halt. Swāmi Vivekânanda says: 'Mind is the name of a change, and body the name of another change, and so on, and all these changes compose our universe'.[44] Prof. Seal calls this change an *evolutionary* process and he says: 'Change is of two kinds: (1) Change by a spontaneous process, without external influence, including isomeric change (*svâbhâvika pariṇâma*). * * * (2) Change due to combination with other substances (*dravyântarasaṁyoga*)'.[45] Prof. Seal explains this theory of change from the viewpoint of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* doctrine of *ârambhavâda* or *pariṇâma-vâda*. He mentions again that Vedânta does not accept the transformation theory of the *Nyâya-Vaiśeṣika*, but believes in spontaneous disintigration and reintegration, which can only be explained by *vivartavâda* or the theory of superimposition. He says: 'The Vedāntists resolve all activity—physical, vital, as well as psychical—into modes of motion, subtle cosmic motion: '*parispanda*,

---

44 Vide *Complete Works of S.V.*, Vol II, p. 130.

45 Prof. B. N. Seal: *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*. pp. 89-90.

sarvaloka-parispanda'(—Saṅkara); *'vâyoh parispandât-makatvât,—prandasya parispandātmakatvāteva-yadvaitam sthulam sukṣam cha tat sarvam manasmparis-panditamātram'* (—*Śaṅkara*)'.[46] Dr. Seal also quotes many citations from the *Sâṅkhya-kârikâ*, Vāchaspati's *Kaumudi*, Udayaṇa's *Kasumânjali*, Jayanta's *Nyâya-manjari*, and other works to prove that all of them have said that the change is no other than motion or '*parispandah*'. He cites: '*vyaktam sakriyam parispandavat*'; '*buddhādayo deham * * teṣām parispandah*'; '*anavarata-parispandamāna * **; '*parispanda eva bhautika vyāpārah*' etc.[47]

The theory of change has also been expounded by the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, who holds that not only the world but the Reality is also the *change*. He says none can bathe twice in the same river, and so it proves that even the World-ground is a form of *change* or streams.[48] Prof. Bergson's continual

---

46 *Ibid.*, p. 91.

47 Cf. the detail Ibid., pp. 122-123.

48 While dicussing the 'law of causation' Swāmi Abhedânanda says that driven by this irresistible and relentless law 'we are moving hither and thither, apparently in a straight line, but more often in a circle. Starting from one desire, we go to a certain distance, describe a curve, and come back to the same place without the smallest knowledge of

change or eternal flux contains the same status of reality. Alexander, Croce and Gentile subscribe nearly the same view. Hume's changing sensations or disconnected cognitions and the fluxes of the Mâdhyamika or Yogāchāra school are also well-known. But the standpoint of the non-dualistic Vedânta is quite different from them. Vedānta says that the *movement* is due to the inscrutable power of *mâyâ* or nescience, and for *māyā* or nescience the *changing* world seems to run in a straight line with its seeming fragments, but, in reality, it forms the circle with its deceiving movements.[48] Bradley also uses this simile to explain the unceasing movement of the fleeting appearance. He says: 'We found everywhere that an unresting circle of this kind is the mark of appearance, * *.'[49] But Vedânta says that though the world moves from point to point, yet it is neither a continual flux nor the changes as maintained by Heraclitus, Hume, Bergson, Alexander, Mâdhyamika or Yogâcâra Buddhists, and even the historical changes of Croce

---

where and how the purpose of life will be achieved' (vide *Doctrine of Karma*, p. 82). This law forms also a category of *mâyâ* or nescience which can be compared with an unceasing movement or eternal progress.

49 Vide Bradley: *Appearance and Reality*, (1930), p. 420.

and Gentile. Vedānta says that the world changes and it changes upon a static ground that recognizes as well as identifies all the changes that take place. In Greece, Aristotle also finds out a solution of this problem. He says that 'in any process of change there is a changeless something, the Form. * * The cause of change or motion is, therefore, something which, while not moving itself, produces by its mere presence change or movement in something else'.[50] Aristotle finds out a prime-mover of the change and says: 'God Himself unmoved, is the efficient cause whose presence in the universe sets up a process of movement whereby potential Forms become actual'.[51] Aristotle traces out in this way a plausible solution of the mystery of the change of the eternal movement, and discovers a basic ground of the changes, which is God. Vedānta also finds the solution of the unending chain of momentary cognitions (*kṣaṇika-vijñāna*) expounded by the Mādhyamikas by discovering a changeless immutable principle as the substratum of the flying changes.

We know a thing by means of sensibility as

50 Vide Prof. Joad : *Guide to Philosophy*, pp. 201-202.
51 *Ibid.*, p. 202.

given to us. The realists say that names and forms of things or objects are not the projections or representations of the mind, they are real and not the copies. They hold that the perception of a thing is an immediate knowledge of the thing which exists outside of the mind as real. The idealists do not agree with them. They look always through the glass of the Platonic Idea and take everything as the manifestations of the Idea or mind. According to them the socalled external objects are the objectifications of the subjective condition. They are the shadow of the cosmic Idea, or, to be more precise, are the mind-constructions. Again the idealists hold the view that the world-appearance is a design or construction by the imagination of the mind i.e. the reality of the world is mind-dependent or ideal.

The monists or the transcendentalists hold a quite different view. They say that mind is not the reality or thing-in-itself, but it is a pale copy of the Absolute. It is subject to change and decay, and, therefore unreal. The mind borrows its lustre from the light of the pure intelligence, the Ātman. The Ātman is the unique real essence, and the mind cannot stand independent of the Ātman. The transcendentalists recognize the Absolute as the only reality and they say that the Absolute is trascen-

dent[52] in its nature. It is not a compound thing made up of two equal bifurcated halves and then polarized into a unique synthesis, but it is trans-empirical, self-subsistent, self-shining and one without the second.

We do everything through the medium of the mind. The mind is a bundle of sensations or impressions. Or it can be said to be the substratum on which rest all the modifications. The modifications are the contents and the mind the reservoir. The reservoir or the substratum is unique and one. It is static in its essence and becomes dynamic with its activities or modifications. It is like the ocean and its vast sheet of water is agitated by the wind of diverse desires. It creates ripples and gradually rolls on furiously. The violent condition of the mind is called the passion or intense desire. The desire is the cause of the world. It always demands and gets its supply and this demand and supply go on for ever and weave a

---

52 James Hutchison Stirling differentiates the terms *transcendent* and *transcendental* following the interpretation of Kant in his *Text-Book to Kant* by saying: '*Transcendent* is an *object* beyond experience. *Transcendental* applies to an object that is *in* experience, but yet of a *validity* that is *beyond* experience'.

series of eternal events and activities. But when the mind is devoid of its modifications and is calm, it comes back to its own essence. The essence is the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) or Brahman. The Brahman is the ground of both the mind and the world. Again the mind or the world is no other than the Brahman itself in its final analysis.

In the truest sense, the Absolute is not the ground of the world. If it is said to be the ground of the change or world-appearance, it must face the limitations of the relation, the related and the relator. Again, it is not the cause of the world, because cause always presupposes the being of the effect whether static or dynamic, potential or kinetic. Again the idea of *being* implies the idea of *becoming*, as in a seed there remains the power of sprouting. Therefore, if the Brahman becomes the ground or the cause of the changing world, it must fall short of its wholeness and purity. From the transcendental viewpoint the Absolute forms neither the ground nor the cause, both material and efficient. It is absolutely raised from the categories of limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*) of ground (*adhiṣṭāna*) and cause (*kāraṇa*) and also of the adjuncts of indeterminateness (*nirguṇattva*) and determinateness (*saguṇattva*).

We, the subjects of the contingent world *appear*

as imperfect, though perfect and divine in essence or by nature. Because of our assuming imperfection we imagine a perfect ideal for our guidance and consolation, and this perfect ideal is God. We impose upon the Absolute the surpassing qualities and call It all-powerful and all-merciful. Then the Absolute is known as anthropomorphic, personal and determinate. The categories of impersonality and limiting adjunct of indeterminateness are not the abiding qualifications of the Absolute, because if they qualify it, it remains no longer the Absolute, but it shines as God, the Creator. But yet God is the topmost limit of human appreciation. From Him everything phenomenal is projected. He does not create, but projects the world of appearance. He projects the world from within. Projection does not mean a new creation, but it connotes the idea of emission of objects which remain latent as cause or impressions (*saṁaskāra*) in God, the determinate Brahman.

Creation implies the idea of separation and brings out new and entirely foreign things. In projection things are manifested (*vyaktam*) which were unmanifested (*avyaktam*). God projects the world, as the seed of the world lies within Him. He projects the world and then enters into it : '*tat sristvā*

tadevānuprāviśat'. But God of the realists creates everything other than Himself. The transcendentalists do not admit this position. To them there are niether designer nor design in the truest sense. The web of *māyā* or the 'idea of the other' creates the projector and the projected.

The 'Wholly other' is the Absolute. This *otherness* does not express the implication of the second, but it discloses the transcendental nature of the Absolute. The Absolute does not surpass the world in its magnitude, quality, weight and immensity, but it transcends everything in essence. The term '*surpassing*' implies the existence of a rival and so posits always a notion of *relation* between the higher and the lower, superiority and inferiority. But the supra-relational Absolute is never qualified by these opposites and difficiencies. The difficiency which may be apparently noticeable in the Absolute is due to the veil of *māyā*. Superimposition is the cause of this socalled defect. Fire is seperate from the iron-ball which becomes red-hot with its contact, but the ignorant think that the ball burns. It happens only for the superimposed ignorance of the appreciator. So, through the web of nescience we apply the priority and validity to the world which is really dead. The Absolute is the only

reality and 'it transcends', which means it shines within itself as one without the second.

Now what does the term *knowledge* mean? Does it imply a process or a series of happenings or the act of knowing? All knowledge which we get through the gates of sense-experiences is contingent and spatio-temporal in nature, It is an apparent cognition in contradistinction to the real knowledge of the Ātman or the knowledge of the Self, But in our ordinary knowledge or consciousness we take shadows for realities and realities for shadows. It has only an empirical validity, whereas Self-knowledge is absolutely valid. The Self-knowledge really transcends the limits of time and space, as there is no subject-object relation in it. It is also a fact that an apparent knowledge or consciousness cannot be imagined without its opposite, the real. Reality is always valid and it justifies itself by its uncontradicted (*avādhita*) nature. Moreover every piece of knowledge as *chit* is luminous and self-sufficient. It reveals itself and at the same time reveals all the objects of the empirical world. The self-revealing nature is inherent in every kind of knowledge. From this standpoint common knowledge having the nature of luminosity or *chit* does not differ from Self-knowledge.

Every empirical knowledge is confined to thought, which is nothing but the structure of subject-object relation. It cannot transcend the deceiving limit of daulity. If it does, it no longer remains as thought, but unfolds itself as thing-in-itself or the ground of thought. Then the fate of the thought will be like a salt-doll which goes to measure the depth of the ocean and is dissolved. But by nature thought is always discursive and full of antimonies.

In a thought there must be a thinking principle. This principle is an act of vibration which is generated from the friction of the two poles, positive and negative, subject and object. Between these two poles there is a neutral third zone and thought commits there suicide. The neutral zone is the balancing point and when thought reaches there it becomes static. Then it calms down and is transcended. It becomes thing-in-itself and loses its name and form in the blissful ocean of the Absolute. All the opposites, thesis and antithesis, are then synthesized for ever and ever in the eternal harmony of the Absolute.

Knowledge or consciousness remains always as luminosity or *chit*. It is also a self-luminous common awareness. It appears as different or manifold only

by its contents. The knowledge of a table and the knowledge of the Brahman are always the same and one, but the distinction lies only in their objects, the table and the Brahman. The objects qualify the substratum and thus they are different only in their names and forms which are nothing but the 'statement of facts', nescience or *māyā*.

A knowledge of the simplest and truest kind is not a process or a form. It does not generate as the result of any action, but it is always the *chit* which is self-shining and self-revealing (*'vastu-tantratvāt'*).

The distinction between the empirical ego or object-self and the real Self is absolutely clear. Both of them are the lights, but the latter is called the Light of lights. All the phenomenal lights, sun, moon, stars, and other lumineries borrow their lights from it. It is the pure intelligence, bliss and knowledge. Thought and intellect are absolutely unfit to measure the depth of the Absolute, because imperfection is the abiding feature of them. They are unable to get into the core of the absolute Reality. But it is also a fact that the apperception or intimate knowledge of the noumenon is only possible for an intellect or reason. This knowledge comes like a flash in contact with intellect or reason. The Vedānta

says that it is the modalized consciousness (*vritti-jñāna*) which reveals the Brahman. The *chit* or pure consciousness remains in the modalized consiousness (*vritti-jñāna*) accompanied with the causal nescience. The *chit* dispels the nescience and the self-luminous Brahman reveals itself (*'śuddha-chaitanya-viṣayasya taj-jñāna-nivartasya'*).

The dispelling of the nescience means the revealing or unfoldment of the Absolute. The reflected consciousness (*prativimvita* or *vritti-chaitanya*) then loses its separate entity and gets transformed into pure *chit* immediatly. The revealing of the pure *chit* or Brahman and the act of transformation of the intellect into higher intuition or pure consciousness both happen simultaneously. This act of transformation does not involve any foreign or new change, but it regains its own divine glory and essence.

Nor is it the fact that intellect or pure thought is first negated and then transformed or transcended into *chit*, Because intellect or reason and the world or *māyā* can never be negated in the absolute Reality, because *negation* implies the notion of removal of an existing object which is real. But intellect or reason, and the world-appearance or *māyā* possess only an empirical or illusive existence (*vyavahārika*

or prātibhāsika sattvā) and not any permanent or transcendental reality (*pāramārthika sattvā*) and, so, being apparently recognized as negative principles they have no access into the sphere of the all-existing absolute immutable Brahman. The non-dualistic Vedānta says that thought, intellect, reason and all other phenomenal objects are quite inadequate for the appreciation of the supersensual Absolute, because imperfection remains in their permanent stuff. It can be said in the language of Bradley that they are but miserable fragments of our Nature, which is phenomenal and unreal. But it is also a fact that *avidyâ* or nescience is revealed by the pure thought which is the reflected consciousness or reflex consciousness (*vritti-jñâna*). The *chit* or pure consciousness remains in company with nescience. The *chit* in the reflex conciousness or the consciousness of the logical knowledge dispells the nescience ('शुद्धचैतन्यविषयस्य तज्ज्ञाननिवर्तस्य'). Some hold that *mâyâ*, ignorance or nescience is cancelled by the Brahman or transcendental knowledge. But it is not correct, because nescience is cancelled always by the witnessing conciousness (*svâksī-chaitanya*) or reflex consciousness (*vritti-chaitanya*) and not by the pure or transcendental consciousness (*śuddha-chaitanya*). To clarify this subtle problem,

Dr. Sâtkari Mukherji says in an ingenious way: 'It may be contened that ignorance together with the object referred to is attested by transcendental consciousness and transcendental consciousness does not present opposition to any knowledge, false or true. So the consciousness of ignorance along with the object referred to does not involve a logical difficulty, as the consciousness is alogical in character. But this contention, even if conceded, raises another difficulty. If the knowledge of ignorance and its object be furnished by transcendental consciousness, the knowledge of the object should be definite and capable of being explained. Even transcendent knowledge is capable of leading affirmation and communication of its objects, as is seen to be the case with mental facts, which are all revealed by transcendental knowledge and are capable of being affirmed or communicated. If the object of ignorance were revealed by transcendental knowledge, this should enable us to define and and explain the nature of the object. But this would make ignorance impossible'.[53] He says

53. Vide *The Concept of Ajñâna in Vedânta Philosophy* in *Indian Culture*, Vol. III, July, 1936, No. 2, p. 105.

again: 'This transcendent consciousness is alogical or super-logical in character and is the prius of logical knowledge. Ignorance or false knowledge is sublated by a logical knowledge and not by transcendental conciousness, which rather attests and reveals all knowledge-situations irrespective of their logical character'.[54] In truth, the self-luminious Brahman reveals itself. The dispelling of the ignorance is correspondingly followed by the revelation of the Brahman and the two phenomena take place simultaneously. Madhusudan Sarasvatī points out that *avidyâ* is revealed to witnessing intelligence (*sâkṣī-vedya*), and not pure consciousness (*śuddha-chit* or Brahman).[55] Because witnessing intelligence being a reflex conciousness is a modification of *avidyâ* (*avidyâ-vritti*) and therefore a product or nescience, and so it is possible for it to reveal the *avidyâ*. It means that it destroys the nescience that lies in reflex conciousness. This *avidyâ's* percepi is not Brahman, for it has no object and it does not reveal, though it is the Divine

---

54 Ibid, p. 104.

55 सा चाविद्या साक्षीवेद्या, न तु शुद्धचित्प्रकाश्या। साक्षी चाविद्यावृत्तिप्रतिविम्बितचैतन्यम्। तेन—निर्दोषचित्प्रकाश्यत्वेनाज्ञानस्य पारमार्थिकत्वापत्तिः, मोक्षोऽपि तत् प्रकाशापत्तिः * *।—*Advaitasiddhi* (Nirṇaya Sāgara press edn.), p. 575.

intuition itself. The witness or witnessing consciousness reavles *avidyâ*, which forms an accident. Sadânanda Yati puts it in a more lucid way when he says that the mind (mental state), inspired by the reflection of spirit, refers to the supreme Brahman as not distinct from the *jīva* and removes only the nescience obscuring it. * * * Spirit as reflected in it, being unable to illumine the self-luminous Brahman, not distinct from the internal self, * * . And it will lapse into Brahman itself, not distinct from the inmost self, as its condition viz, the mental state is no longer there—as the reflection on a (person's) face, when the mirror conditioning it is broken, lapses into face. * * (As the *Vārttika* also admits) its being affected by *vritti* is necessary in order that ignorance may be dispelled, and also the reflexion serves no purpose (here), Brahman being self-luminious'.[57] Therefore, when we realize the purport

56 Vide Dr. Sircar: *Comparative Vedāntism*, p. 72.

57 सा तु चित्प्रतिविम्वसहिता सती प्रत्यगभिन्नमज्ञातं परं ब्रह्म विषयीकृत्य तद्‌गताज्ञानमेव वाधते। तदा पटकारणतन्तुदाहे पटदाहवदखिल कार्यकारणेऽज्ञाने वाधिते सति तत्कार्यस्याखिलस्य वाधितत्वात्तदन्तर्भूता-खण्डाकाराकारिता चित्तवृत्तिरपि वाधिता भवति। तत्र (वृत्तौ) प्रतिविम्बितं चैतन्यं अपि यथा (प्र)-दीपप्रभा आदित्यप्रभावभासनासमर्था सती तया अभिभूता भवति, तथा स्वयंप्रकाशमाण-प्रत्यगभिन्नपरब्रह्मावभासनानर्हतया तेन अभिभूतं सत् स्वोपाधिभूताखण्डवृत्तेः वाधितत्वात् दर्पणाभावे मुखप्रति-

of the Vedāntic *mahāvākya*: 'I am Brahman' (अहं ब्राह्मस्मि), the partless pure Brahman becomes *as if* the content of my knowing and it means the Brahman reflects itself in the reflex consciousness[58] with the nescience, and the reflex process dispells at once the causal nescience too. This dispelling of the nescience means that the self-revealing Brahman shines in its own glory. Some philosophers maintain that reflex consciousness loses at that time its separate entity and gets transformed immediately. The revealing of the *chit* or Brahman and the transformation of the reflex consciousness into pure consciousness happen simultaneously and this transformation does not imply any change in it, but it gets back to its own undying glory and sublimity.

विम्वस्य मुखमात्रत्ववत् प्रत्यगभिन्नपरब्रह्ममात्वं भवति । * * तदुक्तम् (वार्तिके) 'फलव्याप्यत्वमेवास्य शास्त्रकृद्भिर्निवारितम् । ब्रह्मरयज्ञाणनाशाय वृत्तिव्याप्तिरपेक्षिता' ॥—वेदान्तसार १७२-१७५

58 This reflex consciousness (*vritti-jñâna*) is somewhat like the *cogitato* or 'Thought' of Spinoza. Regarding it Prof. Joachim says: "The Attribute of Thought is the 'ideal' side of Substance, * *. God's entire being, * * is reflected upon itself and this reflectedness is itself one of the ultimate characters of his being, viz. the character expressed in the Attribute of Thought'—Vide Joachim: *The Nature of Truth*, (1906), p. 150.

We cannot go beyond our consciousness, because conciousness itself implies the sense of *beyond*, and, if we try to get beyond consciousness we shall have to surpass or transcend it with the aid of consciousness. In the *Upaniṣad* it is said: 'विज्ञातरमरे केन विजानीयात्' i.e. 'who can know the Knower, the basic consciousness? Therefore, consciousness cannot be transcended by consciousness. It is the prime source of all knowledge. Dr. Haldar also says when representing the philosophy of Lord Haldane: 'Do what we may, we cannot go behind knowledge itself'. Dr. Haldane himself admits: 'Reality lies in the foundational character of knowledge, and in the distinction between perceiver and perceived, knower and known, as being distinctions falling inside the entirety of that foundational character, in as much as they are made by and within knowledge itself'.[59] Such is also the conclusion of the great physicist Max Planck. He says: "Consciousness, I regard as fundamental. * * *We cannot get behind consciousness*. Everything that we talk about, everything that we regard as existing, postulates consciousness.' Therefore consciousness is the fundamental

---

59 Vide Dr. Haldar: *Neo-Hegelianism*, (1927), p. 395.

principle upon which we construct the tripertite categories viz. subject, object and their relation. It is the only fountain and quintessence of the world of phenomena. We live, move, and have our being in consciousness. When we say we are conscious of a thing, it means that we make our pure consciousness an object of our awareness or sense-apprehension. But it is also a fact that a subject cannot be an object and *vice versa*. From the monistic or rather transcendental viewpoint there cannot be a subject or object other than the *chit* or pure consciousness. The Brahman is the unique and real consciousness and as there cannot be room for a second or any other consciousness it is proved that the phenomenal appearances are nothing but the manifold images of the one and the same Substance. It is the only fundamental principle of unity amidst the socalled variety. As the burning sparks are no other than the fire—as the reflection of a face in a mirror is no other than the face itself, so the spatio-temporal and subject-object related world-process is not different from the pure and absolute consciousness or the Brahman. The finite individuals realize the Infinite means that the finite ones recollect and regain their own unparalleled sublimity and uniqueness.

Knowledge or consciousness, in its truest form,

is the Absolute. The being and the becoming are one and the same. Swâmi Abhedānanda says: 'The attainment of Godconsciousness is nothing but the spiritual unfoldment. It is being and becoming God. In realization knowldege is not subordinate to the Absolute, being under its possession'. Well has it been said by Prof. Mālkāni that possession is like the head of Rāhu. Rāhu is nothing but the head. The possessive preposition 'of' merely indicates equivalence. Knowledge and the Absolute do not fall apart for all the time. They are one and the same. They appear different or enter into gradations only through the unexplainable veil of *māyā*. The Absolute lies beyond sense, beyond imagination, and even beyond intelligence, and it can only be realized in an ecstasy of unuttarable *feeling* which is no other than the absolute Brahman itself. 'Spirit with spirit can meet, God can speak with man face to face'. So to regain knowledge or divine consciousness of the Absolute, we shall have to dive deep into the boundless ocean of the Absolute, nay, we shall have to loose ourselves into the eternal ocean of the transcendental Brahman.

CHAPTER VI

MAN AND THE ABSOLUTE

Man is the epitome of the Absolute. Mystic Eckhart says: 'The seed of God is in us. Given an intelligent and hard-working farmer, it will thrive and grow up to God, whose seed it is; and accordingly its fruits will be God-nature'.[1] A man *appears* different from the Absolute, because he *thinks* himself different from it, because he *imagines* the difference between him and the Absolute. Man's *mere* imagination or erroneous conception is responsible for the difference which, viewed in strictly logical light, becomes shadowy and unreal. The difference or the idea of separation apparently entangles man in the dark den of delusion, because difference itself is delusion. It binds man with the fetters of *mâyâ*; it deludes him because he forgets the truth that immortality belongs to his permanent stuff, that the Ātman is eternally shining in the inmost depths of his being, and that the deathless Ātman really constitutes his true being. Plotinus says: 'Each being contains in itself the whole intelligible world. Therefore All is everywhere.

---

1 Aldous Huxley: *The Perennial Philosophy* (1946), p. 49.

Each is there All, and All is each. Man as he now is, has ceased to be the All. But when he ceases to be an individual, he raises himself again and penetrates the whole world'.[2] So man does not *appear* as the Whole or All, because he is in ignorance, because he is unconscious of his own divine heritage. But when the ignorance of forgetfulness is removed or rather corrected by *recognition* or right knowledge of the Ātman, he experiences divine flashes within. The Brahman-knowledge is then revealed to him in its fulness and perfection.

Truly speaking, there is no difference between an individual soul and the Absolute. The difference is an *assuming* one and, therefore, false. Some maintain that souls are related to the Absolute in the same way as the sparks to fire. But, according to non-dualistic view of Vedânta, the soul or the Ātman is an undivided whole. It is a homogeneous unity that knows no addition, abstraction or deduction. It is one without the second and is above the concept of totality, nay, it is raised from the categories of one and many.

But the Absolute in the form of God, who is the witnessing consciousness (*sākṣī-chaitanya*) pervades

2 Ibid., p. 11.

the whole universe. Its divine spirit permeates and animates everything. There is nothing beyond or apart from the Absolute, which lies in the core of all things. On once being asked by his desciple the great Christian mystic and neo-Platonist Suso observed: 'God is nowhere—God is like a circular ring, the ring's central point is everywhere, and its circumference nowhere'.[3] Swāmi Abhedānanda maintains an identical view in his celebrated discussion on Godconsciousness. He says: 'The soul in each individual is a centre of that circle whose circumference is nowhere but whose centre is everywhere. That circle is called the universal Spirit. It is the source of infinite wisdom, of all knowledge, all truth, all science, all philosophy, art, beauty and love. This unlimited circle of infinite wisdom is the real background of each apparent individual. Not knowing that the eternal river of wisdom is constantly flowing within him, the apparent man seeks here and there, and struggles for a drop of knowledge to satisfy his intellectual thirst, like the fool, who, standing on the banks of a

---

3 Vide Höffding: *The Philosophy of Religion* (1931), p. 45. Cf. also *Ueinrich Suso's Leben Und Scbrifen* edited by Diepenbrock, Regensberg (1829), p. 212 ff.

mighty river, digs a well for water to quench his thirst'.[4]

The soul of all beings is essentially divine. It is in essence the stupendous whole. The expression of life in the phenomenal objects, sentient and insentient, is the proof of existence of the cosmic energy which embodies not merely an integral part of the whole, but the whole itself. The circumference expresses the idea of externality or *otherness*. As everything in the universe is pervaded by the all-inclusive omnipresent God, not an inch can be excluded from God's divine essence, so in the Absolute as the circle there remains no circumference, but exists only the centres that cover the circle and that means God is all and all is God. The *Iśa Upaniṣad* says: 'All are pervaded by the Absolute, and being devoid of it there can exist nothing'.[5] God forms the substratum of the panoroma of the phenomenal world. The *Māndukya Upaniṣad* also states: 'Everything of the universe is the Brahman; the individual souls are really the Brahman'.[6] The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*

4 Vide Abhedānanda: *Spiritual Unfoldment*, pp. 60-61.

5 *'Iśâ vâsyamidam sarvam yat kiñcha jagatyâm jagat'.* —Iśa Up. 1.

6 *Sarvam hyetad 'Brahmâyamâtmâ Brahman'*—Māndukya Up. 1.2.

mentions: 'Whatever exists in this world, has come out from the vibration of the *prâṇa*'.[7] The *prāṇa* is known as the Hiraṇyagarbha-Iśvara, but yet it is essentially not different from the *prajñā*, *avyakta* or *iśvara* and even from the superempirical transcending fourth or *turīya-chaitanya*. The Absolute is designated sometimes as the Infinite, because it can be appreciated in innumerable ways, nothing is different from it, and nothing is excluded from it. Evelyn Underhill says: 'To say that God is Infinite is to say that he may be apprehended and described in an infinity of ways. That circle whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere, may be approached from every angle with a certainty of being found'.[8] So the Absolute can be realized in every possible way. It is the only real, and everything other than it, is frail and unreal.

The mystics like Eckhart and others say that Man is God and God hides himself in man to serve his divine mission. Here God assumes the status of the Absolute, the supreme reality. And it is true that God is, in reality, the Absolute. Though for the convenience of easy grasp in thought four

---

7 '*Yadidam kiñcha jagat sarvam prâṇa ejati nibsritam*' —Kaṭha Up. II. 32.

8 Vide Underhill: *Mysticism* (1930), p. 238.

consecutive stages of the Absolute have been imagined in the Vedāntic chart, yet essentially the Absolute has no stages or gradations. The four stages are divided into two heads, cosmic (*samaṣṭhi*) and individual (*vyaṣṭhi*). The cosmic divisions are: *turīya*, *iśvara*, *hiraṇyagarbha*, and *virāta*, and the individual ones are: *turīya*, *prajñā*, *taijasa*, and *viśva*. These stages or divisions are only the functional divisions—divisions of the empirical delusive world. For *māyā* or nescience the nontemporal and nonspatial Absolute assumes the manifestations of transcendence and immanence.[9] When the

9 Prof. Windelband observes two phases of God-Nature, the one God becomes the unity in one time, and the diversity in another time. He says: 'It is the theory of God-Nature, in which plurality gives the appearance and unity the reality: and the conceptual relation between the unity and plurality is simply that of inherence. God as the primal reality has his attributes, and in these as limitations we have the individual things of experience, his *modi*;* * In this way we get two relations between the one primary being and the plurality of individual things: the Pantheistic according to the category of inherence, the Deistic according to that of causality. In the one case God is the original thing: in the other case the original cause. For these two positions we use the words *immanence* and *transcendence*. * * The one substance of Pantheism is in-

Absolute is raised from the idea of nescience it shines as the transcendental fourth (*turīya*), and when it is imagined as coexisting with *mâyâ* or nescience it *appears* as the third (*iśvara*), as the second (*hiraṇya-garbha*), or as the first (*virāta*). So *mâyâ* or nescience is a dividing category; it only gives the pure Absolute the phenomenal names and forms (*nāma-rūpa*). The true nature or status of the Absolute is realized when it is revealed to the colourless pure vision of man's soul. For this reason the mystics have described the Absolute as an illuminative Silence where it shines in its inherent undying glory.

The non-dualistic Vedānta says that the absolute Brahman is not the transcendent Reality, but it is really the transcendent transcendental One. Sometimes the word *transcendence* is interpreted as mere *negation* or void, but that is not correct. 'Vedāntic transcendence', says Dr. N. K. Brahma, 'is different from all other notions of transcendence and really unique. It is not spatial or temporal transcendence, it is not the transcendence of aggregation or totalization, it is not the transcendence of harmony or equilibrium, in short,

---

finite; the *modi* are its finite appearances.'—Vide Windelband: *An Introduction to Philosophy* (1921), pp. 76-78.

it is not immanental transcendence, but it is transcendent transcendence'. The world or unreality is not negated or denied but sublated or transcended inspite of its apparent co-existence or simultaneous existence with the absolute Brahman, because the Brahman and the world of nescience belong to different orders or reality. Some of the Western mystics and philosophers figuratively calls the Absolute as the Darkness—the Darkness which is ever-radiant with its self-evident lusture and beauty. Dionysius the Areopagite says that 'the simple, absolute and immutable mysteries of divine Truth are hidden in the super-luminous darkness of that silence which revealeth in secret. For this darkness, though of deepest obscurity, is yet radiantly clear; and, though beyond touch and sight, it is more than fills our unseeing minds with splendours or transcendent beauty'.[10]

---

10 Vide Aldous Huxley: *The Perennial Philosophy* (1946), p. 43.

Dr. M. N. Sircar says: 'It is primordial experience, in *Knowledge* as well as in *Spirituality*. This is unique experience where determinations do not function. It is a state of illuminative silence' (Vide *Hindu Mysticism*, p. 62). Prof. Pratt mentions that Miss Stephen describes: 'It is rather the quiescence of a perfectly ordered fullness—a

The Absolute is not without but within us, nay, it is exactly identical with our all-knowledge Self. It is the Soul of our souls. So it is vain to seek the Absolute outside. It is an indwelling spirit. We should not seek the Absolute here and there nor should we search it in the heavens or the hills, in the seas or the woodlands. We must seek it in the depth of our being—in the vision inwardly drawn. And once we discover the divine Self within us, we are endowed with a vision to see it everywhere, within and without all things and beings of the world. Realization of our true Self leads eventually to the knowledge of the Absolute. That is why in the remote antiquity of the Vedic age the ancient seers of Truth declared: 'Verily the Absolute shines eternally within the cave of the human soul very secretly and mysteriously. So it is very difficult to see the Absolute. By going through the ceaseless and systematic process of spiritual practice the wise man sees it within his own being and in consequence of this realization he surely goes beyond all dualities and delusion.'[11] 'This Absolute

---

leaving behind of hurrying outward thoughts and an entering into the region of central calm.'—*The Religious Consciousness* (1945), p. 360.

11 '*Tam durdaśam gūḍamanupraviṣtham, guhâhitam*

is furthest of far and yet nearest of near; it is seen only through the spiritual eyes secretly residing within the cave of one's own soul.'[12] Therefore man attains *perfection* when he knows the Atman, nay, when he realizes him as an integral part of the transcendental Absolute.

---

gabhvareṣṭham purâṇam: Adhyâtma-yogâdhigamena devam, matvā dhīro harṣa-śokau jahâti.'—Katha Upaniṣad, I.2.12.

12 *'Dūrât sudūre tadihântike cha paśyatsvihaiva nihitam guhâyâm.*—Mundaka Up., III. 1. 7.

CHAPTER VII

JÑĀNA AND VIJÑĀNA

The status of the integral feeling of the Divine consciousness is *mukti* or perfection which is called by the non-dualistic Vedānta *'aparokṣânubhūti'* or the direct divine intuition or *realization* that does not involve any mediacy of any thing or process. It is not different from the real *jñāna* or *vījñāna*. Some scholars and some of the mystics are of opinion that *jñāna* and *vījñāna* are quite different from eaeh other, as the former signifies the discursive and phenomenal knowledge and the latter, the higher supersensual knowledge, which is one and the same as the supra-spatio-temporal transcendental Absolute. In many of the authoritative scriptural texts and commentaries we find different meanings and interpretations of the words *jñāna* and *vijñāna*. As for example, in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (chpt. VI. 8) we find that the word '*jñāna*' has been used to signify the scriptural knowledge, whereas *vijñâna* signifies the absolute knowledge or divine *realization*.: 'ज्ञानविज्ञानतृप्तात्माकूटस्थो विजितेन्द्रियः'। Again we find in the *Gītā* that the chapter VI has been devoted to 'ज्ञानविज्ञानयोग'। There *vijñâna* has been used to denote the direct experience

of the Brahman and *jñâna* as the knowledge about the existence of the Reality. Again in the *Gītâ* (ch. IX, 1) we find the words 'ज्ञानंविज्ञानसहितम्', where *jñâna* clearly signifies the knowledge of the Brahman, and *vijñâna* the direct awareness or experience of the Brahman (*Brahmânubhūti*).

Nâgârjuna, the great Buddhist philosopher uses the term *vijñâna* in the sense of 'cognition' or 'sensation':] 'चक्षुरूपे प्रतीत्यैवमुक्तौ विज्ञानसम्भवः'[1] । Chandrakīrti in his commentary says:] "द्रष्टव्यं दर्शनञ्च प्रतीत्यविज्ञानमुत्पद्यत । * * विज्ञानादिचतुष्टयं विज्ञानस्पर्शवेदनातृष्णाख्यम्" ।[2] Śāntideva in his *Śīkṣâsamuccaya* uses the word *vijñâna* or *vijñānadhātu* in the sense of 'cognition', which is momentary and fleeting.[3] Vasubandhu in his *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* uses *vijñāna* and *vijñāpti* to signify 'sensation'. He further says in his *Vritti*:] 'महायाने त्रैधातुकं विज्ञप्तिमात्रं व्यवस्थाप्यते । * * चित्तं मनो विज्ञानं विज्ञप्तिश्चेति पर्यायाः'।[4] In addition to these, Vasubandhu's version with reference to the term *vijñāna* is:] "कर्मणो

1 Vide *Mādhyamika-kārikā*, p. 34.

2 The commentary of *Madhyamika-kārikā*, p. 34.

3 *Śikṣāsamuccaya* of *Bibliotheca Buddhica*, I, St. Petersberg, 1902, (edited by Cecil Bendall, M. A.), Ch. XII, pp. 202-228. Ibid. also, pp. 221, 222, 224, 226.

4 Vide *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, edited by Sylvain Lévi (Paris, 1925), p. 4.

वासना तेषां विज्ञानसन्तानसंनिविष्टा नान्यत्र । यत्रैव च वासना तत्रैव तस्याः फलं तादृशो विज्ञानपरिणामः * *' ।[5] Sthiramatī in his commentary *Trimśikā-vijñaptikārikā* states: 'तत्रालयाख्यं विज्ञानं'; 'तदालम्ब मनोनाम विज्ञानं मननात्मकम्' ।[6] Again in the *Bhāṣya* he says: "प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वं पुनः विज्ञानस्य परिणामशब्देन ज्ञापितम्' ।[7] So we see that most of the Buddhist philosophers have used the word *vijñāna* to signify the 'cognition' or 'series of congnitions or sensations' and 'perceptual knowledge' which are fluxes and not permanent.

In the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* the nature of *vijñāna* has generally been divided into two classes or grades and they are: *pravirttivijñāna* or individual consciousness and *ālayavijñāna* or absolute consciousness. The *pravirttvijñāna* is again divided into seven classes and they are: *chakṣu, ghrāṇa, śrotra, jihvā, kāya, mana* and *viśiṣṭa*. Some of the Buddhist texts expound the *ālayavijñāna* as a changing streams of consciousness (*vijnanāsantāna*) and it has already been mentioned above with connotation of the word '*vijñāna*' as '*vijñānanantāna-niviṣṭa*.' etc. Regarding *ālayavijñāna* Sthiramati says that 'it is called *ālaya*

5 Ibid. p. 5.
6 Ibid. p. 13.
7 Ibid. p. 16.

because it contains the seeds or potentialities of all the *dharmas*, i.e. subjective and objective phenomena exist in a potential state in the *ālayavijñāna*, and so it is evident that *ālayavijñāna* is the cause of the world-appearance. Vasubandhu 'compares the modes of *ālayavijñāna* to the tide of the ocean which creates the mental properties of contact, feeling, and the like under the influence of the dispositions (*vāsanā*) of good and bad *karmas*. Vasubandhu says in his *Trimśikā-vijñaptikārikā*:

पञ्चानां मूलविज्ञाने यथा प्रत्ययसुद्भवः ।
विज्ञानानां सह न वा तरङ्गाणां यथा जले ॥
मनोविज्ञानसंभूतिः सर्वदासंज्ञिकादृते ।
समापत्तिद्वयान्मिद्धान्मुर्च्छनादप्यचित्तकात् ॥
विज्ञानपरिणामोऽयं विकल्पो यद्विकल्प्यते ।
तेन तन्नास्ति तेनेदं सर्वं विज्ञप्तिमात्रकम् ॥
सर्ववीजं हि विज्ञानं परिणामस्तथा तथा ।
यात्यन्योन्यवशाद येन विकल्पः स स जायते ॥[8]

He further says that *ālayavijñāna* 'is the repository of the desires or dispositions (*vāsanā*) or seeds (*vīja*) of the past experiences of all individuals. * * The world is the expression of the *ālayavijñāna* or

---

8 Vide *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* edited by Sylvain Lévi (Paris, 1925), p. 14.

cosmic consciousness.'[9] Therefore it is found that *ālayavijñāna* or *tathatāgarbha* being the seed of the world (*saṁsāra-vīja*) and active principle, cannot be regarded as the absolute consciousness. Aśvaghoṣa does not also admit *ālayavijñāna* as a world-transcending consciousness. Regarding the nature and status of the *vijñāna* i.e. *ālayavijñāna* Āchārya Vasubandhu says in his *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*:

आत्मधर्मोपचारो हि द्विविधो यः प्रवर्तते ।
विज्ञानपरिणामोऽसौ परिणामः स च त्रिधा ॥
विपाको मननाख्यश्च विज्ञप्तिर्विषयस्य च ।
तत्रालयाख्यं विज्ञानं विपाकः सर्ववीजकम् ॥

* * *

धर्माणां परमार्थश्च स यतस्तथतापि सः ।
सर्वकालं तथाभावात् सैव विज्ञप्तिमात्रता ॥
यदालम्बनं विज्ञानं नैवोपलभ्यते तदा ।
स्थितं विज्ञानमात्रत्वे ग्राह्याभावे तदग्रहात् ॥

* * *

सुखो विमुक्तिकायोऽसौ धर्माख्योऽयं महामुनेः ॥

But the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* considers *vijñāna* or *ālayavijñāna* as a constant, immortal and static source or fountain of all consciousness. *Ālayavijñāna* 'transcends the subject-object duality (*grāhya-grāhaka-visaṁyukta*), beyond origination, existence and des-

9 Vide Dr. Sinha: *History of Indian Philosophy* (1957), Vol. 386.

truction (*utpāda-sthiti-bhaṅga-varjya*), beyond all the plurality of imagination (*vikalpa-prapañcha-rahita*) and is to be directly realized through pure reason (*nirābhāsaprajñā-gochara*). The beginningless tendency, backed by ignorance in the *ālaya* to manifest itself as subject and object is regarded as the force behind creation. *Ālaya* itself is *āśraya* and *viṣaya* of this tendency. What are called individual *pravrittīvijñāna* are but manifestations of the *ālaya*. * * Judged from the ultimate point of view, *ālaya* is indescribable and transcends all categories of the intellect'.[10]

Ālayavijñāna has been regarded as *tathāgatagarbha* which resembles the *Upaniṣadic* (Vedāntic) Ātman or Brahman to some extent and this doctrine has especially been advocated by the *Laṅkavatāra-sūtra*. But still there is a dissimilarity between the conception of the Vedāntic Ātman and that of the Mahāyanīc Ātman. The *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* makes the distinction and advocates that *ālayavijñāna* or *tathāgatagarbha* is not similar to the Vedāntic Ātman, because the *ālayavijñāna* or Mahāyanīc Ātman transcends all categorìes of finite thought (*nirvikalpa*),

---

10 Vide the article *Vijñānavāda of Buddhism* by Prof. Heramba Chatterjee (in *The Prabuddha Bhārata*, May, 1957, pp. 226-227).

affirmation and negation, and it is to be directly realized by pure reason (*nirābhāsagochara*), whereas the *Upaniṣadic* or Vedāntic Ātman 'leads to eternalism, because it clings to affirmation'.[11] But according to Vasubandhu's *Triṁśikā*, *vijñaptimātratā* is the ground (*adhiṣṭhana*) of *ālayavijñāna* and it is the only pure and eternal consciousness and possesses absolute reality (*pāramārthika sattvā*). Vasubandhu says that all appearances, subjective and objective, are transformations of *vijñaptimātratā* and it is the only ground. It is one, homogeneous and undifferentiated unity and reality, and it is the Vedāntic Ātman. But the '*ālayavijñāna*', says Dr. Siṅha, 'is not the Ātman of the *Upaniṣads*. The Ātman is unchangeable and immutable. But *ālayavijñāna* is the growing, developing and mutable cosmic consciousness. The pure consciousness (*vijñaptimātratā*) corresponds to the Ātman'.[12] Dr. Suzuki regards *ālayavijñāna* of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* as the superindividual mind. Dr. S. N. Dāsgupta counts *ālayavijñāna* of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu as the cosmic consciousness. Dr. Coomeraswāmī regards it as the cosmic mind, and

11 Ibid. p. 227. Cf. also Dr. S. N. Dāsgupta: *Indian Idealism* (Cambridge, 1933), p. 93.

12 Vide Dr. Siṅha: *History of Indian Philosophy* (1957), Vol. II, p. 389.

Prof. Keith regards it as also the cosmic consciousness.

Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* uses the word *vijñâna* both in the senses, empirical and non-empirical. As he states: [7] 'न तु तथा * * क्रियाकारकादिद्वैतविज्ञानोपमर्दोपपत्तेः। नह्येकत्वविज्ञानेनोन्मथितस्य द्वैतविज्ञानस्य पुनः संभवोऽस्ति * *'।[13] Here Śaṅkara means by the word 'द्वैतविज्ञान' the discursive and phenomenal knowledge, whereas by 'एकत्वविज्ञानेन' he means the transcendental Brahman-knowledge. In the commentary on the *sūtra*: 'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्', Śaṅkara uses the word *vijñâna* to signify the scriptural knowledge: 'यथा व्याकरणादि पाणिन्यादेर्ज्ञेयैकदेशार्थमपि स ततोऽप्यधिकतरविज्ञान इति प्रसिद्धं लोके'।[9] Again to signify the supralogical Brahman-knowledge he says: 'मिथ्याज्ञानापायश्च ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानाद्भवति। नचेदं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानं संपद्रूपम्'।[14] Here Śaṅkara signifies the supersensible transcendental knowledge by the words 'ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानात्' and 'एकत्वविज्ञानं'। Further he says: 'अनुभवावसानं च ब्रह्मविज्ञानमविद्याया निवर्तकं मोक्षसाधनं च दृष्टफलतयेष्यते' (2.1.4), i. e. 'it is seen evidently that *Brahman-vijñâna* is the feeling or *experience*, and deliverance comes with the removal of nescience'. In the commentary on the *sūtra* II, 1. 14 Śaṅkara says: 'सर्वव्यवहाराणामेव प्राग्ब्रह्मात्मताविज्ञानात् सत्यत्वोपपत्तेः', i.e. 'until and unless

---

13 Vide the commentary on *Brahmasūtra*, 1. 1. 4.

14 Vide the commentary of *Brahmasūtra*, 1. 1. 3.

there dawns the Divine illumination of the Brahman-knowledge so long the world appears as real'. In these two references Śaṅkara uses the words 'ब्रह्मविज्ञानं' and 'ब्रह्मात्मताविज्ञानं' in the sense of the supra-mundane transcendental knowledge. Again in the commentary upon the sayings of the *Mundaka Upaniṣad* (II, 6): 'वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः', Śaṅkara says: 'किञ्च वेदान्तजनितं विज्ञानं वेदान्तविज्ञानं तस्यार्थः परमात्मा विज्ञेयः'।

In the *Mândukya-kârikâ* Gauḍapâda uses the word *vijñâna* in both the senses, unchangeable Brahman-knowledge and ever-changing phenomenal knowledge. As for example: 'जाताभ्यासं * * अजाचलमवस्तुत्वं विज्ञानं शान्तमद्वयम्'।[15] Here the word *vijñâna* has been used to mean the secondless and attributeless supreme knowledge, whereas in the *kārikā*, 162, Gauḍapāda again uses the word *vijñâna* to connote the fleeting knowledge or cognition which takes the forms of both subject and object: "ऋजुवक्रादिकाभासमलातस्पन्दितं यथा। ग्रहण-ग्राहकाभासं विज्ञानस्पन्दितं तथा'। So it is found that the word *vijñâna*, when used in the sense of transcendental knowledge, or *Brahman-vijñâna*,[16] does not differ from the word *jñâna*.

---

15 The *Gauḍapâda-kārikâ*, 160.

16 The Kāśmere Śaiva system considers *vijñâna* i.e. *vijñânakalâ* as the highest and purest principle, which is free from any tint of *mâyâ*: 'मायोर्ध्वे यादृशा विज्ञानकलाः कर्तृता-

In the *Vivarṇaprameya-saṁgraha* Bhāratitīrtha-Vidyāraṇya differentiates *Brahman-jñāna* from *Brahman-vijñāna* by citing the quotations from the *Purāṇas* and the *upa-Purāṇas*. He quotes :

> ततः सर्वाङ्गनिष्ठस्य प्रत्यग्ब्रह्मैक्यगोचरा ।
> या वृत्तिर्मानसो शुद्धा जायते वेदवाक्यतः ॥
> तस्यां या चिदभिव्यक्तिः स्वतः सिद्धा च शाङ्करी ।
> तदेव ब्रह्मविज्ञानं तदेवाज्ञाननाशनम् ॥[17]

That is, by the ethical process of *sama* (control of internal organ), *dama* (control of external senses), etc. when a spiritual aspirant's mental preparation is ripe (i.e. when his mind is calm and purified), there arises an universal reflex consciouness pertaining to the Brahman-knowledge which results from concentration and meditation and analysis of the verbal testimoney. Then the light of the self-effulgent pure consciousness is reflected in his reflex or modal consciousness (*vritti-jñāna*) and it dispels the darkness of nescience (from the modal consciousness). That is known as the unfoldment (*abhivyakti*) of the supreme consciousness. The seers of Truth call it the *Brahman-vijñāna*, and the *Brahman-jñāna* is different

---

शून्यशुद्धबोधात्मनः' ; 'चित्प्राधान्यपक्षे सहजे प्रकाशमात्रप्रधानत्वे तु विद्या-प्रमातृता" ।—Vide *Pratyavijñāhridayam*, pp. 7, 12.

17 Vide *Vivaraṇopanyāsa* (Banaras Sans, Series, edited by Griffith and Thibaut (1901) p. 139.

from it. The difference between the two is that the former is a direct, self-valid (*svatah-siddha*) and self-subsistent consciousness, whereas the latter is an indirect reflex consciousness, which arises from the hearing of the Vedānta teachings or *mahāvākhya*, but it has no capacity of dispelling the nescience. The direct awareness of the Brahman or *Brahman-vijñāna*, says the *Parāśara-upa-Purāṇa* (1st chapt.), is revealed by the grace of Śaṅkara, the embodiment of pure consciousness. But it is interesting to note that except this particular mentioning of the difference (of *Brahman-jñana* from *Brahman-vijñāna*) in the Introduction, he says nowhere in his book that *jñāna* is different from *vijñāna*, rather he uses the word *jñāna* everywhere to indicate the supersensuous Brahman-consciousness:. 'तर्हि श्रवणेऽपि ब्रह्मज्ञानं तत्कल्पकमस्तु। ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य सर्वादृष्टजन्यत्वात्', etc.

Some scholars make out a clear distinction between *jñana* and *vijñana* as understood by Śrī Rāmakriṣṇa Paramahaṅsa. They argue that *vijñāna* marks a higher state than *jñāna*, and in support of their argument they refer to the personal utterance of Śrî Râmakriṣṇa, which narrates:, 'Jñâṇa means to realize the Ātman in its entirety. As some one has heard the name of milk, some one has seen it, and others have drunk it, so he who has heard of it,

is ignorant or *ajñânî*, he who has seen it, is *jñânī*, and he who has drunk it, is *vijñânî*, i.e. *vijñānī* has known or realized the Ātman in its fulness. The term '*vijñāna*' does not merely mean a vision of God, but does mean the communion with Him and speaking to Him like one's own dearest and nearest one. * * If we get upon the roof of a house we shall have to pass through the steps or stairs one by one. The steps or stairs are not the roof itself. But when we reach it, we notice that the roof is built with bricks, brickdusts, lime, etc. and these are again used as the materials for building of the stairs'. But, truly speaking, by these sayings of Śrî Râmakrisṇa it is rendered clear that by the word '*jñânī*' he means to signify the person who has realized the Absolute, and by the word '*vijñânī*', he means the person who has realized the supreme knowledge and his body and mind continue to exist for the welfare of mankind, i.e. a *vijñânī* is a *jīvanmukta*. So the words *jñâna* and *vijñâna* as used by Śrî Râmakrisṇa do not suggest any difference in their status, but they simply suggest that both *jñâna* and *vijñâna* are revealed simultaneously with the correction of our error (*mithyā-pratyaga-nivritti*). It has also been mentioned in Vedānta: 'आदौ ब्रह्मास्मीति अनुभव उदिते पश्चात् सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म'', i.e. first of all by the correction of the nescience as

an error we realize that 'I am Brahman' ('अहं ब्रह्मास्मि') and then we simultaneously feel :। 'Varily everything in this world is the Brahman' ('सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म'). First of all the Divine individual (*vyaṣṭhi*) knowledge arises and then the collective (*samaṣṭhi*) one shines in the form of a flash in one's vision. Rāmānanda Sarasvatī says in his *Vivaraṇopanyāsa*, a commentary on the *Vivaraṇa-tātparya* :। '* * इत्यादिश्रुत्या भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रान्तित्वावगमात्तदाऽत्मान-मेवावेदहं ब्रह्मास्मीति तस्मात्तत्सर्वमभवदित्यभेदज्ञानस्य मुक्तिहेतुत्वश्रुतेस्तदेव मुक्तिहेतुवित्याह—'ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानं मिथ्याज्ञाननिवर्तकम्' इति ।'[18] Both of the socalled processes (i.e. figuratively it is said to be a proceless process) happen simultaneously, and it is, in reality, the integrated apprehension or *feeling* of the unique Reality. It is called '*perfection*' and this *perfection* can be attained even in this earthly life, and there is no contradiction between the persistence of the phenomenal body and the transcendental knowledge (*Brahmajñāna*). Because *perfection* or realization does not involve any act or process of annihilation of the physical organism, but it simply means the killing or purification of the narrow petty selfhood in us and enables us to live in tune with the limitless life around us. Then the vision of the realized soul is entirely changed. Śaṅkara says

18 Vide *Vivaraṇopanyāsa* (Banaras Sans. Series), edited by Griffith and Thibaut (1901).

in this connection, though it in a different way: 'तस्मान्नावगतब्रह्मात्मभावस्य यथापूर्वं संसारित्वम्'। As regards the point of non-contradiction between the persistence of the phenomenal body and supramundane transcendental knowledge, Bhāratitīrtha-Vidyāraṇya says: 'चैतन्यस्य क्रियारहितत्वात्। * * तस्मान्न कर्मनिमित्तः शरीरादिसम्बन्धः किन्त्वविद्याकृतः। स च तत्त्वज्ञाननिवर्त्यः। * * * न चैवं जीवन्मुक्तस्यात्मैक्यानुभवद्वैतदर्शनयोर्विरुद्धयोः साहित्यं प्रसज्येतेति मन्तव्यम्। * * त च शरीरपातात् पूर्वमपरोक्षं तत्त्वज्ञानमेव नास्ति, व्यासादोनां सशरीराणामेव तत्त्वदर्शनस्य पुराणेष्ववगमात्'। Śaṇkara also says in connection with the *sūtrā*: 'तत्तु समन्वयात' (1. 1·4): 'तस्मान्मिथ्याप्रत्ययनिमित्तत्वत्सशरीरत्वस्य सिद्धं जीवतोऽपि विदुषोऽशरीरत्वम्।'

Again the Brahman consciousness is not an escape into nothingness or uncosciousness, but is simply being and becoming vividly conscious of life in its fulness. In this state, our consciousness is enlarged and vision perfectly open. Then man becomes a tool in the hands of the universal Will, he becomes the playground of the Almighty. His body and mind still persist, but they persist simply as the instruments of God. He moves no longer at the dictates of his petty self, which has been submerged and transcended by his spiritual vision. He lives always in touch with the creative source of all-life, with inward peace and meditative calm. He becomes dead in the material plane, which means he

becomes disinterested to the selfish call of the senses and rises to the spiritual level, making everything material an ebodiment of living and dynamic spirit. His outlook is revolutionized and he sees the world with new eyes and the world bears a new meaning to him. The world loses for him its chaos and appears to him as ordered and significant. At this stage he becomes a *jīvanmukta* or liberated soul, while the mortal frame exists. The state of a *jīvanmukta* has also been observed by Râdhâkrisṇan that a *jīvanmukta* 'is not torn out of the ordinary setting of his earthly life. He still has a body and mind, though he knows them to be instruments of his higher life. He does not exult in his own intelligence or seek for his own soul, for he has it no more. If he has gained a transcendent personality and an independence which nothing in this world can touch, it is because not he but the Super-spirit lives in him, making him illimitable'.[19] Evelyn Underhill also portrays this blessed state in a different way, in connection with the exulted mood of a true mystic. She says: 'Under the spur of this love and will, the whole personality rises

---

19 Vide Rādhākrisṇan: *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (1940), p. 78.

in the acts of contemplation and ecstasy to a level of consciousness at which it becomes aware of a new field of perception. By this awareness, by this *loving insight*, it is stimulated to a new life in accordance with the Reality which it has beheld. So strange and exalted in this life, that it never fails to provoke either the anger or the admiration of other men'.[20]

20 Vide Underhill: *Mysticism* (1930), p. 94.

CHAPTER VIII

EXPERIENCE AND THE ABSOLUTE

The absolute is the all-inclusive Essence, which is the one without a second : *'ekamevâdvitīyam'*. It is a higher intuition of the integral feeling or experience — *'ekarasam'*. Plurality is full of contingencies and sensuousness, whereas non-duality or oneness is above them all, it is above the slightest taint of imperfection, reigning supreme as unique One, destitute of any degrees or gradations and without being surpassed by any other else. The absolute is the pure eternal present and its status can be imagined purely as the supra-spatio-temporal supreme Self or the Brahman.

To show the difference between the 'Absolute' and 'God' Prof. Hicks says : 'The totality of things, or what philosophers name the Absolute, cannot be identified with God, so long as God is conceived as a self-conscious Being. What philosophers designate the 'Absolute' must include God and other minds, the world of nature and the world of values, not indeed as isolated and disconnected entities, but rather as intimately related to one another and more

especially to God and thus forming a system or coherent unity'.[1] Now the status of the Absolute, which Prof. Hicks determines or designates is not the real one in Vedântic view. Vedânta does not regard the status of the Absolute as the totality of things, nor as the consumation of the world of nature and the world of values. The Absolute may be considered as a coherent unity, but it shall be a unique unity which is not the sumtotal of ordered and connected entities. Therefore the Absolute, according to Vedânta, is an undivided Whole with a homogenious essence, which is the pure nature of self-luminous and self-existing transcendental consciousness.

The Absolute or the transcendental supersensible knowledge is an entity of the nature of a *felt* experience or divine *feeling*. It is realized by an immediate divine awareness of the integral feeling of the Brahman. Bradley's transcendental experience confirms also the same status, though it differs a little from the Vedāntic experience. Bradley admits that the absolute Reality 'belongs to nothing but the single Real', and there 'is but one Reality, and its being

---

1 Vide Prof. Hicks: *The Philosophical Bases of Theism* p. 262.

consists in experience'.[2] Bergson's Freedom bears also the same status, as according to him, Freedom is that which can be felt but cannnot be defined, which seems like an echo of the Vedântic doctrine which expounds that the Brahman is the pure experience and it cannot be defined by mind and speech :। 'अनुभवावसानत्वात् * * ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य' and 'अवाङ्मनसोगोचरम्'। Bergson admits that the Freedom or Reality is known by a direct intuition.[3] But the difference between Bergson and the non-dualistic Vedânta regarding intuition lies in the fact that Bergson's direct intuition signifies a deep penetration into the spontaneous and moving whole,[4] and the Reality, according to him, is the Time, which is no other than a flow or flux in an unbroken perpetuity or ever-rolling creative evolution[5]—a life-current or *élan vital*, whereas the Vedāntic Reality transcends time and all other movements.

---

2 Vide *Appearance and Reality*, (1930), p. 403. Bradley believes in "an experienced non-relational unity of many in one of which 'I am immediately aware'.—Vide *Essays on Truth and Reality* (1914), p. 175.

3 Cf. Dr. Maitra: *Neo-Romantic Movement in Philosophy* (1922), p. 231.

4 Cf. Prof. Höffding: *Modern philosophers*, p. 241.

5 Prof. Watts Cunninghum says: 'But I could not follow Bergson in his conception of 'creative evolution'. He insisted upon describing it wholly in terms of the past

Prof. Joad is of opinion that Schopenhauer and Bergson 'alike think of reality as a board, flowing river, scathing and dispersing itself of certain special purposes into an infinite number of minute streams'. For them the world-appearance is like a currentful river, and so 'it can no longer be conceived of as a homogeneous flow'. And so Joad cherishes his well-estimated view: 'Its appearance only is a true unity; its reality is a qualified unity which initially contains the seeds of division and plurality'.[6] In the words of Prof. Bax it can be considered 'as the ultimate subject and in-it-selfness of Experience-in-general working through time'. But the non-dualistic Vedānta does not admit any kind of division or duality in the integral unique Absolute. The Absolvte of Vedānta does not involve any process, movement or evolution, but it is the supreme awareness of the super-relational Brahman as well as the simultaneous correction of the idea of otherness or separa-

---

overflowing into the present, and so as purely heterogeneous; * *. Now the notion of creative evolution appeared to be rooted in this basal error of analysis, and in the end to be meaningless'.—Vide *Contemporary American Philosophy*, Vol. I (1925), pp. 260-261.

6 Vide *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. II, (1925), p. 170.

tion from the Brahman. This non-relational immediate awareness of the Brahman, according to the non-dualistic Vedānta, is *knowing* and *being* in one—an attitude which Bradley also upholds.[7]

The Absolute can be felt and experienced. It can be realized by the deepest flashes of intuition, which is the fruition of intellect and reason. In the higher intuition or apperception of the Absolute, thought and intellect are completely transcended, because in comparison with the matchless purity and perfectness of the Absolute thought and intellect are discursive, porous and imperfect. The Absolute is the 'Pure' and the 'Alone'. It can be regarded as the transcendental knowledge of the undivided ultimate experience.

Now, is intellectual intuition of the Absolute possible? Some philosophers are of opinion that intellectual intuition is possible as it is the immediate

---

7 The higher immediate experience as 'a knowing and being in one' is also admitted by Bradley. He says that the divine immediate experience is 'an experience in which there is no distanction between my awareness and that of which it is aware; an immediate feeling, a *knowing and being* in one with which knowledge begins'.—Vide *Essays in Truth and Reality* (1914), pp. 159. 174.

apprehension of the pure Absolute. Others differ from them. They hold the view that intellectual intuition or intuitive experience can take us only to the speculative consciousness, but cannot enable us to reach the bottom of the unfathomed and boundless ocean of Immortality and Bliss, and so intellectual intuition is inadequate for supersensual intuition of the transcendental Absolute. Kant says that though the Absolute or Thing-in-Itself is unknown and unknowable, yet its transcendental luminosity can be grasped or apperceived by the shining intellect. Prof. Royce similarly admits that the Absolute can be appreciated by thought, as the Absolute is no other than the pure thought itself. Bradley's contention is different from those of Kant and Royce to some extent. Bradley says: 'Philosophy aims at intellectual satisfaction, in other words, at ultimate truth. It seeks to gain possession of Reality, but only in an ideal form'.[8] And so he believes that this kind of intellectual satisfaction is 'but one side of our being', it is not the integral whole of our being and experience, and so the Absolute must be 'a coherent and harmonious system which ensures contentment to the intellect'. The intellect, accord-

---

8 Vide *Essays on Truth and Reality* (1914), pp. 11-12.

ing to Kant 'is a power or process of choice, selection, comparison, distinguishing and dividing, analysis and synthesis, affirmation and negation, numeration, of judgement and doubt, of connection and disjunction, differentiation and integration. Its general aspect is sometimes described by Kant as Judgement —the act of thought which correlates by distinguishing; sometimes as Appreciation, and the unity of appreciation. It is, i.e., an active unity and a synthetic energy; it unifies, and always unifies. It links perception to perception, correlating one with another—interpreting one by another; estimating the knowledge-value of one by the rest. It thus *apperceives*. It is a faculty of association and consociation of ideas'.[9] Bergson says that intellect 'behaves as if it were facinated by the contemplation of inert matter'. It is a kind of dream and not active, as it is different from life or *élan vital*. So Bergson differentiates intellect from intuition and says that 'intellect can only deal with things in so far as they resemble what has been experienced in the past, while intuition has the power of apprehending the uniqueness and novelty that always belong to each fresh movement'. Plato divides intellect into two

9 Vide Prof. Wallace: *Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy* (1931), p. 76.

aspects, *reason* and *understanding*. Of these two, 'reason is the higher kind; it is concerned with pure ideas, and its method is dialectic. Understanding is the kind of intellect that is based in mathematics; it is inferior to reason in that it uses hypotheses which cannot test'. But Prof. Hicks says that understanding and reason are not altogether two distinct faculties, because 'they are stages in the life of one self-conscious activity'. From the time of Kant and Jacob, says he, 'the distinction between *verstand* and *vernunft* has been a commonplace in German philosophy, and since the days of Coleridge the former has been translated into English by the term *understanding* and the latter by the term *reason*. The distinction really goes back to the time of Plato and it is Plato who differentiated sharply the word *understanding* from *reason*'.[10]

Reason is said to be the mental faculty which is not only the faculty of distinguishing and discriminating, says Prof. Hicks, but also the faculty likewise of aprehending the real world. Reason, says Russell, 'is a harmonising, controlling force rather than a creative one. Even in the most purely logical

---

10 Vide Prof. Hicks: *The Philosophical Basis of Theism*, pp. 129-130.

realm, it is insight that first arrives at what is new'.[11] Bergson considers reason to be merely a practical faculty and thinks that it cannot promise to give us the reality that is super-mundane or transcendental. Reason, according to Hegel, is 'the conscious certainty of being all reality' or 'exclusively its own basis of existence'. It is a trained and disciplined intellect. Further he says that reason comes 'by feeling and thinking ourselves in and along with the nature'. He believes what is real in a person is his participation in Reality as a whole. Bosanquet calls it a 'nisus to unity'. According to him a man's participation in Reality increases with his progressive development of rationality. He says in his *Introduction* to *The Philosophy of History* that reason is the sovereign of the world, it is the *Idea*, the *True*, the *Eternal*, the absolutely *powerful* essence.[12] Prof. Hocking is of opinion that rational or intellectual knowldge is even *abstract* and *particular* and it represents its objects as static and, therefore, it is dead.[13] The mystic Plotinus says to his friend Flaccus:]

11 Vide Prof. Russell: *Mysticism and Logic* (1918), p. 13.

12 Cf. Prof. Russell: *History of Western Philosophy* (1946), pp. 761-763.

13 Vide Prof. Hocking: *Types of Philosophy*, p. 193.

'You ask, how can we know the Infinite? I answer, not by reason. It is the office of reason to distinguish and define. The Infinite, therefore, cannot be ranked among its objects'.[14] But intellectual knowledge or metaphysical intuition has been regarded as the highest achievement by Bergson and some Western savants.[15] The non-dualistic Vedānta holds a quite different view, as according to it, the highest criterion of truth is the Brahman-knowledge, which knows neither thought nor speculation, neither reason nor intellectual process.

Thought awaits a mediacy in approaching and unveiling the true nature of a thing. Thought is a discursive category that touches only the surface but

---

14 Quoted by Swāmi Abhedānanda in his *Path of Realization* (1946), p. 137.

15 The celebrated scholar Oswald Spengler also designates the rational or absolute intuitional knowledge as the highest kind of knowledge. But unfortunately Spengler's socalled highest rational knowledge meets the fate of contingency, being included in the epirical order. Prof. Spengler says: 'Knowledge has three degrees—opinion, science, illumination. The means or instrument of the first is sense, of the second, dialectic, of the third, intuition. To the last I subordinate reason. It is absolute knowledge founded on the identity of the mind knowing with the object known'. —Vide *The Decline of the West* (1946), p. 122.

does not penetrate into the core of truth. So the Absolute can never be represented or expressed by thought, because the very nature of act of thinking is to reduce a thing to the categoty of relativity, and so it cannot be recognized as pure. Well has it been said by Dr. Caird: 'Infinite' and 'Absolute' are merely terms expressive of the negation of conditions under which thought is possible. * * The very nature of thought implies a distinction and therefore limitation.[16] The inadequacy of rational thought is also known to the real aspirant of the spiritual Truth. The descending of the Absolute upon the reflective thought or contemplative consciousness makes the Absolute loose its 'absoluteness', coloured and conditioned by its limitedness. Even in pronouncing the name and imagining the status of the super-relational transcending Absolute speech and thought hopelessly fail; they are rather lost for ever in the unfathomable depth of the ocean of the Absolute. So, let us strike a note of caution that for the real achievement of the transcendental knowledge of the Absolute we should never look at the seeming certitude, narrowness and inadequacy of thought,

---

16 Vide Dr. Caird: *Philosophy of Religion* (1936), p. 12.

even though it becomes rational or logical. But yet the reason or intellectual apperception may be said to be a very near approach to God-realization, as Vedânta philosophy acknowledges it as a synthetic method of approaching the Absolute. Kant also admits that though the intellect cannot bridge the gulf between idea and reality and hence cannot attain truth, yet the pure reason can only penetrate into the core of the reality with unique simplicity and directness and make an amicable settlement between idea and reality.

Prof. Hicks holds' that though thought and intellect cannot give us the transcendental illumination, yet they cannot be absolutely discarded from the field of philosophy and human life. Because intellectual activity may 'degenerate into cold and merely logical process of ratiocination, that seeks to pass all things in heaven and earth through the sieve of its narrow formulae of elimination or excision, but to suffer this logic-chopping faculty, as Carlyle called it, to usurp the name of reason is simply to trifle with ordinary linguistic usage'.[17] So it can be said that though discursive thought and

17 Vide Prop Hicks: *The Philosophical Bases of Sheism, p.* 129.

intellect are abstractions and their field is very limited in comparison with absolute truth, yet they can render a better service than common sense or ordinary knowledge. Bradley absolutely differs from it in that he believes that even the most logical or most systematic thought and reason cannot reveal to our vision the nature of ultimate reality and hence they are quite inadequate for that purpose. It may be said that thought and reason both are surpassed and at last merged into the all-inclusive Absolute to make the experience complete or realization possible. The ultimate reality is self-knowing or self-luminous (*svayam-vedya* or *svayam-prakâśa*) and so it can never be known or appreciated by any mental function or process which is the only means of Spinoza's intellectual appreciation. The Absolute is, therefore, the supra-mental alogical or super-logical Reality.

Śrî Râmakrişṇa says:, But inspite of your argumentaion a thousand times, you cannot transcend the limit of *śakti* (*śaktir elâkâ*). 'I am meditating,' 'I am thinking' all these mental functions belong to the domain of *śakti* or duality and they all are manifestations ('*aiśvarya*') of *śakti* or nescience.[18]

18 Vide *Kathāmrita* (*Gospel of Rāmakrişṇa*) Vol. I, p. 48.

Such is also the conclusion of Swāmi Abhedânanda, as he clearly says:] 'The *realization* does not mean a mere intellectual apprehension of the thought of the *ideal*, but you will have to bring that *ideal* to and harmonize that *ideal* with your daily life.'[19] So 'intellectual love' of Spinoza, the 'practical reason' of Kant, the 'intellectual intuition' of Schelling, and even the 'metaphysical intuition' or 'intuitive experience' of Bergson, are quite inadequate for transcendental God-intuition, says the non-dualistic Vedânta. The 'intellectal love of God is more than thought', says Dr. Sircar, because 'it is amour wherein the spiritual consciousness emerges and acquints us with Essence and Being'.[20] But it is also true that this acquaintance is not the supreme identity of our individual soul with the supra-rational Absolute. It can be estimated in the category of sensory intuition, which is no other than a discursive and mediate knowledge, bearing only a symbolic or representative value of its own. So the intellectual love of God or intellectual intuition is a metaphysical realization or philosophic contemplation that promises to settle the dispute between

---

19 Vide *Our Relation to the Absolute*, p. 95.

20 Vide Dr. Sircar: *Hindu Mysticism* (1945), p. 45.

the empiricists and the rationalists, who make their investigations in the field of rational philosophy with the help of mere intellect and reason. 'Intellect,' says Swāmī Abhedânanda, 'is one of the powers of the mind,' as it furnishes us with the materials which are not non-empirical, but empirical and changing. Reason is another faculty of the mind that goes hand in hand with the function of judging. Reason gives us only an intellectualized form of truth; it always moves in a concentric circle round the truth, but cannot reveal the truth in its fulness. Even though it is true that reason by itself cannot take us to the Absolute, yet it becomes the foremost means for the realization of the Absolute. Swāmī Vivekânanda says: 'Reason can go only a little way and then it stops, it cannot go any further; and if you try to push it, the result is helpless confusion, reason itself becomes unreasonable. Logic becomes argument in a circle. * * You see the complication, what the logicians call see-saw, one idea depending on the other, and this again depending on that. You find a mighty barrier before reason, beyond which reasoning cannot go; yet it always feels impatient to get into the region of the Infinite beyond. This world, this universe which our senses feel, or our mind thinks, is but one

atom, so to say, of the infinite, projected on to the plane of consciousness; and within that narrow limit, defined by the network of consciousness, works our reason, and not beyond. Therefore, there must be some other instrument to take us beyond, and that instrument is called inspiration'.[21]

Such is also the contention of Dr. Râdhâkriṣṇan when he says: 'The Whole, the Absolute, which is the highest concrete, is so rich that its wealth of content refuses to be forced into the fixed forms of intellect. The life of spirit is so overflowing that it bursts all barriers. It is vastly richer than human thought can compass. It breaks through every conceptual form and makes all intellectual determination impossible'.[22] The mystic Eckhart tunes on the same harp. He says that the Absolute 'is purely One without the admission (*upâdhī*) even in thought (*na monâg api*) of anything quantitative or differentiated, above everything which suffers even in thought or name the faintest shadow of difference (*bheda*), in whom all delineation and qualification is lost'. This is also the view

---

21 Vide *The Complete Works of S. V.*, Vol. II, p. 387

22 Vide Dr. Rādhākriṣṇan: *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy* (1922), Ch. XIII, p. 440.

of *Śrî* Rāmakrisṇa, but he says that the Brahman can be appreciated by the purified mind (*śuddha maner gochara*), though it is beyond the reach of ordinary mind and speech (*vâkya* and *mana*). The fact is that the mind is known as a mind substance with its activities only, but when the activities are stilled, the mind is transformed into or rather sublated by the pure *chit*, the substratum of the mind. Therefore the Absolute can be realized only by the deeper spiritual insight or higher intuition, and this intuition is called the supra-logical Vedântic intuition, that reveals the transcendental Truth and simultaneously dispels the nescience, which is the cause of duality or the idea of *otherness*. The Vedāntic transcendental intuition is called *ātmajñāna* or *tattvajñāna*. All that is required for attaining *tattvajñāna* 'is a removal of the nescience in order that what previously appeared as real may rightly be understood as a false appearance merely'. 'It previously', says Dr. Brahma, 'a snake appeared and now a rope is seen, that is not sufficient for the correction of the error, because the person under the illusion may suppose that he had perceived a real snake which ran away before a lamp could be brought. Unless an identity is established between the rope and the appearing snake, the error cannot be corrected. For this correc-

tion, what is needed is the simultaneous perception of the *real* rope and the *false* appearance of the snake. ** The rope that appeared is not negated or annulled, because it is never real. It was not real even when it was perceived. It has a *traikālika neṣedha*, it is *mithyā*, it is unreal. The *jñānin* leaves nothing behind him as a rejected real but takes everything with him as a perceived unreal'.[23] In the same manner when identity is established between the finite self (*jīva*) and the infinite Brahman, the self-luminous suprasensual Brahman reveals itself with the simultaneous correction of the nescience as an error. The finite self is neither ignored nor rejected, neither negated nor suppressed, neither annulled nor destroyed by the infinite all-knowledge Brahman, but it discovers within itself its own immortal existence and essence.

---

23 Vide *Vedāntic Transcendence* (Presidential Address by Dr. N. K. Brahma (Indian Philosophical Congress, Aligarh, 1941), pp. 4-5.

CHAPTER IX

VEDANTIC CONCEPTION OF PERFECTION

Perfection is known as *mukti* or *mokṣa* in the Vedāntic term. Now, what do we mean by '*mukti*'? Is it a separate thing from the transcendental Absolute? No, *mukti* and the Absolute are one and the same in their true significance. Some argue that *mukti* or *mukṣa* means the liberation or deliverance from the bonds of the world and its miseries. But truly speaking, *mukti* is different from the word 'liberation', as the Vedāntic term *mukti* signifies 'realization of being's true self'. The synonyms of *mukti* are *anubhūti*, *aparokṣānubhūti*, *ātmānubhūti*, *jñāna*, *vijñāna*, *brahma-vijñāna*, etc. *Mukti*, says Dr. N. K. Brahma, 'is always an accomplished fact rather than what is to be accomplished and attained'.[1] Bondage is ignorance and it can be regarded as no other than our own fancy or imagination. In truth, there is no bondage and even no deliverance. It is a false imposition and is corrected by our right knowledge of the pure self.

---

1 Vide Dr. Brahma's article on *The Vedântic Conception of Mukti* in the Second Indian Philosophical Congress, Banaras.

Dr. Brahma says again that *mukti* or *mokṣa* is only the self-conscious realization of the eternal freedom and the ultimate expansion of the self or the Ātman, which always is a fact ever accomplished, * * . It is not the acquisition of something new, rather it is the conscious realization of what is always and already attained. Vedântic *mokṣa* has been compared to the recollection of a forgotten thing or the regaining of an apparently lost object, and in this connection the story of the forgotten necklace round one's own neck is often referred to by Vedântic writers'.[2]

But *mukti* or *perfection*, according to the non-dualistic Vedānta, is quite different from that of the Yoga system. Because the Yoga system advocates *mukti* i. e. *kaivalya* as the result of the process of the withdrawal or suppression of the modifications of the mind : 'योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः'।[3] The complete supression (*nirodha*) of the mind substance is attained in the *nirvikalpa samādhi* or the serene tranquil state of the mind, where there remains no vibration or modification, which means the vibrations or modifications slumber in potential or causal state in the

---

2 Ibid.

3 Vide *Pātañjaladarśaṇa*, upādhipāda, 2.

depth of the subconscious mind. But in the state of Vedāntic *mukti* there does neither remain manifested nor unmanifested causal state of the mind, but the mind is sublated by the *chit* or pure consciousness. The *samādhi* of the Yoga philosophy involves a psychological process and a systematic practice, as Spinoza's intuition involves an 'intellectual process'. But Vedāntic *perfection* or *mukti* does neither involve any psychological nor intellectual process, but it is the *realization* or direct Divine awareness of the true nature of one's own pure self, which is recognized by the *Upaniṣad* as the Soul of souls and Life of lives of all the living beings of the world. The Yogic *mukti* or intution is like the deliverance from the bondage of senses, as Plato thinks, or the bondage of passion, as Spinoza considers. Dr. N. K. Brahma says that there 'is thus a great deal of difference between the Intuition of Patañjali and Vedāntic Intuition. The former begins to appear at a certain definite stage of *samādhi*, while the latter has no beginning at all. The former depends on a particular change that the mind (*citta*) undergoes, although this change consists of the relatively unchanging and fixed state of mind (*citta*), but the latter is entirely unconditional (*svayamprakāśa*).[4]

---

4 Vide *Philosophy of Hindu Sādhanā* (1932), p. 166.

To make it more explicit and clear let me quote Dr. Brahma's beautiful exposition on the point of distinction between the two systems of Indian philosophy from his learned book; *Philosophy of Hindu Sādhanā.* Dr. Brahma says: 'Although the *nirvikalpa samādhi* of Patañjali is commonly regarded as identical with Vedāntic Intuition, and it is supposed that there is no *vytthāna* (passing off) from the same, yet it is to be admitted that the former, being dependent upon a process, cannot be altogether free from a chance of destruction. We have to keep in mind that the term 'liberation' does not at all express Śaṅkara's idea of *mokṣa*, because whereas liberation implies previous bondage, Śaṅkara's *mokṣa* emphatically denied any such implication. Patañjali's *samādhi* is like touching a point gained by the removal of disturbances, Sankara's *jñāna* is the feeling of a vast expansion which not only is now, but was and will always be. In the *nirvikalpa samādhi* state, the not-self is ignored and not felt, whereas in the Vedāntic Intuition the not-self is a resolved contradiction and is eternally negated in Brahman'.[5]

Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* discusses this point in the *Yoga-pratyuktyânikaraṇam*

---

5 Ibid., pp. 165-166.

(2. 1. 3) and he says that the adherents of the Sâṅkhya and the Yoga doctrines are the dualists, as they do not believe in the identity of the individual soul with the Ātman : 'द्वैतिणो हि ते सांख्या योगाश्च नात्मैकत्वदर्शिनः' । He also refutes their views along with those of the Nyâya-Vaiśeṣikas thus : "एतेन सर्वानि तर्कस्मरणानि प्रतिवक्तव्यानि । * * तत्त्वज्ञानं तु वेदान्तवाक्येभ्य एव भवति 'नावेदविन्मनुते तं वृहन्तम्' (तै० ब्रा० १।१२।६।७) 'तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुष' पृच्छामि' (वृ० उ० ३।६।२) इत्येवमादिश्रुतिभ्यः ।"[6]

In the *Yogvâśiṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇa* it has been mentioned that there are two methods for the suppression of the modifications of the mind and they are practices of *Yoga* and *Jñâna*.

द्वौ क्रमौ चित्तनाशस्य योगो ज्ञानश्च राघव ।
योगो वृत्तिनिरोधो हि ज्ञानं सम्यगवेक्षणम् ॥

Therefore, the practice of Yoga differs from that of Jñâna, as the former adopts the process of suppression of the mind, and the latter interpretes it as the direct awareness of one's own true self. Nârâyendra Sarasvatī also admits this point of difference between the Yogic and the Vedāntic *sâdhanās* and in order to make it clear he gives a hint in his commentary *Vârtikâbharaṇa* upon the *Pañcikaraṇa-vârtika* by Ācārya Sureśvara thus : 'चित्तस्य समाधानं ब्रह्मात्माभेदाकारतया अवस्थानम् ।

---

6 Vide *Saṅkara-bhāṣyam, II.* 1. 3.

अखण्डब्रह्माकारवृत्तिरूपेण परिणामः, न तु शास्त्रान्तरप्रसिद्धचित्तवृत्तिनिरोध इत्यादि'। Swāmi Abhedānanda clarifies it in a different way. He says: 'Instead of indulging in desires, some say, you should kill them out. But you cannot kill them out. There are certain cults that teach: 'Kill out all the desires and make your mind blank'. We cannot do that. *We can reduce the number of desires by discrimination and not allowing indulgence. In that way we can purify our heart or mind.*[7] Śrī Aurobindo maintains similar view. He says: 'By *mukti* I do not mean *laya*, which is a thing not to be pursued or desired, but waited for whatever God wills, but liberation from ignorance, Ahaṅkâra and all dualities'.[8] Further he states: The *ripus* cannot be conquered by *damana* (even if it succeed to some extant, it only keeps them down), but does not destroy them; often compression only increases their force. It is only by purification through the Divine consciousness entering into the egoistic nature and changing it that this thing can be done.'[9]

Perfection or *mukti*, according to the non-dualistic Vedānta, is not *nirvāṇa* or *śūnyatā* or

7 Vide *Doctrine of Karma*, p. 137.

8 Cf. *Yogic Sādhanā*, p. 56.

9 Vide *Śrī Aurobindo Mandir Annual* (1945), No. 4.

nairātma, because it connotes the idea of the state where there remains no experience or entity and which is a negation of the existence of the self, as maintained by the Yogāchāras. But the non-dualistic Vedānta holds the view that *perfection* or *mukti* is an all-existent positive experience of the supra-relational consciousness, which constitutes the stuff of the Ātman. It is the only existence and all other existences draw their reality from it. It is not at all the 'blank unknowable unity', as Prof. Wright suggests it in his *A History of Modern Philosophy* in course of interpreting the philosophical system of Hegel. Prof. Wright's characterization is absolutely mistaken and it betrays his lack of thorough grasp over the deeper spirit of Indian philosophy. The ideal of *perfection* or *mukti* as envisaged in Indian spiritual tradition is too deep for superficial judgement. Of course, Prof. Wright is keen enough to notice that that the Indians always recognize or at any rate try to recognize God or the Absolute in everything of the world, and that they try to realize the Absolute in and through their life, nay, even in a drop of water or an insignificant grain of sand.[10] Such approach is

10 Prof Wright says: 'The Indians sometimes went on to characterise the Absolute as a blank unity of which

not to be treated as a subjective hallucination or a psychological trick, but it is an unerring mark of man's deep spiritual vision or *adhyâtma anubhūti*. It is possible for the Indians, because they believe that the whole universe is permeated and animated by the universal Spirit. But the Yogāchāra or Mādhyamika school denies the existence of the soul-entity (*attā*) and does maintain only the reality of the Void or *śūnyatâ*. In reality, the Void or *śūnyatā* does not imply the idea of non-entity, but it means a *tathatā* or *suchness*, which bears an existence of the positive character. Aśvaghoṣa believes in the doctrine of *tathatā* or *thatness*, but his *tathata* or *thatness* 'is an uncreated and indestructible voidness or *śûnyatā* of the eternal reality'. Again his *tathatā* is different from the *tathāgatagarbha*, as expounded by the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*. But refuting the doctrine of *tathāgatagarbha* Aśvaghoṣa says in favour of his doctrine of *tathatā* that many Buddhists believe that Lord Buddha himself 'taught the doctrine of non-personal *ātman* as separate from the psychological

---

nothing could definitely be said, while at other times they fancied that the Absolute is discoverable in a sacred cow, or even in drops of water and grains of sand'.—Vide *A History of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 325-26.

skandhas which are momentary'. But, in truth, the psychological *skandhas* are neither created nor annihilated, and though their apparent nature is inexplicable, yet their inner nature is identical with *tathatā* or *thatness*, which is the only ultimate and absolute reality and all things other than it are phenomenal and illusive.[11]

Prof. Beal clarifies the point in a different but unique way, while discussing about *nibbāṇa* or *nirvāṇa*, as described in the Buddhist text of *Mahā-parinibbāṇa-sūtta* (*Mo-ho-pan-nyi-pan-king*). He says: 'In the subsequent books the narrative is occupied with laboured proofs that Nirvāṇa is not the cessation of Being, but the perfection of it, and that the four characteristics of Nirvāṇa are these, Personality, Purity, Happiness, and Eternity.* * That Nirvâṇa is the one true and universal condition of Being * *.'[12] The problem of Nirvâṇa has been elaborately discussed by Nâgârjuna himself in his book *Prāṇyanula-śāstra-tīkā*. He says that

11 Vide Dr. Dasgupta: *Indian Idealism* (Cambridge, 1933), pp. 98-99.

12 Vide *Results of an Examination of Chinese Buddhist Books in the Library of the India Office* printed in 'International Congress of Orientalists' (1874), edited by Robert K. Donala, p. 133.

Nirvâṇa is 'one and the same condition of non-sensational existence'. 'The conclusion of the whole matter', says Prof. Beal, 'is that Nirvâṇa is identical with the nature of Tathâgata, without bound, and without place or time'.[13]

In fact, among the Buddhist themselves there are varying views regarding the conception of Nirvâṇa. The Hīnayânīsts, for instance, admit that Nirvâṇa consists in the liberation from three kinds of *dukṣkhatā* or miseries incidental to the existence in the three *laukikadhâtus*. They say that Nirvâṇa is the attainment of *nibbâṇadhâtu* without any residue.[14] The Mahâyânīsts differ from them and they maintain that Nirvâṇa is the Void or *śūnyatâ*, which is the real status of the realization or perfection. The authortative text of the Mahâyânī Buddhists, *Laṅkâvatâra-sūtra* again expounds that without the realization of the *dharma-nairâtma* liberation or *mukti*, in the truest sense, cannot be attained. Because Nirvāṇa is that state 'where there is no birth, no extinction; it is seeming into the state of Suchness, absolutely transcending all the categories constructed by mind;

---

13 Ibid., 156.

14 Vide Dr. N. K. Dutt: *Aspects of Mahâyâna Buddhism and Its Relation to Hînayāna* (1930), pp. 129-132.

for it is the Tathāgata's inner consciousness'. The text *Sūtrālankāra* again clarifies the point that as the Hīnayânīsts have only personality as their basis (*pudgala-nimitta*) for meditation, so they reach the *śrāvakabodhi* or *pratyekabodhi* and not the *samyaka-sambodhi*, which can only be attained by making all *dharmas* (existent things and conditions), the basis (*nimitta*) of meditations. The Mahâyânīsts further consider that the dual conception of thing cannot assure us with the gurantee of the real and genuine state of realization. It has also been explained by the early Mahâyâna text *Saddharmapuṇdarika* that Ñirvâṇa 'is a heaven of peace and rest and is a *vimukti* (emancipation) so far as the *kleśas* are concerned'.[15] Now, from all these textual evidences it is evident that the word *nibbâṇa* or *nirvâṇa* connotes the idea of an *existent* condition or entity which can be attained or realized as a positive essence. Swāmi Abhedānanda says in this connection :, 'The Buddhists call it Nirvâṇa (*mukti*), which means the cessation of misery, sorrow, selfishness and all other imperfections, and the attainment of blessedness. It is not a state of nothingness, as some people believe, but

15 Vide Prof. Sogen: *Systems of Buddhistic Thought* (1912), p. 29.

the attainment of perfection'.[16] The very question of Nirvâṇa, says Prof. Yâmâkâmi Sogen, 'was put nearly two thousand years ago by the Greek monarch Menander or Milinda to a Buddhist elder named Nâgasena and Nâgasena replied that Nirvâṇa is a condition that exists, it should be impossible in any way to make us understand the form or figure, duration or measure'. Really the conception of Nirvâṇa is indescribable. But Nāgārjuna describes the status of Nirvâṇa to some extent in his *Mādhyamika-kārikā* thus :

अप्रतीतमसम्प्राप्तमनुच्छिन्नमशाश्वतम् ।
अनिरुद्धमनुत्पन्नमेव निर्वाणमुच्यते ॥[17]

So it is found that in the pre-Buddhistic times the word *nirvâṇa* was used in the positive sense, but afterwards it was used to convey a negative meaning. Prof. Sogen says that by the well-known rule of Pâṇini 'निर्वाणो वातेः' the past participle suffix '*Ta*' ('त') is replaced by '*Na*' ('ण') when the word is applied to the wind. Thus the root meaning of Nirvâṇa, according to the Sanskrit grammarians, seems to have been the 'cessation of a gust of wind' * *'.[18] The Pāli

16 Vide *Spiritual Unfoldment* (1955), p. 83.

17 Vide *Mādhyamika-kārikā*, Chpt. XXV, *Kārikā*, 3.

18 Vide *Systems of Buddhistic Thought*, (1912) p. 31.

scholars also used the words 'निव्वन्ति धीरा यथायम् पदीपो' i.e. 'the wise attain Nirvâṇa like this lamp attaining extinction'. Prof. Sogen quotes four kinds of meaning of Nirvâṇa, which have been discussed in the *Abhidharma-mahâvibhâṣâ-śâstra*, the great philosophical Encyclopaedia of the Hinayâṇists. He quotes: '(a) *Vâṇa* means 'the path of transmigration' and *Nir* means 'leaving off' or 'being away from'. Therefore 'Nirvāṇa' means 'the leaving off permanently all the paths of transmigration' [:] (b) *Vâṇa* means 'stench' and *Nir* means 'not', and these two combined, mean 'a state altogether free from the stench of vexatious Karmas' [:] (c) *Vâṇa* means 'a dense forest', '*Nir*' means 'to get rid permanently of', so that Nirvāṇa signifies 'a state which has got rid permanently of the dense forest of the *skandhas*, the three fires (of lust, malice and folly) and three attributes of things (*viz.* origination, stay, and destruction)' [:] (d) *Vâṇa* means 'weaving' and *Nir* means 'not', and so Nirvāṇa means 'a state in which there is the entire absence of the thread of vexatious Karmas, and in which the texture of birth and death is not to be woven'.[19] So, it is found that almost all the Buddhist

---

19 Ibid., pp. 31-32.

teachers use the word *nirvâṇa* in the sense of 'Void' or *śūnyatâ*. Nâgârjuna in his *Mâdhyamika-kârikâ* identifies it with both the word and the conception of *saṁsāra*. He says:

संसारस्य निर्वाणात् किञ्चिदस्ति विशेषणम् ।
न निर्वाणस्य संसारात् किञ्चिदस्ति विशेषणम् ॥
निर्वाणस्य च या कोटिः कोटिः संसारणस्य च ।
न तयोरन्तरं किञ्चित् सुसूक्ष्ममपि विद्यते ॥[20]

Śaṅkara raises the point regarding the *śūnyam* or *śūnyatā*, while refuting it in his commentary on the *Praśna Upaniṣad* (chpt. VI. 2). He says: 'तन्निरोधो[21] शून्यमेव सर्वमिति चापरे' । Regarding the theory of Viod (*śūnyvāda*) he further says: 'वैनाशिको ज्ञेयाभावे ज्ञानाभावं कल्पयत्येवेति चेत्, येन तदभावं कल्पयेत्तस्याभावः केन कल्प्यत इति व्यक्तव्यम् वैनाशिकेन' । That is, Śaṅkara explains that the Mādhyamika Buddhists believe in the negation of consciousness because of the absence of the object or content of consciousness. But they are not correct, as they fail to show the means by which they *imagine* the absence or negation of consciousness (*jñānābhāva*). There must be some cognizer (*jñātā*), who cognizes and at the same time witnesses the consciousness and its absence too. The cognizer is the permanent

---

20 Vide., *Mâdhyamika-śâstra*, ch. XXV, 19-20.

21 'विज्ञानस्य निरोधे' ।

Ātman, who witnesses the absence of consciousness. Śaṅkara states: ''तदभावस्यापि ज्ञेयत्वाज्ज्ञानाभावे तदनुपपत्तेः। ज्ञानस्य ज्ञेयाव्यतिरिक्तत्वाज् ज्ञेयाभावे ज्ञानाभाव इति चेत्, न। * * तदव्यतिरिक्तञ्चेत् ज्ञानं नित्यं कल्पितं स्यात् * *।' The witnessing Ātman is a positive entity and it is no other than the Brahman itself. Herbert Spencer argues it in the same way when he puts: 'Though the Absolute cannot in any manner or degree be known in the strict sense of knowing, yet we find that its positive existence is a necessary datum of consciousness, * *'.[22] It is interesting to mention that the Buddhists also admit the positiveness of the Negation or Absence (*abhāva*), as they believe in the knowability of the Negation. Śaṅkara points it out and says: अभावस्यापि, ज्ञेयत्वाभ्युपगमात् अभावोऽपि ज्ञेयोऽभ्युपगम्यते वैनाशिकैर्नित्यश्च'। So, as Negation or Void is cognized as a content of knowledge or consciousness, it should be regarded as a positive and existing one and not as a non-entity like the castle in the air. The position of the nihilists has already been discussed. They say that Nirvāṇa signifies the Void or Nothingness, which has no permanent and positive existence.[23]

---

22 Vide *First Principles*, p. 29. Cf. also Prof. Caird: *Philosophy of Religion* (1936), p. 13.

23 The Kaśmere Śaiva school uses the word *sūnya*

The non-dualistic Vedānta absolutely differs from the nihilistic Buddhist thought. Vedānta upholds the view that *perfection* or *mukti* is itself the Absolute which is an existence (*sat*), divine intelligence (*chit*) and bliss (*ānanda*). It is unchangeable amidst all the changes of the phenomenal world. It is the fountainhead of life and energy of all living beings. Its experience is an immediate awareness of a positive character, though it is defined or determined only by a recourse to the negative process *viz* 'not this; not this' (*neti neti*) or as St. Bernard says '*nescid nescid*'. Well has it been said by Viscount Haldane: 'We cannot define unique individuality; what we can say of it is mainly *negative*. And yet actual fact implies it.[24]

---

which signifies the *vijñāna-kalā* or indeterminate being.—Vide *Pratyabhijñābridayam* (Kāśmere ed.), p. 7.

24 Vide *Contemporary British Philosophy*, (1925), Vol. I, p. 134.

Prof. Bosanquet also admits: "I suppose, because its quality, being the most indubitable of experiences, is also uniquely and intimately in *positive feeling* what the term absolute expresses by a more negative approach'. (—vide *Contemporary British Philosophy* (1925), Vol. I, p. 71).

Dr. Caird also says: '*Infinite* and *Absolute* are merely terms expressive of the negation of the conditions under

Perfection or *mukti*, according to the non-dualistic Vedānta, is not 'the discontinuance and cessation of misery'—an attitude upheld by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣka schools. It is not even the regaining of the status of the Puruṣa, as is believed by the Sâṅkhya school of Kapila. It is not again the removal of the bondage of the *māyā-śakti* and the realization of the individual soul's true nature through the function of the *svarūpa-śakti*, which is called the *bhakti* and of which the highest blissful expression is *priti*.[25] The Vaiṣṇava mystics and philosophers describe the beatific character of *perfection* or *mukti* as thus: 'There is nothing here which implies effort and tension, nothing which implies a distant goal to be reached. The contraries drop. Life is revealed in Love in its spontaneity. The philosophic effort is replaced by mystic ease. Reason is superseded by intuition. Beauty, Truth and Holiness are simultaneously expressed. This easeness is manifested in Vaikunṭha, i.e., that which is freed

---

which thought is possible' and therefore the Absolute 'is simply the negation of thought, the form of which every predicate even that of being, falls away' (—Vide *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 12, 18).

25 Vide Dr. S. K. De: *Early History of the Vaiṣṇva Faith and Movement in Bengal* (1942), p. 295.

from all conflicts and contraries — even the contraries of reason. * * The Vaiṣṇavas characterise this as the order of bliss ('*Hlādinī*' that which is pure Bliss and which gives pure Bliss)'.[26] But from the viewpoint of the non-dualistic Vedānta this kind of *mukti* or *perfection* is not the *feeling* or *experience* of the nescience-transcending secondless Brahman, but it appears as a state of the *seeming* oneness of the exalted union with the beloved Deity, who is seperate from but nearest to the appreciator.

Perfection or *mukti*, according to Vedānta, is not the ecstatic exaltation in the superconscious state of trance or vision, as maintained by different Western mystics. The ecstatic trance or vision is not the ultimate aim and object of the transcendental spiritual illumination. Dr. Rādhākrisṇan describes it in a beautifull language thus: 'All experience of God when it becomes intense is ecstatic, though every ecstatic emotion is not an experience of God'.[27] Really a sense of rapture simply intensifies an aspirant's urge to enter into the shrine of spiritual illumination, but it is not a real penetration into the core of the

---

26 Vide *Hindu Mysticism* (1945), p. 168.

27 Vide *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (1940), p. 77.

absolute Truth. 'In ecstasy', says Dr. Rādhākriṣṇan, 'the soul feels itself, or thinks it feels itself, in the presence of God, being irradiated by the light; but we must go beyond it to a stage where the consciousness of being at unity with the divine becomes constant. To have an ecstasy is to look upon the promised land but not to set foot on its soil. It is not beatitude or the perfect spiritual possession of divine reality but is its beginning, the first step here below'.[28] But the Vedāntic *perfection* or *mukti* is 'the stage of the perfect equilibrium (*nirdoṣam samam*) which reconciles and harmonizes all one-sided oppositions. Fulness and harmony, unlimitedness and bliss, balance and luminosity, mark out the prominent characteristics of the stage'.[29]

The Vedāntic *perfection* or *mukti* in an eternally accomplished fact. It cannot be produced by any activity, because actions are useless in regaining *perfection*. It can be experienced by Divine intuition only. It is rather an assuming state of actionlessness; it is the existence in the essential state of inactivity. So *perfection* or *mukti* can be regarded as the

28 Ibid., p. 78.

29 Vide *The Proceedings of the Second Indian Philosophical Congress*, Banaras.

otherworldliness, which involves denial – a denial with a complementary positive attitude towards direct experience. This experience can be said to be 'the objective light that lights up objects without being itself objective'. But the Naiyāyikas hold a different view and they say that the experience as cognition may be regarded as an object of cognition. When cognition is known, the primary one forms an object of the secondary one. The non-dualistic Vedānta refutes this argument and states that the Naiyāyikas forget to notice that when they make the primary one an object of the secondary one, they destroy the cognitive nature of the former i.e., they deny altogether the nature of the former as a cognition or consciousness and thus make it an object cognized. Therefore cognition or consciousness cannot be an object of cognition or consciousness. It becomes always the subject. And from this it follows that the appreciation of the alogical transempirical Absolute or the integral immediate knowledge of the Atman (*ātmajñāna*) is free from any kind of relation and limitation. It is always a self-revealing, independent and self-accomplished fact. It is, says the mystic Ruysbroeck, that 'God in the depth of us receives God who comes to us: it is God contemplating God'.

The Vedāntic *perfection* or *mukti* can, therefore, be regarded as the existence of the Ātman in its essential condition of infinite bliss and undying glory. When man realizes his identity with the absolute Brahman, all kinds of conditions and contradictions are extirpated. Then the eternal bliss arises from the all-selfhood (*sarvātmabhāva*) of the immortal Ātman. It can be imagined as a state or a stateless state of unbounded joy and serene sweetness, which is *felt* only by the realized souls, but cannot be translated into human terms in its adequacy. The joy or sweetness of the supersensual experience, says Prof. Pratt, "is something to which the mystics universally testify with such unanimity that I need hardly make use here any of their testimony * *. St. Augustine, * * speaks of the experience as 'a most rare affection', 'an inexplicable sweetness, such that, if it should be perfected in me, I know not to what point my life might not arrive'. One of my respondents writes, 'God is very real to me, as real as an earthly friend, though with a more purely spiritual reality. I have experienced His presence. * * This does not express it all—it is beyond expression".[30] This indefinable supreme experience

30 Vide Prof. Pratt: *The Religious Consciousness* (1945), pp. 351-352.

never suffers from any degree of grades[31] or evolution, but it is an absolutely one and integral *feeling* of the homogenius unity of the matchless Reality. This *feeling* can be attained even in this earthly life, dissolution of the phenomenal body is not necessary for its attainment. The enlightened soul can move and have his being in this world as a *jīvanmukta*, absolutely raised from the attachment of *māyā*. He looses his personal individuality in the ocean of the universal Spirit and all his private consciousness are merged into a greater and impersonal consciousness.

31 The grades are only admitted in the way of spiritual practice or *sādhanā*.

CHAPTER X

THE SPIRITUAL PRACTICE

The spiritual practice, nay, all kinds of disciplined practice connotes the idea of process, which again conveys the notion of progress.[1] The spiritual practice is the continual strivings for the emancipation from the bondage of delusion or *māyā*. The strivings are the *changes* that move onward for getting fruition in an ultimate goal and that goal is the *perfection*. For a number of days or years the aspiring souls acquire new experiences and knowledge in the path of incessant practice or *sādhanā* and thus the sincere strivings make him befitting for reaching the real destination of his life. The practice is also a kind of progress and this progress, says Prof. Galloway, 'is the product not of laws but of persons, and it carries within it the witness of spiritual freedom'.[2] Hegel says in his *Religionsphilosophie*: 'The whole manifold of human relations, activities, joys—all that man values or esteems, wherein he seeks his happiness, his glory and his pride—all are ulti-

---

1. Cf. P. A. Sorokin: *Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis* (1950), pp. 25-26.

2 Vide G. Galloway: *The Philosophy of Religion* (1945), p. 227.

mately focussed in religion, in the thought, consciousness and feeling of God'. Religion is thus conceived or recognized as a mode of experience or process of religious thought into practice which brings unto man absolute peace and happiness. And it is also found that where 'religion is present', says Prof. E. L. Sehaub, 'thought is inspired by the quest of perfection and moves in a medium of feeling'. This feeling is an instance of man's sincere search for the Reality and he therefore adopts the practice or spiritual *sādhanā* which consoles him and directs him to the abode of permanent bliss and tranquility.

'On earth', says Prof. Rādhākrisṇan, 'there is no joy which is not tainted with sorrow. There is not one who is happy among mortals. Of all the fruits of our labour and toil, there is nothing which shall endure, nothing that shall abide and pass not away'. So we shall have to go beyond all imperfections and limitations; we shall have to drink deep the nectar of Immortality and Bliss; because 'the world cannot escape the doom of all things mortal'. The life on earth is 'a walking shadow' says Shakespeare, 'a dome of manycoloured glass' says Shelley, 'a shell which bursts into parts' says Bergson. We, who are mortals, are like the chained men in the cave,

says Plato. We need therefore a flight—an absolute flight from the three 'C's—cryings and cares of and cravings for the deceitful world. The world of space-time is full of failures and contradictions. Contingency is the abiding category of the world. Tears are its boon and blessing. *Mukti* or Divine self-recognition can only make us free from the miserable den of doom; the light of Self-knowledge can only dispel the darkness of our world-agony and ignorance.

Spiritual practice is a necessary precondition for the flashes of the Divine. The Divine flash is also the precondition for the attainment of perfection or *mukti*. According to the non-dualistic Vedānta, *mukti* or the correction of false knowledge (*mithyā-pratyaya*) does not involve any intellectual process, rather it requires a sincere practice—a ceaseless and systematic practice, which is nevertheless to be regarded as secondary. Spiritual practice, whether Karmayoga, Bhaktiyoga, Rājayoga or Jñānayoga results in the purification of the mind or intellect which is again the prelude to the full vision of the transcendental luminosity. But, it is true, that mind or intellect cannot reach the alter of the supermundane Absolute. The mind is the Mahāmāyā, as mentioned by Śrī Rāmakriṣṇa Paramahansa. Śrī Rāmakriṣṇa says: 'Mahāmāyā

can take us only to the portal of the transcendental shrine, can only point out the temple, but cannot enter within. After taking us to the door of the temple, Mahāmāyā disappears'. So the spiritual practice is a sort of preparation for man's attaining to divine illumination. It yields startling results when moved by utter sincerity, whole-heartendness and simplicity. There must be deep consistency between words and actions—between thoughts and deeds of a spiritual aspirant. Simple-heartedness cuts away the knots of the mind and makes it receptive for the beatific vision of the transcendental Light. The mind must always be kept wide open. Mind must be free from all preconceived ideas and superstitions. Blind-faith, credulity and emotionalism must be utterly shed in the light of argument and reasoning. We should not be deluded by the fascinating charm of the set of doctrines, dogmas and creeds, says Swāmi Abhedānanda, which 'are more or less derived from local traditions and mythologies, bearing as they do the inevitable stamp of local forms and names'.[3] The socalled religion does also bear

3 Vide Abhedānanda: *Attitude of Vedānta towards Religion* (1947)' p. 131. Cf also Galloway: *The Philosophy of Religion* (1945), pp. 185-186.

the same status. Because they 'grow like plants', says Swāmi Abhedānanda, 'drawing their nourishment from the soil of their birth, from the local beliefs and traditions which vary from place to place'.[4] Aldous Huxley says that rites and ceremonials are essentially social activities. They are like the emotional cement 'which can give cohesion to great masses of people'.[5] Comte also believes in this doctrine. Huxley says that emotional concern and sentiment are absolutely responsible for strengthening the growth of doctrines, dogmas, rites and ceremonials and their survivals:; 'rites and ceremonials will survive and develop for just so long as the emotional concern is felt'.[6] For this reason, the rational idealists consider those rites and ceremonials as fetters and take warning from the fabricating of their further growth. The seekers after truth must, therefore, brush aside absolutely the husks of religion and dive deep into the unfathomed ocean of true religion which is the Divine realization itself. Forgiveness, fellow-feeling and love should be free enough to embrace all men and creatures. Our

---

4 Vide *Attitude of Vedānta towards Religion* (1947), p. 131.

5 Vide Huxley: *Ends and Means* (1946), p. 248.

6 Ibid., pp. 229, 231

striving must be mighty and unflagging and we should march on and on until the goal is reached.

Every spirutual aspirant should strive not as a dull automaton, but as a self-conscious individual. He should not depend upon Providence, supernatural powers and chance (*adriṣta*), for such dependence inevitably weakens the mind and will-power. Swāmi Abhedānanda emphatically points out that mere belief in the supernatural power or Providence makes men 'absolute automata bound hand and foot by the chain of slavery'.[7] 'But in reality', says he, 'all accidents have natural causes whether we know them or not. That which appears to be supernatural or Providential to an unscientific mind, is natural to a scientist or a philosopher whose conception of nature is larger and more universal, * * Therefore, all chance-events or socalled accidental occurences are * * governed by the law of causation or Karma * *'.[8] So a spiritual aspirant should not lose faith in himself. In his pursuit of truth he must discover in himself and build up a centre of strength to animate his progress onwards. Above all, he must cherish

---

7 Vide Abhedānanda: *Doctrine of Karma* (1948), p. 18.

8 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

deep confidence in himself. He must remember that he is a child of the immortal bliss ('*amritasya putra*'), that he himself is the Blessedness. He must entirely rely upon his own ability and intrinsic power (*puruṣakāra*), and not on merely chance (*adriṣta*). It is the persevering pursuit that brings success in every sphere of our life. So every seeker after truth should preserve within him the firm conviction that all help evolves from within and not from outside. The Self or Ātmn is all-powerful and it is the perennial source of all-energy and all-bliss. The spark of Divinity is already within us, and it is up to us to recognize it and restore the undying glory of the self-conscious Ātman. The Ātman should be our sole guide to action, directing us as it always does in the form of reason and intuition. The spiritual aspirant should remember, as Śrī Rāmakriṣṇa used to say, that the wind of grace (*kripā-vātāsa*) ever blows, we shall have to raise only the mast and shroud of the self-conviction. We should depend all the time upon our own ability, because we ourselves are the architect of our destiny. It is our actions that mould our habit and determine our character. No external power or supernatural agency will help us in our struggle for spiritual realization.

The central point to be emphasized is that there

must be a profound harmony between our thinking and doing (*mana o mukha*). 'What we believe', says Swāmi Abhedānanda, 'we must live to; what we have learnt, we must practise. Religion cannot be in theory, it must be in practice'. Such is also the view of F. H. Bradley, the eminent English philosopher. Often our life exhibits a disparity between our honest thinking and outward reaction. But for a spiritual aspirant such disparity is suicidal. There must be a perfect consistency between our inward thinking and outward activity. In other words, the ideas framed by conscious thinking must not remain merely as the intellectual concepts, but they have their roots stuck deep into the emotional subsoil of our life. Only such an alteration of our psychology is sure enough to guide for parity between thinking and action. If we believe in the cult of *bhakti*, we must maintain it all through our life, or if we are the followers in the path of knowledge (*jñāna*) or discrimination (*vichāra*) we should not fail to maintain that peculiar spirit in every walk of our life. We should concentrate on the highest and then meditate upon it. And such concentration, meditation and other Yogic practices should not be mechanical, but spontaneous, not blind, but purposeful, not

vacant, but meaningful. They should be joyfully undertaken with an eye to the goal.

Meditation is a profound penetration into the inner core of the ultimate reality. It is not only the enriching of the surface, but also of the depth. It results in a state of what has been called the 'transcendental consciousness. It is, says Aldous Huxley, 'the direct intuition of, and union with, an ultimate spiritual reality that is perceived as simultaneously beyond the self and in some way within it'.[9] 'Meditation', says Dr. Rādhākrisṇan, 'is the way to self-discovery. By it we turn our mind homeward and establish contact with the creative centre. To know the truth we have to deepen ourselves and not merely widen the surface. Silence and quiet are necessary for the profound alteration of our being,* *'.[10]

All religious and spiritual practices should, therefore, be done in a right way. Sincere longing and striving are necessary. If our pursuit is inspired by mere sense of duty and obligation, and not by love, we will be fettered in turn. Only the acts of love can liberate

9 Vide Huxley: *Ends and Means* (1946), p. 286.
10 Vide Rādhākrisṇan: *An Idealist View of Life* (1937), p, 113.

us and help our spiritual advancement. Right discrimination will mark our every movement and effort. We must shed bias and break off all pretentions that shut us away from truth. Such an integrated living can only transform our deep-rooted ideas and habits and can enable us to rebuild our life on new foundations. We shall have to conquer our habits by counter-habits. We must give a right turn to the course of our life. It is we and none else, who can sublimate our attempts and achievements. The spiritual aspirants should therefore depend upon his inner strength and surrender himself to the divine dictates of his own self. Self is the only healer of our diseases, physical and mental. The Self keeps its eternal vigil as the guiding star in our tempestuous voyage of life. It is the mighty ship that carries us across the ocean of sorrow and suffering and we can thereby reach our ever-effulgent abode of eternal Bliss and Blessedness.

We should perform our actions with a sense of love, not with a sense of duty. The latter keeps us enchained by slavery of obligation, whereas the former elevates our being by breaking the shell of our petty self and vanity. Swāmis Vivekānanda and Abhedānanda also draw distinction between *duty* and *love* almost in the self-same way. Swāmi Vivekā-

nanda says: 'Duty is good to the extent that it checks brutality. * *; but those who want to be Karma-Yogīns, must throw this idea of duty overboard. There is no duty for you and me. Whatever you have to give to the world, do give by all means, but not as a duty'.[11] Further he says: 'Duty is seldom sweet. * * Duty is sweet only through love, and love shines in freedom alone'.[12] Swāmi Abhedānanda also observes that '*duty* puts us in bondage, while *love* brings freedom emancipation to the soul'.[13] So we should do everything without the hope of return. Because he who does not work for work's sake is looser; he who works with the hope of return, is a miser—'*kripaṇā phalahetava*'. Man's craving for the return of fruits simply implies his passion for the satisfaction of his narrow self and not his striving for the achievement of the supreme joy, resulting from the God-realization. So it is not for nothing that religion asks us to give up all petty hopes of return and to be unselfish. When we become unselfish, our mind is purified, and this purification is a necessary

11 Cf. Vivekānanda: *Complete Works* (1931), Vol. 1 p. 102.

12 Ibid., p. 65.

13 Abhedānanda: *Doctrine of Karma*, (1948). p. 118.

precondition for achieving the highest goal of life'—freedom from the fetters of false knowledge or *māyā*. This freedom is the Perfection, which knows no process or progress, no becoming or development and no change of any kind. It is the absolute Rest that shines eternally with its transcendental consciousness and peace. Man's perennial speculation about and quest for his ultimate aim and object in this transient mundane life are fulfilled for ever and ever with the attainment of this Perfection.

Appendix

GOD THE ABSOLUTE OF SPINOZA

There is only one substance according to Spinoza, and that substance is self-complete, self-subsistant, infinite, and all-embracing. 'The concept of God and the concept of Nature are for Spinoza identical with the concept of Substance'. This Substance is the fundamental Reality and the eternal world-ground or God; or as Höffding says: Everything which is predicated of substance must also be predicable of God. The Substance is only real; and there is no negative principle like evil or disharmony in it. It is one and is possessed of infinite attributes, something other than God himself. Besides God no substance can be conceived, 'everything which is, is in God and, without God, can neither exist nor be understood'.

Spinoza's God the Absolute is the primal cause of everything. He says in his *Ethica*: 'Clearly, therefore, God is one, that is, only one substance can be granted in the universe, and that substance is absolutely infinite'.

There are four logical arguments which form Spinoza's ontological proofs for the existence of God. The first is: the conception of God as infinite subs-

tance is clear, and being infinite, God is possessed of an infinite quality, i.e. *existence*. The second is: there is no logical contradiction regarding the possibility of God's existence. So what is possible must exist. Thirdly, we the finite beings are never created by ourselves. There must be some one greater than outside of us as our creator or designer, and He is the infinite being, God. Fourthly, an infinite being will necessarily possess infinite powers and thereby—maintain His own existence. Spinoza says that this world is an infinite gigantic creation, and if it be extended infinitely in time and space, the human conception will not be helpless in finding out God as its only cause. So, well has it been said by Dr. Windleband: 'Spinoza's definition of *substance* or *deity*, as the essence (*essentiâ*) which involves its own existence, is only the condensed expression of the ontological proof for the existence of God'.

Spinoza does not deny the existence of the world-process, as he has enriched his immanent God with the attributes of *thought* and *extension*. Thought is the soul, mind or spirit, and extension is body or matter. These two attributes are utterly distinct and each completely transcends the other. But inspite of the true attributes of the

one and unconditioned Absolute, he clearly subsumes that though God is the indwelling cause of everything and possessed of attributes, yet 'God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal'. 'Body and soul are not two in kind, but constitute one being looked at from two different sides', as has been stated by Prof. Flackenberg. The material and the spiritual are merely the two sides of one and the same necessary world-process. It can be compared to a magnet with its two poles, positive and negative. As positive and negative poles are the two extremes of one and the same magnet, so thought and extension—spirit and matter—are the two modes of one and the same substance, God. There is nothing real which is not both 'extended' and 'ideal'. There is no 'lifeless matter', no 'immaterial spirit'. Matter and spirit assume two different manifestations only for the sake of world-process, otherwise they lose their seperate entities in the one eternal ocean of the Absolute. It may be put in the expressive language of Dr. Schwegler that 'everything individual, as finite merged in the gulf of substance'. But here we should not overlook one of the weighty and ingenious comments of Dr. Hāldār, when he says: 'The theory of Spinoza which reduces thought and extension to parallel attributes

of the one substance does not help us. * * Spinoza's modes of thought are, of course, not such a unity : they are only parallel to the modes of extension. But unless thought is conceived as a unity that trancends this parallelism, knowledge remains unexplained. It is not possible to attribute such a view to Spinoza though perhaps there are some indications of it in his theory'.

In truth, Spinoza's God the Absolute is an independent unity, and He does not care for anything other than Himself. Spinoza himself has defined in his *Ethica* that God is 'that which is in itself and is conceived by itself'.

Again from the transcendental viewpoint the parallel modes of the attributes, *thought* and *extension* may be reconciled without entering into any contradiction with their ground. The Hegelians like Erdmann and others maintain this view. They say that the attributes have no real existence in the Substance, they are assumed only to represent 'the subjective ways of understanding the world of things and minds in relation to God'. But Kuno Fischer maintains a different view. He says that those two attributes, *thought* and *extension* should be considered as two real potencies or supreme powers, as two lines of divine

activities. Prof. Adamson says that this is a realistic expression and it can be understood only in the light of more purely logical conception; otherwise 'consciousness and extension are ways in which the sum of being is apprehended by us; but there is only one sum of being'. Further he says that like the waves of the sea, the modes have no existence in themselves, they are only the manner in which the infinite essence gives expression to itself.

Whatever may be the controversies regarding the parallel attributes of *thought* and *extension* of God, it is true that though Spinoza admits the two attributes of his unconditioned Substance, yet he does not admit their seperate entities or existence apart from his Essence, the Ground. He rather treats them, as Prof. Caird says, as negative and illusory in themselves, but finds them in God a ground of reality. Spinoza's God is absolutely self-dependent and unique. Being perfect and all-inclusive, there is nothing to be desired outside of God. He is the cause of all, but uncaused Himself, and everything other than God is illusion and error. Or it may be said, as Prof. Norman Smith nicely puts it, that 'finite existences are illusions of the imagination that vanish when their essence is realized to be continuous with, and indivisible from,

the one reality'. Therefore God the Absolute, according to Spinoza, is the Whole, and though He apprehends the capability of division, yet is absolutely indivisible, He is, in truth, simple, indeterminate, and concrete, There is no limitation or finiteness in the Whole. He is one and identical in His essence and existence. All limitations die out or cease to exist in the undivided unity of God the Absolute.

The manifold appearance is the outcome of creation or emanation. But this creation or emanation does not come out from God, and it still remains in God. The manifold world is created out of finite things or *modi*, and 'God is their indwelling cause, not transcendent creator'. The God of Spinoza is really the free cause. 'There is no different law by which God acts, but He Himself is a law'.[1] The ground and the consequence—the freedom and the inner necessity—are the same and identical with the Whole

1. Prof. A. E. Taylor urges: 'My objection to Spinoza's formula would be based not on what it asserts but on what it denies. It asserts, truly as it seems to me that God acts 'by the law of his own nature', but falsely sets such action in God in opposition to 'free action', as though the complete identity of *voluntas* and *natura* were not itself the very ideal of perfect freedom'.

of Spinoza, 'The relation of cause and effect, he (Spinoza) in the end shows, is not only identical with that of ground and consequence, but also with that of substance and quality'. This whole of the eternal one is the highest knowledge, and from the realization of this knowledge there arise the supreme joy and happiness within us.

But the realization or the method of arriving at the union of man with the order of things, or with God is purely an intellectual process. It is called 'intuition', according to Spinoza. This intuition is not the 'intuition' or 'appreciation' of Kant, as intuition for Kant, is nothing but the representation of appearance, and is the form or *â priori* condition of time, and so it is phenomenal. The intuition or appreciation of Kant is also a power or faculty of the mind which can be taken to be identical with understanding or empirical self-identity. But Spinoza's intuition transcends the intuition of Kant, and even the '*conscientia*' of Descartes and the temporal '*I-consciausness*' of Leibnitz. Spinoza's intuition can be said to be the God-intuition, which involves a speculative or intellectual process or vision and yet forms the fountain of sublime bliss and divine unity with God.[2] God of Spinoza is also different from the

2. Prof. Seth also admits: 'For Spinoza, with all

Thing-in-Itself of Kant, because the Thing-in-Itself of Kant remains beyond the reach of human intellect and appreciation, whereas the all-containing God of Spinoza can be intuited and known by the intellect, and can be appreciated in the Divine communion.

The divine flash of God-intuition, according to Spinoza, is other-worldly and sublime. It lies along the path of mysticism. The union with God, according to Spinoza, says Dr. Windleband, is like the 'theory of *cognition*, with its three stages, which sets *intuition*, as the immediate apprehension of the eternal logical resulting of all things from God, as knowledge *sub specie oeternitatis*, above perception and the activity of the intellect'. Dr. N. K. Brahma also says rightly: "Intuition is 'understanding at a glance and not by process', Spinoza says. It gives us knowledge of the whole, and it involves a simultaneous and synthetic presentation of the eternal order of things, as distinct from the successive and analytical presentation

---

his intellectualism, the moral and practical interest may be said to be supreme, since the great service which the intellectual vision of all things, in the light of their divine unity and necessity, renders to man is to free him from 'the bondage of the passions'; for Spinoza. as for Socrates, virtue is knowledge'.

of the intellect. * * It springs from knowledge of the ultimate reality in its aspect of totality and eternity. From this standpoint Intuition seems to be an extension and consummation of reason, and appears to be more intimate with reason than with sense".[3] 'The more we understand', says Höffding, 'that we ourselves and our conditions are determined by the infinite nature, by God Himself, who moves in us, as well as in all things acting upon us, the more we regard ourselves not as a single, isolated, impotent being, but as included in God and identical with Him. We feel pleasure in this thought, since it is the fruit of the highest activity of our mind, and pleasure, too, at the thought of the Being who is the cause of the joy with which knowledge fills us : Thus arises an intellectual love of God (*amor intellectualis dei*), which fills us with the highest peace. * * Through that intellectual love of God, founded in our union with the absolute Being, our true nature is expressed; * * * we are immortal'.[4]

Some are of opinion that the intellectual love of

---

3. Vide Dr. Brama: *Philosophy of Hindu Sādhanā*, (1932), p. 151.

4. Vide *A History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. I, (1935), pp. 326-327.

God, as maintained by Spinoza, is an unity of thought and emotion. But it seems that they are not correct. Because, according to Spinoza, the intellectual love is never affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain. 'The intellectual love of the mind towards God', says Prof. Russell, 'is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself'. In truth, Spinoza's love of God is always accompanied by wisdom or consciousness and blessedness. But it involves a *process*, and from the viewpoint of the non-dualistic Vedānta, it is not the transempirical transcendental Love, but it can be known as the hightest kind of disinterested love that makes a close tie with God the Absolute.

Prof. Alexander deals with this problem in his *Space Time and Deity* and says: 'Even the intellectual love of God which in Spinoza's system has the force of religion can do so, not as a mere passion for truth in its fullest form, but because it presupposes a religious passion'.[5] Elesewhere he again says: 'Spinoza's intellectual love of God is part of the infinite love with which God loves himself and asks nothing for itself'.[6]

---

5. *Space Time and Deity* (1934), Vide Vol. II, p. 342.
6. Ibid, p. 392.

It has already been said that Spinoza maintains that the things of the phenomenal world are not created or emanated and that they do not come out from God, but they eternally exist in God. In other words, it can be said that Spinoza's God the Absolute creates the world, which means God's own nature impels Him to create for inner necessitation. God is not bound by any law or obligation of will or necessity, but He Himself is the law or the divine Will and shines within Himself as an undivided One and unique reality. In this respect Spinoza's God the Absolute differs from the Absolute of Descartes and that of Bruno also. Because, though Descartes tries to equate his Absolute with the status of God, yet he diviates from the true conception of that equation and thus falls into the pit of duality. Bruno also attempts to equalize the act of creation with the Creator, but he too fails to make the former to be merged into the womb of the later. But Spinoza believes that creation and the creator are one and the same, resulting his speculative or philosophical thought into the doctrine of pantheism.

But it should be remembered that this pantheism of Spinoza is quite different from the socalled patheistic doctrine of the non-dualistic Vedānta. Because

Spinoza makes his God the Absolute always immanent, whereas the non-dualistic Vedānta makes the Brahman absolutely raised from the limitation of immanency, and the limiting adjuncts of space, time and causation. The Brahman of the non-dualistic Vedānta does not involve any duality of one and many, creator and creation, spirit and matter. It is unparalleled, unique and undivided one. But Spinoza's God the Absolute appears as indeterminate and universal, and yet it has an affection towards the categories of the particular and the determinateness. So, Spinoza's Absolute *assumes* the status of the One without the many, but at the same time bears in itself an inner duality of or a mysterious relation between the created and the creator. Again we have seen that Spinoza's intellectual love of God involves the process or medium as an action, whereas the transcendental knowledge of the Brahman, according to the non-dualistic Vedānta, does neither involve any process, nor any action, because it is self-subsisting and self-revealing in itself.

Dr. M. N. Sircar also raises the question when he compares the Absolute of Spinoza and that of the non-dualistic Vedānta. He says: 'Spinoza has two conceptions of Substance, as (1) transcending all attributes, and (2) the centre of infinite attributes.

It is no doubt difficult for Spinoza to explain the logic of connexion between these two conceptions'.[7] It is true, says Dr. Sircar that '*Natura Naturans* and *Natura Naturata* represent the same Being from two standpoints, but we do not get in Spinoza's philosophy how these two aspects of Substance are reconciled, and can be retained as equally plausible conceptions regarding it'.[8] But Vedānta philosophy has discovered this clue of uniting these two modes of the Substance and says that there exists only one thing real and others being reflections, are unreal. The modes are not the innate qualities of the Substance. rather they are the limitations or limiting adjuncts which make the Substance different from the modes or the world. The modes are the *appearance* that changes, but the Substance is changeless amidst all the changes of the phenomena. One who realizes the Substance or God the Absolute as the only real, attains perfection and that means the perfected soul living within the world of becoming remains as if inactive and becomes the fountain-head of living force and inspiration to them who remain around him and follow him.

---

7. Cf. Dr. Sircar: *The System of Vedāntic Thought and Culture* (1925), p. 44.

8. Ibid., p. 44,

[illegible] Spinoza to explain the
[illegible] between these two conceptions.
[illegible] that Natura naturans
and [illegible] represent the same Being
[illegible] but we do not get in
[illegible] how these two aspects of
[illegible] can be regarded as
[illegible] think it. But
[illegible] this clue
[illegible] and
[illegible] other
[illegible] The [illegible] not
[illegible] rather they
[illegible] which make
[illegible] the world
[illegible] but the
[illegible] of the
[illegible] Substance or God
[illegible] conception and
[illegible] within the real
[illegible] the
[illegible] manifests to
[illegible] Him.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Abbéde Saint Pierre: *Observations on the Continuous Progress of Universal Reason* (1737).
2. Abhedānanda, Swāmi:
   (a) *Attitude of Vedānta towards Religion* (1947).
   (b) *Doctrine of Karma* (1947).
   (c) *Life Beyond Death* (1948).
   (d) *Our Relation to the Absolute* (1946).
   (e) *Path of Realization* (1946).
   (f) *Reincarnation* (1951).
   (g) *Spiritual Unfoldment* (1946).
   (h) *True Psychology* (1954).
3. Adhvarindra, Dharmarāja: *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* (edited and translated by S. S. Suryanārāyaṇa Śāstrī, published by the Adyar Library, Madras, 1942).
   (b) Do, translated and annotated by Swāmi Mādhavānanda (published by the Rāmakrishna Mission Sāradā pīṭha, Belur, 1953).
4. *Advaitasiddhi*: (with Siddhi-Brahmānandi-Viṭṭhaleśiya), edited by Ananta Krisṇa Śāstrī (Bombay, 1917).
5. Alexander, Prof. S.: *Space Time and Deity*, Vols. I & II (1934).
6. Alexander, Hartley B: *Religion and Progress* (The Belief in God and Immortality as Factors

in Race Progress) in 'The Hibbert Journal', Vol. IX, 1910-11

7. Aurobindo, Śrī:
   (a) *The Life Divine*, Vols. I & II (1943).
   (b) *The Yogic Sādhanā.*
8. Baruā, Dr. B.M: *Philosophy of Progress* (1945).
9. Beal: *Results of an Examination of Chinese Buddhist Books in the Library of the India Office* in 'International Congress of Orientalists', edited by Robert K. Donala.
10. Beer, Prof. M: *The Life and Teaching of Kārl Mārx* (1929).
11. Bergson:
    (a) *Creative Evolution.*
    (b) *Introduction to Metaphysics.*
12. Bernard Shaw: *Back to Methuselah.*
13. Bhāndarkār, Dr: *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems* (1928).
14. Bhattāchāryay, H. M: *Studies in Philosophy* (1933).
15. Bosanquet, Bernard:
    (a) *The Value and Destiny of the Individual* (1919).
    (b) *The Principle of Individuality and Value* (1912).
16. Bradley, F. H:
    (a) *Appearance and Reality* (1930).
    (b) *Essays on Truth and Reality* (1914).

17. Brahma, Dr. N. K:

(a) *The Philosophy of Hindu Sādhanā* (1932).

(b) *Vedāntic Transcendance* (Presidential Address, in 'Indian Philosophical Congress', Aligarh, 1941).

(c) *The Vedāntic Conception of Mukti* (in the Second Indian Philosophical Congress, Banaras).

18. *Brahmasūtra-Śaṅkara-Bhāsyam* with 'Bhāmatī-Kalpataru-Parimal', edited by Mahā-M Ananta Kriṣṇa Śāstrī (second edition), Bombay, 1938.

19. Bury, J. B: *The Idea of Progress* (1924).

20. Caird, Edward:

(a) *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers* (1923).

(b) *Philosophy of Religion* (1936).

21. Chatterjee, Heramba: *Vijñānavāda of Buddhism* in the 'Prabuddha Bhārata,' May, 1957.

22. Collingwood, R. G. :

(a) *The Idea of History* (Oxford, 1946).

(b) *The Idea of Nature* (1945).

23. *Contemporary American Philosophy* (edited by George P. Adams and Wm. P. Montague), Vols. I & II (1930)

24. *Contemporary British Philosophy* (edited by Dr. J. H. Muirhead), Vols. I & II (1925).

25. *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* (edited by S. Rādhākriṣṇan and J. H. Muirhead (1936).

26. Creighton, J. E: *An Introductory Logic* (1946).

27. Croce, Benedetto :

    (a) *My Philosophy* (1951)

    (b) *History as the Story of Liberty* (Meridian Books, New York, 1955).

28. Dāsgupta, Dr. S. N. :

    (a) *Indian Idealism* (Cambridge, 1933).

    (b) *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (1951), Vol. II (1932), Vol. III (1940), Vol. IV (1949), Vol. V (1955).

29. Dawson, Christopher: *Progress and Religion: an Historical Inquiry* (1935).

30. Dean Inge: *The Idea of Progress* (1920).

31. De, Dr. S. K. : *Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal* (1942).

32. Dewey, John, : *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, 1922).

33. *Dr. Urquhart Commemoration Volume* (1937).

34. Dreamer, Prof., : *Religion and Medicine* (1908).

35. Dutt, Dr. N. : *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and Its Relation to Hīnayāna* (1930).

36. *The Problem of Progress* in the 'Philosophical Review', Vol. XXXII, No. 2 (1923).

37. Falckenberg, Richard: *History of Modern Philosophy* (translated by A. C. Armstrong, New York).

38. Flint, Robert: *History of the Philosophy of History* (1894).

39. Flügel, J. C.: *Hundred Years of Psychology* (1948).

40. Fordham, Frieda: *An Introduction to Jung's Psychology* (Pelican Book, 1956).

41. Freud, Sigmond: *The Ego and the Id* (1947).

42. Galloway, G: *The Philosophy of Religion* (1945).

43. Hāldār, Dr. Hirālāl:
    (a) *Neo-Hegelianism* (1927).
    (b) *Essays in Philosophy* (Calcutta University, 1920).

44. Har Dayāl, Dr: *The Bodhisattva Doctrine or Buddhist Sanskrit Literature* (1932).

45. Hegel, G.W.F: *The Phenomenology of Mind* (translated by J. B. Baillie, London, 1910).

46. Hicks, Prof. G. Dawes: *The Philosophical Bases of Theism.*

47. Hobhouse, L. T.:
    (a) *Development and Purpose* (1930)
    (b) *Morals in Evolution* (1906).

48. Hocking: *Types of Philosophy.*

49. Hoernle', R. F. A.: *Studies in Philosophy* (1952).

50. Höffding, Herald:
    (a) *Modern Philosophers* (1915).
    (b) *A History of Modern Philosophy*, Vols. I & II (1935).
    (c) *Philosophy of Religion* (1931).

51. Huxley, Aldous:
    (a) *Ends and Means* (1946).
    (b) *The Perinneal Philosophy* (1946).

52. *The Iśa Upaniṣad* (*Iśādi Daśopaniṣad* with *Śaṅkara-Bhāṣyam*, published by the Vāṇi-Vilāsa-Sanskrit-Pustakālaya, Banaras).
53. Jaeger, Werner: *Aristotle* (1934), translated by Richard Robinson.
54. Jastrow. Prof.: *The Subconsciousness* (1596).
55. Jhān, MM. Gangānāth: *The Advaitasiddi* (translated in Eng.).
56. Joad, C.E.M.:
    (a) *Guide to Philosophy* (1936).
    (b) *The Philosophy of Federal Union.*
    (c) *Guide to Modern Thought.*
57. Joachim, Harold H:
    (a) *The Nature of Truth* (1906),
    (b) *Logical Studies* (1948).
58. Jung, Prof. C. G.:
    (a) *Psychology of the Unconscious.*
    (b) *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (1947).
    (c) *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* (1917).
59. Kant, Immanual: *Critique of Pure Reason* (translated by Max Müller, New York, (1902).
60. Kārl Mārx: *Selected Works* (Moscow, 1946).
61. *The Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (viz. *Iśādi Daśopaniṣad*, Banaras).
62. Lāski, H. L.: *Communism* (The Home University Library Series, 1924).
63. Lenin, V. I.: *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (Moscow, 1947).

64. Loomba, Prof. R. M.: *Bradley and Bergson* (1937).

65. *Mādhyamika-vritti* with the Commentary of Chandrakīrti (published by Sarat Chandra Das).

66. Maitra, Dr. Susil Kumar: *Fundamental Questions of Indian Metaphysics and Logic* (1956).

67. McDougall, William:

    (a) *An Outline of Abnormal Psychology* (1948)

    (b) *An Outline of Psychology* (1936).

68. Marshall: *Consciousness* (1909).

69. Montgomery, W.: *Protestantism and Progress* (1912).

70. Mookherjee, Dr. S. K:

    (a) *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux* (1935).

    (b) Vide *The Concept of Ajñāna in Vedānta Philosophy* (in '*Indian Culture*', Vol. III, July, 1936).

71. Morley, John: *Some Thoughts on Progress* in 'Educational Review', Vol. XXIV (1905).

72. Muirhead, Prof.: *The Platonic Tradition in the Anglo-Saxon Philosophy* (1931).

73. *The Mundaka-Upaniṣad* (viz. *Iśādi Daśopaniṣad*, Banaras).

74. Murfy, Dr. Gardner: *An Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology* (1949).

75. Myers, F. W. H.: *Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death* (1903).

76. Paton, Prof.: *Kant's Mataphysic of Experience*, Vols. I & II (1936).

77. Pratt, J. B.: *The Religious Consciousness* (1945).

78. *Iśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśinī* (Kāsmere Series of Texts and Studies, No. XXII, 1918).

79. Quick, Oliver: *Creative Evolution and the Individual* in 'Mind', Vol. XXII, No. 80, April, 1913.

80. Rādhākriṣṇan, Dr. S:
   (a) *An Idealist View of Life* (1937).
   (b) *Indian Philosophy*, Vols. I & II (Indian Edition, 1940).
   (c) *Kaliki* (1940)
   (d) *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (1940),
   (e) *Reign* of *Religion in Contemporary Philosophy* (1922),
   (f) *Progress and Spiritual Values* in 'Philosophy', Vol, XII, No, 47, 1937,
   (g) *Religion and Philosophy* in the 'Hibbert Journal,' Vol, XX, 1921-22,

81. Rāju, Prof. P. T.: *Fruedian Topography* in the 'Prabuddha Bhārata', June, 1947,

82. Rand: *Modern Classical Philosophers*,

83. Ray, B.: *Consciousness in Neo-Realism* (1935),

84. Ritter, Constantin: *The Essence of Plato's Philosophy* (translated by Adam Alles, 1932),

85. Russell, Bertrand:

(a) *Mysticism and Logic* (1918),
(b) *History of Western Philosophy* (1946),

86. Śāstrī, Nilkānta and Ramanna: *Historical Method in Relation to Indian History* (Madras, 1956).

87. Schaub, Edward Leroy: *Progressism* (Calcutta University, 1934).

88. Schrader, F. Otto: *Introduction to the Pañcharātra and the Ahirbudhnya-Saṁhitā* (Adyar Library, Madras, 1916).

89. Seal, Prof. B.N.:

(a) *New Essays in Criticism* (1903),
(b) *The Positive Sciences of the Hindus* (1915),

90. Selbie, W. B. : *The Psychology of Religion* (Oxford, 1926),

91. Seth, James: *English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy* (1911),

92. *Sikṣāsamuccaya* of Śāntideva (Bibliotheca Buddhica, edited by Cecil Bendall, St. Petersburg, 1902),

93. Sinclair, May: *A Defence of Idealism* (1917),

94. Siṅgh, Dr. J. N.: *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol I, (1957), Vol, II (1952),

95. Sarkār, Prof, Benoy Kumer:

(a) *Political Philosophers Since* (1905), Vols I & II,
(b) *Villages and Towns as Social Patterns* (1941),

96. Sircar, Dr. M. N.:

(a) *Comparative Studies in Vedāntism* (1927).
(b) *Indian Mysticism* (1945),
(c) *The Yoga o' Kundalinī* in the 'Prabuddha Bhārata', Feb-March, 1913,
(d) *The System of Vedāntic Thought and Culture* (Calcutta University, 1925).

97. Spencer, Herbert: *First Principles*,

98. Stein, Dr, Ludwig: *Philosophical Current of the Presentday*, Vols. I & II.

99. Stirling, James Hutchison: *Text-Book to Kant* (The Critique of Pure Reason, Edinburgh, 1881),

100. Sogen, Yāmākāmi: *Systems of Buddhistic Thought* (Calcutta University, 1912),

101. Suzuki, D. T. *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*,

102. Tāgore, Rabindranāth:

(a) *The Religion cf Man* (1949),
(b) *Sādhanā* (1947),

103. Taylor, Prof. A. E.:

(a) *The Faith of a Moralist* (1931),
(b) *Plato: The Man and His Work* (Meridian Books, 1957).

104. Teggart, Frederick: *Theory of History* (1925).

105. Thera, Ven Vappa Moha: *Satta-visuddhi or the Seven Stages of Purity* in 'Mahabodhi Journal, Vol. 55, Nos. 5-6, May-June, 1947.

106. Todd, A. J: *Theories of Progress* (1918).

107. Toynbee, Arnold: *Study of History* (abridged edition in 2 Vols.).

108. Urban, Wilbur Marshall: *The Intelligible World* (1929).

109. *Vijñaptimatratāsiddhi* edited by Sylvain Lévi (Paris, (1925).

110. *Vivaraṇopanyāsa* (Banaras Sans. Series), edited by Griffith and Thibaut (1901).

111. Vivekānanda, Swāmi:
   (a) *The Science and Philosophy of Religion* (1931).
   (b) *Complete Works* (Eng. Edition).

112. Wallace, William: *Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy* (1931).

113. Way, Lewis: *Alfred Adler: An Introduction to Psychology* (Pelican Books, 1957).

114. Westermarch, Edward: *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* (1912).

115. Whitehead, Prof. A. N:
   (a) *The Concept of Nature* (1930).
   (b) *Religion in the Making* (1930).
   (c) *The Nature of the Physical World* (Everymen's Library Series, 1930).
   (d) *Process and Reality* (1929).

116. Windelband, Dr. W.:

(a) *A History of Philosophy* (1901).

(b) *An Introduction to Philosophy*, (trans. by Joseph McCabe, 1921),

117. Wood, Ledger: *The Analysis of Knowledge* (1940).

118. Woozley, A.D: *Theory of Knowledge* (1949).

119. Worcester: *Religion and Medicine* (1908).

120. Wright, Prof: *A History of Modern Philosophy* (1941).

INDEX

BOOKS ON

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

BY SWAMI ABHEDANANDA

ATTITUDE OF VEDANTA TOWARDS RELIGION

Contents: Vedanta Philosophy—Practical Vedantism—Is Vedanta Pantheistic—Ideal of Vedanta and How to Attain to It—Vedanta in Daily Life—Ethics of Vedanta—True Basis of Morality—Vedanta towards Religion—Religion of Vedanta—Theory and Practice of Vedantic Religion—Evolution and Religion—The Necessity of Religion—Aim of True Religion—Unity in Variety of Religion—Universality of the Vedantic Religion—Ideal of Universal Religion—Steps towards Realization—Realization of the Vedantic Truth.

Demy 8 vo. *208 pages,* *Rs. 6·50*

RELIGION OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Swamiji has given in this book a scientific treatment of religion and philosophy, which delights the mind of the twentieh century. *Rs. 0.75*

SCIENCE OF PSYCHIC PHENOMENA

Contents: The Psychic Phenomena—Prana and the Healing Power—The Magnetic Healing—Science of Mental Healing—Spiritual Healing—Healing by Discarnate Spirit —Science of Perfect Health.

Demy 8 vo. *116 pages,* *Rs. 4·00*

PATH OF REALIZATION

Contents: I. Search after Truth, II. Worship of Truth, III. Faith and Knowledge, IV. Necessity of Symbols, V. Efficacy of Prayer, VI. Ecstasy, VII. Salvation through Love.

Double Crown *192 pages,* *Rs. 4·00*

REINCARNATION

Contents: I. Reincarnation. II. Heredity and Reincarnation, III. Evolution and Reincarnation, IV. Which is Scientific—Resurrection or Reincarnation, V. Theory of Transmigration,

Double Crown, *115 pages,* *Rs. 2·00*

SPIRITUAL UNFOLDMENT

Contents: Self-Control—Concentration and Meditation —Godconsciousness.

Double Crown, *116 pages,* *Rs. 2·00*

IDEAL OF EDUCATION

Contents: Ideal of Education—Practical Education—Women's Education—An Address to Educational Conference in America.

Pocket Size *104 pages,* *Rs. 1·00*

SELF-KNOWLEDGE

Contents: I. Spirit and Matter. II. Knowledge of the Self. III. Prana and the Self. IV. Search after the Self. V. Realization of the Self. VI. Immortality and the Self.

Double Crown *167 pages,* *Rs. 3·00*

DOCTRINE OF KARMA

Contents: I. Law of Causation, II. Law of Action and Reaction. III. Law of Compensation, IV. Law of Retribution, V. Philosophy of Work. Appendices: A. Delusion, B. Mind and Heart.

Double Crown *158 pages,* *Rs. 3·00*

DIVINE HERITAGE OF MAN

Contents: Existence of God—Attributes of God—Has God any Form—Fatherhood and Motherhood of God—Relation of Soul to God—What is an Incarnation of God—Son of God—Divine Principle in Man.

Double Crown *133 pages,* *Rs. 4·00*

HOW TO BE A YOGI

Contents: Introductory—What is Yoga—Hatha Yoga—Raja Yoga—Karma Yoga—Bhakti Yoga—Jnana Yoga—Science of Breathing—Was Christ a Yogi.

Double Crown *208 pages,* *Rs. 4·00*

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Contents: Philosophy and Religion—Vedanta Philosophy—Teachings of Vedanta—Religion of Vedanta Philosophy—Religion of the Hindus—Unity and Harmony—Cosmic Evolution and Its Purpose—Philosophy of Good and Evil—Word and Cross in Ancient India—Who is the Saviour of Souls—God our Eternal Mother—Divine Communion—Way to the Blessed Life—Appendix.

Demy 8 vo. *221 pages,* *Rs. 6·50*

WORD AND CROSS IN ANCIENT INDIA

A short history of the sacred Word and Cross in ancient India. *Rs. 0·37*

INDIA AND HER PEOPLE

Contents: I. The Prevailing Philosophy of today, II. The Religion of India today, III. The Social Status of the Indian people: their system of caste, IV. Political Insttiutions of India, V. Education of India, VI. The Influence of of India on Western Civilization, and the Influence of Western Civilization on India, VII. Woman's Place in Hindu Religion.

Double Crown *321 pages,* *Rs. 6·50*

LIFE BEYOND DEATH

Contents: Modern Science and Higher Spiritualism—Does the the Soul exist after Death—The Scientific View of Death—The Soul after Death—Rebirth of the Soul—The Soul and Its Destiny—Pre-existence and Reincarnation—Pre-existence and Immortality—Science and Immortality—Spiritualism—Spiritualism and Vedanta—Spiritualism and Ancestor-Worship—Spititualistic Mediumship—Automatic Slate-writing—What is there beyond the Grave—Questions and Answers—Appendices—Index.

Demy 8 vo. *322 pages,* *Rs. 6·50*

TRUE PSYCHOLOGY

(OUR RELATION TO THE ABSOLUTE)

Contents: True Psychology—Consciousness—Powers of the Mind—Mind and its Modifications—Power of Concentration—Individuality and Personality—States of Existence—Our Relation to the Absolute—Questions and Answers.

Demy 8 vo. *252 pages,* *Rs. 6·00*

MEMOIRS OF RAMAKRISHNA

(LIFE & TEACHINGS)

His Life Divine—Dialogues of the Master—Personality of the Super-mystic has become living in these sweet incidents —The Life and Teachings of Sri Ramakrishna. Translated into various languages of the world.

Demy 8 *vo.*, *355 pages*, *Rs. 7·50*

MYSTERY OF DEATH

Contents: Preface—Introduction—The Ruler of Death —Death and Immortality—The Abode of Death—The Changeable and the Unchangeable—Knowledge of the Absolute—Ego and the True Self—Ego, Self and Sensation —The Divine Element in Us—The Immortal Self—The Realm of Immortality—Unity in Variety—Body and the Soul—Perfection to the Soul—Oneness amidst the Manifold—World as the result of Vibrations—End of Worldliness means the beginning of Realization—Realization of the Absolute.

Demy. 8 vo. *396 pages.* *Rs. 8·50*

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF PANCHADASI

This book is an attempt to throw light upon the Vivarana School of philosophy.

Rs. 1·00

GREAT SAVIOURS OF THE WORLD

Masterly exposition on the lives of Sri Krishna—Zoroaster —Lao-Tze—Buddha—Christ—Mohammed—Ramakrishna —with historical records and their philosophical and spiritual Teachings.


Demy 8 vo., *30+339 pages*, *Rs. 8·00*

RAMAKRISHNA VEDANTA MATH

PUBLICATION DEPARTMENT

19B, Raja Rajkrishna Street, Calcutta-6

CALCUTTA : INDIA.



SWAMI PRAJNANANANDA is a Sannyasin desciple of the Great Swami Abhedananda, a direct desciple of Ramakrishna Paramahansa. Although a student of philosophy, his researchical works on Music have been widely appreciated. His books on Music : (a) *Sangita O Samskriti* (A History of Indian Music), Vols. I & II, (b) *Raga O Rupa*, Vols. I & II are original contributions in the domain of Indian Music. He has edited a very valuable Manuscript on Music : *Sangitasara-samgraha* by Ghanashyama-Narahari hitherto unpublished. His other works are : *Sangite Rabindranath, Bangala-Dhrupada-mala, Sri Durga, Abhedananda-Darshana, etc.*

Author's Forthcoming Book on Music

A STUDY IN INDIAN MUSIC

FOREWORD BY DR. S. RADHAKRISHNAN

Contents :

I. Birth of Indian Music and its Development.
II. Music in the Vedic Age.
III. A Peep into the Music of Hindu and Buddhist India.
IV. Some Musical Features in *Naradi-Shiksa* and *Natyasastra*.
V. Musical Features in the Mytho-Historical *Puranas*.
VI. Mixture of Aryan and Non-Aryan Elements.
VII. Indian Music crossed the Borders of India.
VIII. A Historical Outlook in Musical Study.
IX. The Concept of Raga.
X. Theory of Music.
XI Music has Its Change.
XII. Iconography of Indian Music.
XIII. Psychology of Music.
XIV. Philosophy of Music : (a) Philosophical Background of Indian Music, (b) Siva-Sakti Principles in Indian Music.
XV. The Aim and Ideal of Music.

Appendix :

I. Antara and Evolution of the Music-parts, II. Veena, the most Ancient Musical Instrument of India, III. Ancient Tuning-method of India, IV. Music and Musical Literature of Bengal, V. Detailed Bibliography, Index and Contents.

In Preparation :

I. A Comprehensive History of Indian Music (Vedic and Classical Ages), Vol. I (in English).
II. Knowledge, Its Theory and Function (A Study in Comparative Epistemology).